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ABSTRACT

A new ant colony optimizer, the “tabu ant colony optimizer” (TabuACO) is
introduced, tested, and applied to a contemporary problem. The TabuACO uses both
attractive and repulsive pheromones to speed convergence to a solution. The dual
pheromone TabuACO is benchmarked against several other solvers using the traveling
salesman problem (TSP), the quadratic assignment problem (QAP), and the Steiner tree
problem. In tree-shaped puzzles, the dual pheromone TabuACO was able to demonstrate
a significant improvement in performance over a conventional ACO. As the amount of
connectedness in the network increased, the dual pheromone TabuACO offered less
improvement in performance over the conventional ACO until it was applied to fullyinterconnected mesh-shaped puzzles, where it offered no improvement.
The TabuACO is then applied to implement a transactive energy market and
tested with published circuit models from IEEE and EPRI. In the IEEE feeder model, the
application was able to limit the sale of power through an overloaded transformer and
compensate by bringing downstream power online to relieve it. In the EPRI feeder
model, rapid voltage changes due to clouds passing over PV arrays caused the PV
contribution to outstrip the ability of the substation to compensate. The TabuACO
application was able to find a manageable limit to the photovoltaic energy that could be
contributed on a cloudy day.
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NOMENCLATURE

Symbol

Description

𝛒

pheromone deposition or evaporation factor

µ

mean

σ

standard deviation

𝝉

pheromone concentration

ACO

“ant colony optimization” or “ant colony optimizer”

AMI

advanced metering infrastructure

CDF

cumulative distribution function

DER

distributed energy resource

DG

distributed generation

G&T

generation and transmission

ISO

independent system operator

PDF

probability density function

PV

photovoltaic

RTO

regional transmission organization

QAP

quadradic assignment problem

TE

transactive energy

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISSERTATION
This dissertation will describe an area of research in computational intelligence in
the form of advancements in ant colony optimization. The ant colony optimizer (ACO) is
identified in Section 1.2. The subject of this research is called the “tabu ant colony
optimizer” (TabuACO). The TabuACO is identified in Section 1.3. A literature review in
Section 2 compares the TabuACO to other research efforts. Section 3 describes the
several different versions of the TabuACO that have been tested against various solvers
using several different benchmark problems. After demonstrating the performance and
scalability of the optimizer, this dissertation proceeds to apply the algorithm to a practical
problem in Section 4. The optimizer is applied to the energy market. An introduction to
the smart grid is provided, along with a background of the operation of the energy
market. Transactive energy is explained in Section 4.4. The TabuACO is applied to the
transactive energy market in Section 4.7-4.8. Section 5 offers conclusions. Section 6
offers ideas for future work.
1.2. BACKGROUND
Ants solve problems in nature, and their technique serves as a computational
paradigm.
1.2.1. Ants in Nature. Ants communicate in nature by laying down pheromones
along the trails they travel [1]. The pheromone is an odorless chemical that serves to
attract other ants and evaporates over time.
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It is believed that at least one species of ants is able to lay a repulsive pheromone
to discourage exploration of known unproductive trails [2].
Ants have a scent which is inherited from the queen ant. If an ant encounters a
pheromone trail from another nest, it will usually not mistake it for its own. This allows
an ant to ignore seemingly “irrelevant” trails if it so chooses. Ants compete with other
species for the available food sources, and must contend with other factors such as
predators, unfavorable weather conditions, and efficient use of resources over time. Ants
do not have a centralized “leader” but instead work instinctively as agents on behalf of
the interests of the collective whole. It could be argued however that different ant species
employ different methods to reach their objectives.
While foraging for food ants also detect pheromones in the environment. These
pheromones are placed by other ants (of the same species) to communicate a particular
meaning. Pheromones evaporate over time, butwhile they are still present, they can serve
to mark the trail to an important food source. The pheromone, even in small quantities,
can influence foraging ants to walk to the find. As they return to the nest with their
payload, the successful ants will lay down pheromone to mark the trail. The new
pheromone deposit will supplement the evaporating pheromone. Thus, between the
repeated deposits and ongoing evaporation, trails are created. These trails enable ants to
walk in groups along lines between the nest and the food source.
Ants that find alternative routes also lay pheromone, but the faster route allows
more trips and more ants to lay more layers of pheromone than the longer route. This
buildup of pheromone allows the optimal solution to emerge. This solution is stored in,
and described by, the environment.

3
1.2.1.1. Ants have various diets and unique pheromones. Ants lack the
equipment necessary to chew and digest food. Instead, they squeeze the juices from
various foodstuffs. Different species of ants favor different sources of food. Some species
prefer sweets, others prefer protein, and others will grow their own fungus. The harvester
ants (for example Pogonomyrmex rastratus and P. pronotalis) favor seeds in their diet.
Research shows that more than 87% of the items carried to the nests are seeds, and 93%
of the seeds are grass seeds [3]. Argentine ants on the other hand prefer to feed on other
insects (when available), and then when the supply of insects is depleted, changeover to
feed on sweet plant sap [4]. The leaf cutting ant (atta cephalotes) cuts leaves to grow
fungus for larvae while adults imbibe liquid directly from the crushed leaf tissue [5].
1.2.1.2. Some species collaborate between nests. A pheromone trail left by a
foraging ant from one nest could be worthless to ants from another nest. Yet examples
have been found of collaboration among nests on those occasions in which a super colony
of the same species is formed over a vast area [4] [6].
1.2.1.3. At least one species of ant can deposit repulsive pheromones. It would
be “expensive” for an ant to mark all of the places that are determined to be unproductive
while foraging. However, it is not necessary to mark every unproductive location, nor is
it necessary to mark the length of every trail to empty locations. It would be sufficient to
merely mark the start of unproductive trails. This is precisely where the Pharaoh ant
(monomorium pharaonis) lays a repulsive pheromone to mark unrewarding trails [2].
1.2.2. The Ant Colony Optimizer. The ant colony optimizer (ACO) is a
programming technique which solves problems in a manner inspired by nature.
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The ACO is recognized as one of the five nature-inspired computational
intelligence (CI) paradigms:
•

Artificial Neural Networks

•

Fuzzy Systems

•

Evolutionary Computation

•

Genetic Algorithms

•

Swarm Intelligence
Ant colony optimization was developed by Dorigo [7]. Dorigo’s original work

explored the use of an ACO to develop a closed Hamiltonian graph to solve a traveling
salesman problem.

ACOs which develop Hamiltonian graphs generally begin by

sprinkling ants throughout the search space. The ants lay pheromone in relation to the
quality of a find. With successive deposits and evaporations, an optimal solution emerges
in the pheromone pattern.
ACOs can also be applied to develop a minimum spanning tree within graphs or
trees. ACOs that develop spanning trees generally allow ants to originate from a nest,
forage for a “prize,” and lay attractive pheromone back to the nest in proportion to the
quality of the find. Ants that forage in this way must generally remember the path home.
The formation of loops is a possibility when random foraging is allowed. The algorithm
must (typically) trim any loops after foraging has detected a food source and prior to
pheromone application.
In many cases, the ACO is a particularly good fit in situations where the problem
maps nicely to a graph (with nodes and edges). When a network exists that must be
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optimized according to some cost function the ACO is usually appropriate. The ACO
algorithm can be very simple yet effective [8].
1.3. THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER
A generalized description of the TabuACO is provided in this section.
Customizations of the algorithm follow in subsequent sections, with a particular
application of the algorithm at the end.
1.3.1. Dual Pheromones. The tabu ant colony optimizer (TabuACO) is different
than a conventional ACO in that it employs two distinct pheromones to speed
convergence to a solution. Each pheromone serves a distinct purpose. Much like a
conventional ACO, an attractive pheromone is laid in response to a positive find. Unlike
a conventional ACO, a repulsive pheromone is laid in response to a negative find. In this
sense, the algorithm combines the benefits of a tabu-search algorithm with the benefits of
an ACO. The precise rules for deposition, evaporation, and path selection vary by
application and are described in Section 3.
1.3.2. Multinest. Some problems lend themselves to a situation in which
multiple nests can be activated to simultaneously compete and/or collaborate in the
solution of the problem. When applied this way, each ant must know its nest of origin,
the travel rules and constraints which govern the implementation of the problem (such as
what constitutes a “find,” any cost to travel, or authorization to spend funds), and how to
compute the score (the objective function). For a multinest ACO to work, the software
must issue at least one ant from each of the nests and allow the ants to collaborate.
Quite often the purpose of multinest activity is to leverage a parallel processing
effort to speedily solve a single problem [9]. However, it is possible that each nest could
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work to satisfy its own objectives. It is possible for each nest to have its own success
criteria. The application of the TabuACO for the energy market was coded to support
multinest operation. However, a single processor1 was used as the computing resource in
the tests which follow.
1.3.3. Graph Navigation. The TabuACO algorithm requires a graph with
reference directions in order for ants to navigate and properly interpret the sign of the
pheromone. Figure 1.1 provides an example. The black arrows represent edges with a
reference direction. They should not be interpreted as unidirectional edges. The blue
arrows represent attractive pheromone. The red arrows represent repulsive pheromone.

NEST
Legend
Repulsive Pheromone
Attractive Pheromone
Node or Edge

FOOD
Figure 1.1. Bidirectional Graph with Overlaid Directions, Fully Painted with Pheromones

The proposed ant-inspired method uses a directed graph in order to navigate. This
allows a directional pheromone to be laid down by ants. To achieve directionality, and

1

The processor was usually a multi-core processor, but this property was not exploited. Section

6.1.3 describes the use of parallel processing as a future work.
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allow ants to roam freely, a pheromone value between [-1, +1) is used instead of the
conventional [0, 1) range. A positive value influences the ant to go in the direction of the
arrowhead.2 A negative value influences the ant to go in the direction of the tail.1 A
pheromone value of zero implies no influence to the stochastic path selection process.1
Some optimization problems impose additional constraints beyond a simple travel
cost or prize. This additional data can be modeled in the graph and observed by the
foraging ant. Nodes and edges can be modeled to have a location, and thus edges can
have lengths.
Nodes and edges can have a transit cost represented in the model under multiple
costing schemes. There can be a financial cost as well as an efficiency or loss of service
cost. A network and its model can have capacity constraints. If a node or edge cannot
carry the full payload the ant is authorized to bring back to the nest, then the ant must
abide by this restriction and lessen her ambitions to be no more than what the “weakest
link” can support along the path she chooses. If the ant should wander back across this
weak link in the path, then this constraint imposed by the solution can be lifted (by
popping it from a stack) and the new minimum link capacity serve as the payload
constraint.
To keep the solution viable from a traffic perspective, additional capacity
constraints can be tracked and enforced by the ants as they forage. When an ant traverses
an edge, the records pertaining to that assed must first be checked to see if there is
sufficient uncommitted capacity to carry the payload the ant has in mind. If the network
has made prior commitments to other ants, the ant may have to reduce its expectations
2

This is the case for both attractive and repulsive pheromones.
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regarding the payload that can be carried over a given link. (The network itself may have
capacity limits at certain nodes or edges.) The ant will eventually return in the opposite
direction across the link. If the ant returns across the edge in the reverse direction empty
handed, the temporary reservation originally placed in the prior crossing is discarded.
When the ant returns across the edge with food, the temporary reservation is adjusted to
the actual payload size the ant is carrying.
Multiple evaluations may occur over a series of time intervals. Each time period
may present slightly different circumstances, but within the same network. Pheromone
information, developed over the course of one interval, serves as the initial conditions for
the successive interval. Ants must deliver food at a certain rate in order to satisfy the
requirements of the nest. If food is removed from a source, it is gone for the duration of
the evaluation interval, but more food may appear at the same location in a future
interval.
To keep the solution viable from the ant’s perspective, constraints are imposed by
the ant as she travels. Ants start from their nest and memorize the path home by utilizing
a stacking mechanism. They are given the authority to acquire a certain amount of food,
and expend a limited amount of resources in doing so. The ant may have to settle for a
smaller payload than expected for a variety of reasons:
•

The food source might have less food than the ant’s maximum (or authorized)
payload.

•

The network may impose constraints on the size of the payload.

•

A cost may be associated with the ant’s travel and thus reduce the ant’s
purchasing capacity upon arrival at the food source.
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Travel costs might correspond to the fuel expended by the ant in delivering the
payload, or to the cost incurred by the ant for using the network. A nonzero travel cost
encourages ants to forage near home and not wander infinitely far away.
These constraints correspond to real-world constraints in the ecosystem. The ants
themselves may have payload capacity constraints. Some species are larger than others
and can simply carry heavier payloads. An ant may have stamina limitations in her ability
to reach a distant food source and carry food back to the nest.
Section 4.8 explores the idea of the ant identifying the constraints within the
model and pursuing a solution that abides by those constraints. A common model of the
electrical grid is studied and the capacity constraints of the distribution asset observed.
Yet, despite this capability, it may not be enough. Many complex phenomena can occur
which might outstrip a simple model’s ability to account for all of the possible capacity
constraints. For example, on the electrical grid a shortage of reactive power can often be
remedied by closing a switch to engage a capacitor bank. Tap changers can make voltage
corrections in response to conditions on the grid. Distributed generation will often cause
voltage to rise locally. To model all of these phenomena in addition to the basic power
flow, the complexity of the software must grow considerably. At some point it implies
that the software architecture should change so that engineering analysis is performed
separately from the routing optimization. This is precisely what occurs in section 4.9. A
more advanced analysis of a much larger network occurs. An external engineering
analysis package is utilized to validate proposed routing solutions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the state of the art is an important aspect of any research. A proper
literature review is necessary to ensure that the research does indeed further man’s
knowledge.
2.1. ACO LITERATURE REVIEW
There are have been numerous developments in the field of Ant Colonly
Optimization since its inception.
2.1.1. ACO Origins. Ant colony optimization was first suggested as a
metaheuristic in a journal article by Dorigo in 1991, and later in his PhD thesis in 1992
[7]. Dorigo studied the work of entomologists Pierre-Paul Grassé, Goss, and others [1].
Goss et. al. developed an equation (1) based on observations of the Argentine ant for the
probability that an ant would choose a path given that she had two choices, and that
pheromones of some concentration were present on both paths.

𝑝1 = (𝑚

(𝑚1 +𝑘)ℎ

ℎ
ℎ
1 +𝑘) +(𝑚2 +𝑘)

.

(1)

Where m1 and m2 are moments in time since the ant has visited path 1 or path 2
respectively, and h and k are constants with h≈2 and k≈20.
Dorgio’s first ACO algorithm used a path selection formula that computed the
probability of selection based on pheromones that are elevated in an exponential manner
as described in (2).
𝑘
𝜏𝑖𝑗 ← (1 − 𝜌) ∙ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝑚
𝑘=1 Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗

(2)
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Where τij is the pheromone along an edge joining cities i and j, ρ is the
𝑘
evaporation rate, m is the number of ants, and 𝛥𝜏𝑖𝑗
is the quantity of pheromone laid on

edge ij by ant k.
Since Dorgio’s original work, numerous improvements have been made [9] –
many of them by Dorgio. He developed the Simple Ant Colony Optimizer, and the Ant
Method. Other improvements by other researchers have continued to this day.
2.1.2. Repulsive Pheromone Research (a.k.a. “Negative,” “Anti-Pheromone,”
etc.). In 1996, Schoonderwoerd et. al. were pioneers in suggesting that an antipheromone could be useful in speeding convergence [10].
In 1999, Roux, Fonlupt, Robilliard, and Talbi reported on a methodology they
called the ANTabu [11].

Their approach combines a conventional ACO with a

conventional Tabu Search. These algorithms are applied repeatedly in sequence to
develop an optimal solution. The ACO is used to develop an initial schedule which is
then optimized by the Fast Tabu.
In 2002, Montgomery and Randall wrote about three different ACOs that employ
an “anti-pheromone” to speed convergence to a solution [12]. Montgomery and Randall
described their solvers as variants of an Ant Colony System (ACS).
•

Their Subtractive Anti-Pheromone algorithm is like the ACS and uses a single
pheromone, but it has an additional step during the pheromone evaporation
process to favor the evaporation of paths that are shown to be poor performers.

•

Their Preferential Anti-Pheromone algorithm is like the ACS, but uses two
pheromones—one for good solutions and another for bad solutions. Global
evaporation is applied at the end of an iteration to all pathways.
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•

Their Explorer Ants algorithm uses a single pheromone like the ACS, but some of
the ants are programmed to find their own pheromone repulsive. Thus, these ants
explore unexplored territory when given the opportunity.
Montgomery and Randall made these comparisons while studying the Traveling

Salesman Problem. They found their Anti-pheromone solvers did not offer a statistically
significant improvement over the ACS benchmark.
In 2013, Ramos, Rodrigues, and Louca reported a Second Order Swarm
Intelligence method which was essentially an ACO that used both attractive and repulsive
pheromones to solve the TSP [13] [14]. They found that “by using two different sets of
pheromones, a second-order co-evolved compromise between positive and negative
feedbacks achieves better results than single positive feedback systems.” They showed
that the algorithm compared favorably against the benchmarks. It is also noteworthy that
their use of "no entry signals and negative feedback” allowed “a colony to quickly
reallocate the majority of its foragers to superior food patches.” They also note that “this
(was) the first time an extended ACS algorithm (was) implemented with these successful
characteristics.”
In 2014, Ezzat and Abdelbar described a Less Exploitative Variation of the
Enhanced Ant Colony System [15]. It is similar to the TabuACO in the sense that paths
that have already been analyzed by ants can be flagged to prevent further (unnecessary)
analysis. Their method utilizes a “don’t-look bit” to prevent further exploration, and a
“don’t-push stack” to prevent further participation of the path in the formation of a
solution.
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In 2015, Haynes and Corns described an Algorithm for a Tabu Ant Colony
Optimizer [16]. This conference paper introduced the TabuACO algorithm and tested it
against a few prize-collecting Steiner tree problems. The TabuACO was compared to a
conventional ACO and found to outperform the conventional ACO.
2.1.3. QAP-Related Research. In 1999, Gambardella, Taillard, and Dorigo
introduced Ant Colonies for the Quadratic Assignment Problem [17]. Taillard also
developed a Robust Taboo Search (RTS) for the QAP [18]. Taillard was kind enough to
post the source code for this algorithm, and the RTS is used later in section 3.3.4 as a key
benchmark algorithm. In subsequent years other researchers have conducted experiments
in this area. Talbi et. al. combined a parallel ACO with a Tabu search in an effort to solve
the QAP. The design alternated between these two search methods to narrow and focus
the search [19].
Wiesemann and Stutzle introduced Iterated Ants: An Experimental Study for the
Quadratic Assignment Problem [20]. Qi presented A Modified Ant Algorithm for Solving
the Quadratic Assignment Problem [21].
2.1.4. Scalability. In a 2010 journal article by Sameh, Ayman, and Hasan, each
ant runs on a separate processor [22]. They describe a parallel ACO algorithm in which
pheromones are shared in a common environment. Their research extends parallelization
strategies suggested by Stutzle [23].
2.1.5. Multi-objective ACOs. Lopez-Ibenez in his 2004 thesis described an ACO
in which he leverages the Max-Min Ant system to develop a multi-objective ACO in
which a single pheromone is used to represent multiple objectives [24].
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In 2005, Pinto, Baran, and Fabregat described a Multi-Objective Multicast
Routing based on Ant Colony Optimization [25]. The algorithm maintains a population of
ants and an external set of Pareto solutions. The algorithm uses a classic evolutionary
algorithm to develop solutions. The distribution of the ants within the environment is
controlled by the chromosome. Good distributions which lead to good solutions are
evolved using crossover and mutation to generate solutions which improve with
successive iterations.
2.1.6. Multi-pheromone ACOs. In 2010, Alaya, Solnon, and Ghedira described
an Ant Colony Optimization for Multi-objective Optimization Problems [26]. Their mACO algorithm utilizes multiple pheromones – one for each objective. It also supports
multiple colonies – one for each objective. Ants randomly choose a pheromone trail
corresponding to an objective to optimize.
2.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION
The improvements to the smart grid present many opportunities for improvement,
optimization, and problem solving. This research applied the Tabu ACO solver to
implement a planning function which worked to protect distribution assets and organize
the delivery of energy through the grid from producers to consumers. A portion of the
findings were published in [27]. The results are described more fully in section 4. . The
approach taken was rather unique. The distribution network was modeled as a graph.
Producers, consumers, and certain other assets were modeled as nodes, while wires were
modeled as edges. In one effort the ants themselves were tasked with observing the
constraints of the assets and identifying a viable solution in which the interests of the
stakeholders were satisfied. The solver was given a scenario from the IEEE 34 node
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feeder model. The ants, through the network identified a constrained asset and protected
it while implementing an energy market function. These results are presented in Section
4.8. This experiment proved the concept but did not test scalability. A larger experiment
was conducted in which the test for the fitness of the circuit, and a test for the objective
of the solver (implementing an energy market) were performed. Engineering Analysis
software from EPRI was used to test proposals that were generated by the Tabu ACO
solver. These results were published in [27] and are presented in more detail in Section
4.9. The Tabu ACO was able to form contracts between the stakeholders, while the EPRI
OpenDSS software was able to identify a market scenario that limited the PV
contribution to manageable levels.
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3. THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER
In Section 3. the TabuACO will be described and tested against a variety of
puzzles. A generalized form of the solver is first presented, then it is applied to the
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP), and the
Steiner Tree Problem.
3.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE ALGORITHM
This section will describe the TabuACO at a high level. The TabuACO has many
of the traits of a conventional ACO. Both the TabuACO and conventional ACO can be
described at a high level by Figure 3.1. After initializing the environment, the code
implements a loop which implements an ant sortie. If the stopping criteria are not met,
the ant is sent out looking for “food.” If she finds food (or runs out of time), her sortie
ends and she returns home. If food was found, its quality is evaluated and the ant returns
home. She applies attractive pheromone in response to the quality of the find. The
TabuACO and conventional ACO both incorporate all of these features. The TabuACO is
different than the conventional ACO in the way the ant behaves when she finds an empty
node, and in how she computes chooses paths. The TabuACO uses two pheromones
(attractive and repulsive) while the conventional ACO uses only one pheromone
(attractive.) This difference in behavior for the ant is found during the sortie process. This
difference is captured in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.1. ACO Activity Diagram

The activity in red is unique to the TabuACO. This is a distinguishing feature that
sets it apart from a conventional ACO. The TabuACO differs from a conventional ACO
in three ways:
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1.)

The ability to apply a rule to identify edges that may be deprecated.

2.)

The deposition of repulsive pheromone.

3.)

The use of the repulsive pheromone in the ant’s decision process.

Figure 3.2. Detailed View of Ant Sortie Activity (with TabuACO Activity in Red.)
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The TabuACO makes gains over traditional ACOs by effectively “trimming”
paths from the graph which are known to be unproductive trails for the target food type.
The algorithm requires a sense of direction in the graph. Undirected graphs will need to
be overlaid with a reference direction. This is necessary so that pheromone meaning can
be interpreted in the graph setting. Attractive pheromones on an edge are interpreted to
mean that a recommendation exists from other ants to go in the direction of the arrow. If
the arrow is pointing into the node where the ant is located, it represents a
recommendation to not go down the edge. Similarly, repulsive pheromones on an edge
are interpreted to mean that travel in the direction of the arrow is discouraged. Instead,
ants should travel against the direction of the arrow. Attractive pheromones are used to
attract ants to a food source. Repulsive pheromones are used to discourage ants from
traveling to empty leaf nodes.
When ants are placed at a nest in the graph, they forage until they find food and
return home. Ants remember the way home as they forage. Ants can be assigned a
specific type of food to find and they lay a pheromone that corresponds to that food type.
Different nests or different ants from the same nest may have different agendas and lay
pheromones that are ignored when they don’t agree.
If an ant forages, finds a leaf node, and determines that the leaf node lacks the
type of food it is looking for, the ant will deprecate the node by marking all of the edges
connected to the leaf node with repulsive pheromone.
If an ant forages, encounters an inner node, and determines that it lacks suitable
food, she will also consider all of the adjoining edges (except the edge homeward). If
none of the adjoining edges have any attractive pheromone, and all of them have some
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repulsive pheromone, the ant deprecates the node by deprecating all of the adjoining
edges.
If the ant finds the food she is looking for, she will lay attractive pheromone all of
the way back to the nest. This behavior, with the deposition of attractive pheromone, is
just like a conventional ACO.
3.1.1. The Deprecation Rule. If the prize-collecting ant travels an edge to
encounter an empty node that has all other edges (insomuch as they exist) deprecated,
then the just-travelled edge may also be deprecated.
Rationale:
1.)

A deprecated edge is effectively “trimmed” from the solution and temporarily
trimmed from the puzzle.

2.)

An empty leaf node may be deprecated.
Then, a node containing one unexamined edge, and N-1 deprecated edges, is

determined to not contain a prize. All N-1edges may be deprecated per the first rationale,
leaving an empty leaf node which in turn may be deprecated per the second rationale.
3.1.2. Pheromone Deposition. Once an ant completes a sortie, the fitness
function is computed to determine the goodness of the outcome. The fitness function
renders a score, and the score is used to determine the relative goodness of the find
(compared to previous finds). The ant then retraces her footsteps back to the nest and
applies an attractive pheromone using an exponential moving average function. All edges
have a reference direction, and a positive or negative value is deposited to represent
attraction depending on the reference direction of the edge.
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A repulsive pheromone is deposited by the ant, in full concentration, on
deprecated edges, according to the rules described in section 3.1.1 above. All edges have
a reference direction, and a positive or negative repulsive value is deposited to represent
repulsion depending on the direction of the edge.
The code accounts for attractive and repulsive pheromones separately. One does
not merely erase the other. The rules for pheromone deposition and evaporation are
different for each type. If the pheromones were to be stored as a single (positive or
negative) value, certain path geometries in the puzzle could allow useful information to
be lost.
3.1.3. Pheromone Initialization. At the start of a trial, all pheromones in the
model, both attractive and repulsive, are zeroed.
3.1.4. Pheromone Evaporation. Attractive pheromones are periodically
evaporated using an exponential moving average formula. The formula averages zero into
the pheromone values. Both positive and negative values are moved towards zero when
this occurs. An attractive pheromone (𝜏𝑎 ) is scaled back by an evaporative constant (𝜌𝑎𝑒 )
between zero and one. A repulsive pheromone (𝜏𝑟 ) can be scaled back in a similar way.
However, 𝜌𝑟𝑒 is typically equal to 1.

{

𝜏𝑎 = 𝜏𝑎 × 𝜌𝑎𝑒 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠
𝜏𝑟 = 𝜏𝑟 × 𝜌𝑟𝑒 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠

(3)

3.1.5. Edge Selection. The ant computes a probability density function (PDF)
based on pheromone deposits found on each path. Paths that loop back to a node on the
path home are assigned a zero probability (unless the path back is the only option). From
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the PDF a CDF is computed. The CDF also relates to each connected edge just as the
PDF. The ant then selects a number between zero and one. The random value selected is
then related back to an edge number contained in the CDF, and the process ends with an
edge being selected. These details are described in the pseudocode in the sections below.
3.1.6. Problem Setup. The ACO begins with a setup of the problem which
relates the process to be optimized to a graph (or tree) structure. The TabuACO requires
that the edges have a reference direction. This is so that the attractive and repulsive
pheromone clues can be interpreted correctly by the ant. The graph must be organized to
represent the problem to be solved. It also provides an environment for ants to store data.
Some puzzles naturally have an organization to them which leads to an obvious up/down
directional relationship between edges and nodes. Other puzzles do not have an obvious
top and bottom. For these puzzles, an arbitrary up/down or left/right directionality can be
imposed.
A common stopping criterion is when no improvement has been made in the score
after some number of trials.
When the ant forages, the ant selects a path influenced by environmental factors.
The edges and nodes that represent the environment may be modeled to reflect the
constraints of the puzzle. Certain moves may be illegal due to the puzzle constraints.
Other moves may be permissible only if certain runtime criteria are met. Of the moves
that are allowed, the ant’s selection is influenced by both the attractive and repulsive
pheromone present in the environment. The ant sortie is a series of moves in which the
ant is allowed to travel until she encounters a “find” or her travel is otherwise exhausted.
Ants remember the path home, avoid forming loops, and prefer to not backtrack. Ants are
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assigned a specific type of food to find and they lay a pheromone that corresponds to that
food type. In the TabuACO, if the ant encounters an empty leaf node, the edge leading to
the leaf node is deprecated. The ant has just explored a location that will never have a
“find” and never needs to be explored again. In a similar manner if a node is encountered
that is completely surrounded by deprecated edges, has no attractive pheromones, and the
remaining edge has been travelled and fully explored as well, then all of the edges on the
node can be marked as deprecated. In this way deprecation can start at a leaf node and
spread outwards through the graph as topology and travel allow.
Once an ant has encountered a find, a score is computed, and the ant returns
home. During the trip home, the ant lays attractive pheromone as a function of the score.
On rare occasions, the environment is updated, and pheromones are globally evaporated.
This general pattern is used for all of the applications of the TabuACO – whether
they be known benchmark problems or new applications of the solver which have not
been modelled before.
The TabuACO has been tested against several different benchmark problems. In
each case the optimizer was modified somewhat to suit the problem being solved. The
QAP was modelled as a tree, and unidirectional travel occurred from the root to the leaf.
The Steiner tree problem was modelled as a graph, and the ant allowed to roam in any
direction. Each variant of the TabuACO offered improvements to accomplish different
purposes.
3.2. THE TRAVELING SALESMAN PROBLEM
The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) was promoted in the 1800s by William
K. Hamilton and Thomas Kirkman. In this problem, there are n cities to be visited
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(numbered one through n). A fully interconnected graph represents the travel between
cities, with a cost cij associated with each edge. The challenge is to find the least
expensive path, while visiting all n cities, and returning to the starting point. The TSP
objective function can be described by (4).

𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 ∑𝑛𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗 𝑐𝑖𝑗

(4)

The TSP is considered a classic problem. It has been heavily studied and is described in
countless literature. The TSP is considered NP complete. Puzzles with dozens of cities
can be challenging. A particularly difficult puzzle containing a million cities have been
devised. While considered unsolvable by most methods, some progress has been made
with divide and conquer techniques [28] [29].
3.2.1. Proposed Methodology. The TSP puzzles used by [12] will be used here
to compare the TabuACO to a reference ACO. The reference ACO will be the TabuACO
operated with attractive (and no repulsive) pheromones.
3.2.2. TSP Modeling. The TSP is represented by a fully interconnected graph.
Every node is connected by an edge to every other node. Nodes are not connected to
themselves. There is a cost of traveling every edge. Puzzles will be drawn from the
TSPLIB. The TSPLIB presents data in XML. The cost of traversing each edge is
presented in the XML as each edge is declared. Some puzzles are presented in an (older)
geographic format. In this format, each row represents a city along with an X-Y
coordinate. In this case it is assumed that it is possible to navigate to each city from every
other city, and the cost of travel is the distance between the two cities.
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Each city has a number. Reference directions are overlaid on the graph by
defining nodes (cities) with a lesser number to be upstream from nodes with a higher
number. By way of example, Figure 3.3 contains a fully interconnected mesh graph with
4 nodes. Each node has a number. A direction is overlaid on each edge based on the node
number so that a node with a lower number is “upstream” of a node with a higher
number.

1

4

2

3
Figure 3.3. Example Imposed Reference Directions for a TSP graph of N=4.

3.2.3. Path Selection. A Probability Density Function (PDF) is computed
based upon path history and pheromone density as described in (5).

𝑘
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡..𝑒𝑛𝑑−2

0,
(

𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
{

2−𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 −𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗

3

𝑘
) 4 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑−1

4
2−𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 −𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗
4

(5)

, otherwise

Where, nj is node j, pij is the probability of path selection along the edge from
𝑘
node i to node j, 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡
is the path history for ant k starting at the nest and ending at the
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current position, 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 is the attractive pheromone along edge between node i and j, 𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 is
the repulsive pheromone along the edge between node i and j.
If an edge selection would cause the ant to loop back and cross into its path
history, the probability of selection is zero. If an edge selection would cause the ant to
backtrack, the selection is discouraged relative to other choices – being reduced by a
factor of ¾. Otherwise, a probability of selection is the sum of the attractive and repulsive
pheromones. However, given that the graph is directional, and either pheromone can be
positive or negative, the sum of the two lies somewhere between -2 and +2. This is
adjusted to become a number between 0 and 1.
3.2.4. Pheromone Deposition and Score Dissemination. For all edges along
ant k’s path home, deposit positive attractive pheromone along edges where the reference
arrow points away from the nest, and negative attractive pheromone along edges where
the reference arrow points toward the nest. This is stated mathematically in (6).

𝑘
For ∀𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒
,

(6)

𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡
{
𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 − (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡

3.2.5. Expected Results. There is little reason to expect that the TabuACO
solver will outperform the ACO solver. Negative pheromone deposition only occurs
when the ant can find a leaf node to trim away. There are no leaf nodes in these puzzles.
3.2.6. Experiments. The puzzle is set up at the start of each sortie with fresh
food at each node location (each city). City #1 is selected as the nest. An ant will be sent
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on a sortie, expected to visit each city, and upon claiming the last prize, return home. The
code has been set to force the ant to use the remaining single hop home.
If repulsive pheromone application is enabled, the ant will watch for opportunities
to lay down repulsive pheromone.
The TabuACO (with both attractive and repulsive pheromones enabled) will be
allowed to run for 104 sorties, and progress towards completion noted. Twenty trials will
be conducted, and the mean and standard deviation calculated.
Similarly, the reference ACO (with attractive pheromones only enabled) will be
allowed to run for 104 sorties, and progress towards completion noted. Twenty trials will
be conducted, and the mean and standard deviation calculated.
The Student’s T-test will be used to identify significant performance differences
between the two solvers.
3.2.7. Data. The TabuACO solver was tested on a series of TSP problems. The
TSP puzzles selected are depicted in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Results Comparing TabuACO to Conventional ACO Using TSP Puzzles.
Puzzle
Name
eil51
eil76
gr24
kroA100
d198
lin318
pcb442

Best
Known
Score
426
538
1272
21282
15780
42029
50778

Sorties
104
104
104
104
104
104
104

Percentage above best-known
score
ACO
TabuACO
422
424
162
162
110
111
613
610
3479
3479
1672
1674
1367
1368
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3.2.8. Discussion of Results. It is interesting to note that the set of TSP puzzles
studied here are the same ones studied by Montgomery in his anti-pheromone research
[12]. Montgomery, running a variety of anti-pheromone algorithms, found no discernable
improvement over the reference ACO. Our results for the TabuACO also found no
discernable difference between the TabuACO and our reference ACO. For the Tabu vs.
classic ACO, the outcome is explained by the nature of the problem being solved. The
TSP graph has no extraneous nodes. Every node in the TSP must be visited by the ant in
order to form the solution. The TabuACO did not find anything it could deprecate. It was
not able to effectively reduce the search space. Thus, it offered no advantage over a
conventional ACO. Increasing the number of sorties will not make a difference in the
outcome because the setup of the problem prevents nodes from being trimmed away.
When the TabuACO deprecates an edge, there is always a node somewhere which is also
being deprecated. All of the nodes present in the TSP puzzle must be present in the
solution. This prevented the TabuACO from identifying any edges to deprecate [30].
3.3. THE QUADRATIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
The Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP) was described by Koopmans and
Beckmann in 1957 [31] [32]. It is NP-hard [33]. It is commonly used as an expression of
a facilities planning problem [32].

The QAP can be expressed mathematically as (7-8):

min 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑝)

𝑝𝜖Π𝒩

(7)
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𝑁
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝜋) = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝐵𝜋(𝑖)𝜋(𝑗)

(8)

Where, Π𝒩 represents all of the permutations of 𝒩. 𝒩 is a set of numbers one to
n. A and B are NxN arrays which represent distance or cost. π is a 1xN array which
represents the ordering of the solution.
With the solution being drawn from the set of numbers one to N without
replacement. The solution size grows as N!. With n=12, a search space of 479 million
possibilities is created. If a brute force solver were to test each possible combination at a
rate of one every 100 ms, it would take more than 1.5 years to complete the evaluation.
The QAP offers a type of problem which can offer a large search space, and a
challenge to those who wish to represent the problem with a model. Memory constraints
usually allow only a mere fraction of the model to be retained in memory at any given
time. The challenge of the researcher is to identify the salient features that can be used to
represent the problem and guide the solver to optimization.
3.3.1. Proposed Methodology. In most forms of Computational Intelligence
problems are solved by forming an objective function which is then maximized or
minimized. Code reuse is facilitated when the solver can be separated from the objective
function. However, for successful convergence of an ACO it is important that as much of
the results as possible be retained in the model.
The starting point for the TabuACO is that repulsive pheromones are utilized in
addition to attractive pheromones. However, in order for a problem to be solved, it must
first be modeled. The ACO is well suited to solving problems that are modelled as a
graph. The TabuACO requires that the graph have directional edges. If the puzzle to be
solved does not naturally have directionality, it must be assigned as part of the setup of

30
the problem. The TabuACO uses the directionality to help the ant interpret the meaning
of the pheromone. In a graph setting, a foraging ant can find herself inclined to choose an
edge that has pheromone on it. The TabuACO uses the pheromone sign (positive or
negative) along with the direction of the arrow to interpret the direction the ant should
travel. A positive pheromone (attractive or repulsive) will guide the ant in the direction of
the arrowhead. Similarly, a negative pheromone value is used to guide the ant away from
the direction of the arrow. Without directionality defined, an ant can be drawn up a trail
she is meant to go down.
A tree is a simplified form of a graph. When foraging occurs in a tree it can be
confined to be unidirectional. When this occurs, it simplifies the code. There is only one
direction for the ant to follow and pheromones cannot be misinterpreted by the ant. In this
special case, the ant decision process does not need to consider the sign of the pheromone
with respect to the direction of the edge.
Whenever a foraging ant arrives at a node, she will encounter a series of edges.
She must make a decision (as depicted in Figure 3.4), and does so from clues she finds in
the environment (if they are available).
The proposed algorithm uses the overlaid graph directionality to interpret a signed
pheromone value in a directional sense.
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Figure 3.4. The Ant and the Decision Process.

Root

Leaf

Leaf

Leaf

Figure 3.5. Example Tree

In this application of the ACO, ants will start at a root node (at the top as depicted
in Figure 3.5) and forage downward. In this particular application, the problem is setup so
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that treasures are stored in leaf nodes. This application has a zero cost in travelling to a
find. The combination of paths used to reach a find represents a potential solution. In a
conventional ACO, we would expect that the ant would lay attractive pheromone along
paths that yield good results. This approach assumes that good finds are located near each
other. If this is not true, and good finds are randomly distributed among all locations, the
solver may eventually find the optimum, but it may be no faster than a brute force search.
The TabuACO goes beyond a conventional ACO by adding additional
information beyond the attractive pheromone:
•

An edge is given a mode which indicates if it is unexplored, partially explored,
fully explored, or prohibited by virtue of the puzzle.

•

The solver may supplement this with repulsive pheromones. (Note: All
pheromone values, attractive and repulsive, must be signed when bidirectional
foraging is allowed.)

•

The solver may deposit other information in the environment such as an
indication of the best score ever discovered while travelling that edge.
The TabuACO will use any combination of the above stigmergy to find the

optimum.
3.3.1.1. QAP modeling. A tree is used to model the QAP. An example is shown
in Figure 3.6. Black lines represent potential choices. The red lines represent prohibited
choices due to prior selections.
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Figure 3.6. Example Encoding of [2 1 3 4] for N=4

A node is modeled as having N downstream edges and one upstream edge. A root
node is introduced at the top tier. The root node fans out to N navigable edges at tier 1.
Tier 1 nodes in turn fan out to N-1 navigable edges and 1 non-navigable edge. Tier 2
nodes fan out to N-2 navigable edges and 2 non-navigable edges. The process continues
to Tier N where there are no navigable edges and N non-navigable edges. This constitutes
a leaf node. This creates a structure in which there are conceivably NN+1 nodes and
N(NN+1) edges.
Figure 3.7 describes the Class Design for the TabuACO experiment used when
modeling the QAP. Each node has a “name” one through N. The edges take on one of
five different edgeModes. The node names can take on one of any of the N names in the
range.
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Figure 3.7. Class Design Shown for N=12

3.3.1.2. Pheromone calculation. The research implemented in [16] uncovered a
fundamental difficulty with laying attractive and repulsive pheromones in response to the
quality of a find. As a solution converges, the quality of the find tends to improve. What
was once considered a good find, in retrospect, over the course of time, becomes a
comparatively bad find. Most pheromones that are laid on paths indicating the quality of
a particular find will become obsolete. A conventional ACO would evaporate all
pheromones in an effort to destroy obsolete and misleading information, but not all
pheromones are necessarily misleading. The TabuACO attempts to remedy such loss of
information by storing non-evaporative “best of” score data along each edge in addition
to pheromone information.
The pheromone and score data are then used to compute a PDF of the selection
options, the PDF is then used to compute a CDF. The CDF is used to select from the
available options.

35
3.3.1.3. Path selection. When an ant explores and selects an unexplored path, the
solver promotes the edge status from “unexplored” to “partiallyExplored.” If every
downstream edge subordinate to a downstream node has been explored, then the edge
leading to the downstream node may be promoted from “partiallyExplored” to
“fullyExplored.” The edge status is used to select the pheromone formula used in the
calculation of the PDF.
The TabuACO may be operated in several different modes. Ordinarily both
attractive and repulsive pheromones are used. (In this section the notation “TabuACOA1R1” for convenience.) For test purposes it may be operated in other modes. It can be
operated with attractive pheromones only (called “TabuACO-A1R0” in this paper.) It can
be operated with negative pheromones only (A0R1), and just for comparison sake, it can
be operated with no pheromones at all (A0R0). These options are listed in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Probability of Selection Based on Path Mode
Tabu
ACO
Solver

Attractive
Pheromone
may be used

Repulsive
Pheromone
may be
used

A0R0
A0R1
A1R0
A1R1

No
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
Yes

Path mode
unexplored
Probability of selection
0
P1/N
0
P1/N
0
P1/N
0
P1/N
prohibited

somewhat
explored

fully
explored

P1/N
PR
PA
PAR

P1/N
0
PA
0

There are four probabilities identified in Table 3.2. The probability of selection
for a path that would cause the ant to wander off the model is zero (no formula
necessary). Likewise, when a path has been fully explored the repulsive pheromone
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calculation from the table yields a probability of zero. The probability formula for
attractive pheromones PA is computed by (12), repulsive by (13), and the combination of
the two by (11).

1 𝛼

𝑃1/𝑁 = (𝑁)
𝜏1 =

(9)

𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 −𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑓𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 +1
1 𝛼

𝑃𝐴𝑅 = (𝜏1 + 𝑁)

(10)
(11)

𝑃𝐴 = {

𝑃𝐴𝑅 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 > 0
𝑃1/𝑁 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(12)

𝑃𝑅 = {

𝑃𝐴𝑅 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 < 0
𝑃1/𝑁 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(13)

Where α is an exponential value used to tune the solver, bestOfScoreij is the best
(minimum) score identified along any of the partially explored downstream leaf nodes
while traversing edge ij, localAveragei is the average of all path scores among the
partially and fully explored edges (prohibited and unexplored paths are excluded)
connected downward at node i, maxLocalScorei is the worst score identified among the
downstream edges which have been partially or fully explored downward at node i, N is a
puzzle dimension as described by (2).
When an ant is faced with N paths, she must choose one of them. Many paths may
be prohibited. They are given a likelihood of selection of zero. Paths which are
1 ∝

unexplored are by default given a likelihood of (𝑁) . If the score history indicates that
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traversing the edge has proven advantageous, a contribution proportional to the quality of
the find 𝜏1 is added to the probability function.
Note that the PDF values for the various N pathways do not always sum to exactly
1.00 with the above formulae. However, the code contained a normalization function
which caused the CDF to provide a value which did indeed start with zero and end with
1.00.
In another design note, it should be mentioned that the formula would have
assigned a probability of zero to pathways which loopback onto the ant’s path history.
However, since the entire problem was modeled as a tree, loops are not possible, and this
portion of code was omitted. The ant did however contain a bias to her decision making
which prevented her from backtracking. This appeared to speed the solvers to
convergence, and was applied to the TabuACO as well as the reference ACO.
3.3.1.4. Pheromone deposition and score dissemination. In this model of the
QAP, a tree structure is synthesized where the root is pictured at the top (tier 0), and
leaves are at the bottom (tier N). The score is computed for a given “path” through the
tree which generates a sequence of numbers between the root and a leaf. Whenever the
ant completes a sortie by encountering a find, a new score for that combination of
pathways is computed. The ant traverses back from the find at the leaf node to the root.
The ant updates the “best score” for each edge involved in the solution. If the solution
produces a better score than the historical best score for that edge, the new best score
replaces the historical best score on that edge. Each edge is considered in turn until the
ant arrives home.
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The ant uses this score information to compute a local best score, as well as her
personal experience of a lifetime best score, to compute pheromones as needed as
described in Table 3.2.
3.3.1.5. Pheromone initialization. This version of the ACO begins with an
environment in which there is effectively no pheromone concentration in the
environment. It is initialized as shown in (3).
Similarly, each edge is set to either unexplored or prohibited. The “best known
score” for each edge is left undefined for edges with a status of unexplored or prohibited.
3.3.1.6. Pheromone evaporation. Pheromones are derived values in this
particular implementation of the TabuACO and ACO. However, the pheromone metadata
can be destroyed due to the memory management process. Poor performing pathways
may be discarded from memory. This is comparable to rapid evaporation of selected
pathways known to be poor performers.
3.3.2. TabuACO Pseudocode to Search Trees. Figure 3.8 describes the main
routine used to operate the algorithm. The algorithm begins with some initialization in
lines 1-3 and repeats in a loop until the solution score is found. During the trip to the leaf,
the ant will choose random paths that are influenced by the pheromone calculation, which
in turn is based upon any known scores along previously explored paths. The path chosen
represents the QAP solution, and with the ant reaching a leaf node, enough symbols have
been selected to complete the formation of a solution. The solution is then scored and the
results disseminated along the path traveled. With a large puzzle, it was found that the
best use of the ant’s time was to perform repeated sorties which explore new territory.
Then, armed with some preliminary information, the ant is able to favor certain symbols
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over others in the first position, second position, and so on, until an optimal solution
emerges. As depicted in Figure 3.6, an ant will start at the root of the tree (shown at the
top) at level 0. At each junction, she must choose a downward path, and then move
downward one level until a leaf node is encountered (reaching the Nth symbol.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

Initialize the root node and an ant;
antSortieHopCount ← 0;
Reset run timer;
Repeat
createDnCDF(); per Figure 3.9
decodeCDF(); per
Acquire a node (new or existing) from the memory manager.
Move ant down to selected node.
Increment antSortieHopCount;
If( ant at leaf node)
Compute score using (8).
Repeat
Travel a step homeward. Along the edge homeward update the historical
best score as appropriate with the newly computed score.
Promote the edge status to fullyExplored if all other connected edges are
fullyExplored or prohibited; otherwise promote the edge status to
partiallyExplored.
Until( ant home)
Endif
until( stopping criterion met)
Report optimal and resulting scores
Figure 3.8. Main Routine Pseudocode

Figure 3.8 line 5 has the ant using the “createDnCDF” routine to create a
cumulative density function (CDF) in preparation for path selection. Then, by calling
“decodeCDF” in line 6, the ant needs merely to pick a random number between 0.0 and
1.0, and determine the corresponding path which has been selected as a result.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

compute localAveragei, for local (downward going) edges around node i;
compute MaxLocalScorei, the high score on local (downward going) edges
around node i;
//build PDF from stigmergy data
for (j = 1 to N)
compute P1/N using (9)
compute PAR using (10);
compute PA using (12) and PR using (13);
case (the mode of edge j)
“prohibited”: pdfij ← 0;
“unexplored”: pdfij ← P1/N;
“somewhatExplored”:
case (pheromone usage) of
“no pheromones”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃1/𝑁 ;
“repulsive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝑅 ;
“attractive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴 ;
“attractive&repulsive”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴𝑅 ;
Endcase
“fullyExplored”:
case (pheromone usage) of
“no pheromones”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃1/𝑁 ;
“repulsive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 0;
“attractive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴 ;
“attractive & repulsive”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 0;
Endcase
“solution”: pdfij← 1;
Endcase
Endfor
//compute CDF from PDF
for k = 0 to N
cdfk ← 0.0;
for l= 0 to k
cdfk ← cdfk + pdfl;
Endfor
Endfor
for k = 0 to N
cdfk ← cdfk / cdfN;
Endfor
Figure 3.9. CreateDnCDF Pseudocode
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The acquisition of a node in Figure 3.8 line 7 can be somewhat involved. The
memory manager ranks the value of each node to the solution and recycles the node
ranked lowest.
Nodes far away from the root, with a poor score, and numerous edges that are
fully explored are good candidates for reuse. (There are multiple reasons to retain score
information in the environment. One reason is to influence the path selection by the ant in
(3), but another reason is to influence the memory manager’s ranking and recycling of the
limited memory resource in Figure 3.8 line 7.)
Figure 3.9 describes the pseudocode to build the CDF used to select the path the
ant will follow. The routine uses path stigmergy as input, and develops a path selection as
output.
With the CDF having built with the createDnCDF routine (Figure 3.9,) it must be
decoded. This is done with the decodeCDF routine (Figure 3.9.) A random number
between zero and one is selected, and this in turn maps to a corresponding range in the
CDF array. The array index represents the path number which is chosen.

1
2
3
4
5
6

selection ← 0;
rvalue ← random number between 0 and 1;
while((rvalue ≥ cdfselection) and (selection < N))
selection ← selection + 1;
endwhile
return selection;
Figure 3.10. DecodeCDF Pseudocode
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3.3.3. Expected Results. The QAP has been shown to be an NP hard problem.
If the entire search space were laid out in memory using a scheme similar to Figure 3.6,
we see from Table 3.3 (the N! column) that the memory requirements can easily outstrip
the ability of today’s computers. Even if this were viable, the time required to solve the
puzzle can become inordinate as well. If we were to use a brute force search, and
anticipate that on average, the optimal solution would be found by searching half of the
search space, and that 125 thousand segments could be processed per second (where a
QAP puzzle is N segments long), it would take the time described in Table 3.3 (columns
3 and 4) to solve the puzzle.

Table 3.3. Estimated Time Required to Solve a Puzzle
Based on a Brute Force Search Process
QAP
length

Search space Time to search n!/2
= N!
@ 125 k segments/s

12
15
18
20
22
25

479x106
1.3x1012
6.4x1015
2.4x1018
1.1x1021
1.6x1025

2x103 s
5x106 s
3x1010 s
1013 s
4x1015 s
6x1019 s

0.5 hr.
6 days
812 yrs.
3x105 yrs.
1x108 yrs.
2x1012 yrs.

An ACO solves its puzzle through information stored in the environment
(stigmergy). Large puzzles such as the QAP can be challenging to solve with an ACO.
The TabuACO represents the QAP as depicted in Figure 3.6. Since it cannot store the
entire model in memory, it will store only a portion of it. This will create a challenge
since the ACO requires information from the environment in order to solve the puzzle. A
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memory manager will attempt to identify nodes that have the least value and recycle
them. This could cause a loss of information which slows convergence. All of the forms
of pheromone metadata associated with a given node (and connected edges) are destroyed
when memory is recycled. When new (possibly recycled) nodes and edges are created by
the memory manager, the unexplored pathways have a probability of selection of
1

approximately (𝑁). As pathway history matures, scores which prove to be above average
will influence the probability in one direction or another away from 1/N.
With the TabuACO it is always possible for deprecation to spread. Given that the
problem is modeled as a tree, we would expect deprecation to spread upward towards the
root. This particular implementation of the TabuACO applies a path status to deprecate
explored pathways. Deprecation does spread upward in the model, and nodes closer to
the root are considered more valuable to retain in memory than those far removed from
the root. Thus, deprecation that has spread upward has a high probability of retention in
the model by upper edges even when the child leaf nodes and edges have been destroyed
by the memory manager.
3.3.4. Experiments. Two types of experiments will be conducted: one to show
that the use of repulsive pheromones offers an improvement over an attractive-only
solver; and another experiment to compare these solvers to other benchmark solvers.
3.3.5. Comparison of Performance Between an Attractive-Only Pheromone
Driven ACO to an Attractive-Plus-Repulsive Pheromone Driven ACO. A library of
QAP problems is available from Burkard, et al. [34].

The entire series from N.

Christofides and E. Benavent [35] was tested. The Student’s t-Test [36] was used to
measure the significance of an improvement to a 95% confidence level.
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3.3.6. Comparison of Performance Between Assorted Benchmark Problems.
The benchmark testing by [17] compared the Hybrid Ant System for the QAP (HASQAP) with the genetic hybrid method of [37], the reactive tabu search [38], a tabu search
of [18], and simulated annealing [39]. Of these tests, Taillard’s tabu search [18] will be
run alongside the TabuACO solvers on the same machine, matched by iteration count
rather than runtime. By comparing Taillard’s tabu search to the TabuACO, it provides a
benchmark comparison to all of the solvers tested by [17].
3.3.7. Data. Two sets of experiments were performed. One experiment tested the
TabuACO against a conventional ACO. The other tested the TabuACO against other
solvers.
3.3.7.1. Performance

comparison

using

attractive-only

verses

attractive+repulsive pheromones. The entire suite from Christofides and Beavent was
tested to compare the TabuACO to the reference ACO solver. The results are summarized
in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. Results Comparing the Performance of the TabuACO to the Reference ACO

Puzzle
Name
chr12a
chr12b

Best
known
score
9552
9742

chr12c

11156

chr15a

9896

chr15b

7990

Sorties
3582
174
104
1102
5x104
1801
104
3081

Percent above bestknown score
ACO
TabuACO
62.7
49.3
118.2
118.2
48.0
44.9
58.3
58.3
24.5
22.9
132.6
133.3
95.0
86.2
155.1
142.9
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Table 3.4. Results Comparing the Performance of the TabuACO to the Reference ACO
(con’t)
chr15c

9504

chr18a

11098

chr18b

1534

chr20a

2192

chr20b
chr20c

2298
14142

chr22a

6156

chr22b

6194

chr25a

3796

7326
5x104
22541
5x104
55
2x105
220016
106
606779
28646
4x104
452890
106
239838
106
440915
106

116.9
89.7
153.1
140.5
116.9
30.2
99.4
92.1
83.2
167.3
182.3
31
29.5
31
29.9
166
156.5

121.7
81.8
152.6
136.3
116.8
29.2
96.5
85.0
67.6
168.9
167.0
30
29
31
26.1
161
152.1

3.3.7.2. Comparison to other solvers. The puzzles in Table 3.5 were solved by
the RTS, TabuACO, and ACO solvers. In most cases the RTS solver drove the puzzle to
the best-known minimum. In some cases, the RTS solver could not achieve this
minimum. It was allowed to run its course, and the number of iterations used to achieve
its best score were recorded. This same number of iterations were then used to allow the
TabuACO and reference ACO solvers to achieve the best score they could attain. The
percentage above ideal is expressed in the two rightmost columns. Ten trials were
conducted and averaged.
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Table 3.5. Comparison of RTS to TabuACO and Reference ACO Solvers

Puzzle
Name
bur26a
bur26b
bur26c
bur26d
bur26e
bur26f
bur26g
bur26h
els19
kra30a
kra30b
nug20
nug30
tai20b
sko42
sko49
sko56
sko64
sko72
sko81
sko90
tai20a
tai25a
tai25b
tai30a
tai30b
tai35a
tai35b
tai40a
tai40b
tai50a
tai50b
tai60a
tai60b
tai80a

Best known
score
5426670
3817852
5426795
3821225
5386879
3782044
10117172
7098658
17212548
88900
91420
2570
6124
122455319
15812
23386
34458
48498
66256
90998
115534
703482
1167256
344355646
1818146
637117113
2422002
283315445
3139370
637250948
4941410
458821517
7208572
608215054
13557864

Iterations
to
solution
1042
874
11032
2294
2535
5014
15117
5457
2564
4516
5467
8135
29810
895
90800
245204
264948
18492
53704
915957
5851
52349
84827
989
38009
32393
904498
27880
113095
22954
13688
954177
461004
639669
697395

Percent above best known
RTS
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.03
0.09
0.08
0.03
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.003
0.00
0.00
0.70
0.00
1.06
0.00
0.89
0.00
0.94

ACO
4
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
59
32
29
13
17
30
17
15
15
15
14
13
15
12
12
56
13
36
13
32
14
37
15
33
13
36
12

TabuACO
4
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
59
33
29
14
16
30
16
15
15
15
14
13
15
13
12
56
13
32
12
32
13
37
15
34
13
36
12
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Table 3.5. Comparison of RTS to TabuACO and Reference ACO Solvers (con’t)
tai80b
wil50

818415043
48816

343559
84827

0.02
0.02

34
9

34
9

3.3.8. Discussion of Results. Two different experiments are discussed. One pits a
conventional ACO against the TabuACO. The other compares the TabuACO to other
solvers.
3.3.8.1. Performance comparison using attractive-only pheromones verses
attractive+repulsive pheromones. The study shows that (for the puzzles studied) the
TabuACO with both attractive and repulsive pheromones outperformed the solver with
attractive pheromones only [30]. When a short run was performed, it was difficult to
detect a difference in performance between the two. A longer run was often necessary to
bring out the differences in performance. It is believed that this is due to the need for a
significant amount of information to be present in the environment before the ant’s
behavior becomes significantly affected. Compare the puzzle with a small number of runs
to the same puzzle with a large number of runs. Quite often, a statistically significant
difference3 is not apparent until after ten thousand sorties.
It should be noted that the TabuACO solver is intended to work with
computationally constrained applications which are unable to store the entire model in
memory. If the important and relevant portions of the model are retained, convergence
upon the optimum should be possible. If important portions of data are missing from the

3

Significance being quantified here by the student’s T-test.
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model, the solver will have difficulty finding the optimal solution and may malfunction
altogether.
With the QAP established as outlined in Figure 3.6, a large search space is
created. Only a portion of the travelled edges are retained in memory. An analysis of a
completed run typically shows a count of fullyExplored edges to be approximately
0.02%. The memory manager recycles fullyExplored nodes. Yet, due to their strategic
location, these remaining edges served to influence the outcome of the TabuACO solver.
The test results show that in every case which is driven toward a result, there is a
statistical advantage to using the repulsive pheromone information in addition to the
attractive pheromone information.
3.3.8.2. Comparison to other solvers. The analysis in this paper compared the
RTS solver to the TabuACO solver, and by extension, to all of the other solvers tested in
[17]. The comparison in this case was based on iteration equivalents rather than
computational time. The RTS solver beat the TabuACO solver in every case. The
TabuACO and conventional ACO did fairly well on the entire “bur” series of puzzles, but
not as well on other series. It was expected that the RTS (as a specialized solver) would
outperform the more general-purposed ACO and TabuACO solvers. The TabuACO and
conventional ACO both deposited attractive pheromone and attempted to converge to a
solution by exploring combinations of numbers that appeared to yield good scores. The
TabuACO outperformed the conventional ACO because it prevented previously explored
portions of the graph from being reexplored. The Robust Taboo Solver (RTS) however
made use of a prioi information. It was able to eliminate many combinations of numbers
from the search space by exploiting properties of the QAP equation itself.
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3.3.8.3. Memory management. The solver retained only 1000 of the most
valuable nodes (as determined by the scores leading to them). For any puzzle studied, this
is a remarkably small percentage of the solution space. Even for the smallest puzzle, less
than 2 part per million of the solution space was retained in memory. For the largest
puzzle, 1000 nodes represent a mere 1:1022 portion of the solution space. The results
show a statistical difference in performance between single and dual pheromone
operation. It is believed the memory manager must be doing an effective job ranking
node value, retaining important nodes and discarding less important ones.
3.4. THE STEINER TREE PROBLEM
The Prize Collecting Steiner Tree Problem (PCST) is well known. Given a graph
with nodes and edges, where a cost assigned to using every edge, and one or more nodes
have “prizes.” The “rooted” version of the problem contains a special node which must
be part of the solution. The cost can be expressed as the value of the prize minus the cost
of the edges spanning between the required node and the prize node. The objective is to
determine the lowest cost path between the required node and the prize node and from
this information develop a minimum spanning tree. When multiple prizes exist in the
problem, and therefore multiple trees exist in the solution, a “Steiner Forest” is created.
3.4.1. Steiner Tree Literature Review. In 1999, Gendreau and Larochelle
reported “A tabu search heuristic for the Steiner Tree problem” [40]. Gendreau and
Larochelle leveraged a tabu technique which prohibited certain moves based on a
minimum spanning tree analysis of a given tree. The tabu analysis caused certain
unproductive moves to be categorically prohibited. This narrowed the search space to
solve the tree to a smaller space. The solver alternates between techniques until
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convergence. The solver was found to perform well compared to other contemporary
solvers which were similarly able to leverage unique characteristics of the Steiner Tree.
In her 2004 PhD dissertation, Ljubic described and developed a number of
memetic algorithms designed to solve Steiner Tree

[41]. Memetic algorithms are

evolutionary algorithms which purposefully leverage some aspect of the puzzle being
solved in order to gain a computational advantage.
3.4.2. Introduction. The “Second Order Swarm Intelligence” ACO presented
by Ramos, Rodrigues, and Louca [14] is well suited to problems such as the TSP in
which ants are scattered across a surface, travel, and deposit pheromones to identify a
closed Hamiltonian circuit by highlighting the optimal path within the environment.
However, other types of problems exist in which the objective is quite different, the cost
function is quite different, and the solution is not obtained in the pheromone trails
themselves but in other network related information.
The paper presented herein examines a class of problem in which a closed
Hamiltonian circuit is not desired. Instead, a Minimum Spanning Tree is desired from a
root to every prize in the graph. The type of solution offered needs to support multiple
roots competing for the same prizes. This type of problem seems closely aligned with a
form of the Rooted Prize Collecting Steiner Tree.
The common Steiner Tree problem allows insertion of “Steiner Points” which are
typically representative of modifications to the build out of a network. The research
considered in this paper focuses on a variant of the rooted Prize Collecting Steiner Tree
problem in which modifications to the original network topology are not allowed.
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Table 3.6. PCST - ACO Modeling
Steiner Tree Model
Root
Prize
Objective Function

ACO
Nest
Food source
Ant agent explores network to discover
prize valuation minus travel cost.

The ACO seems to be a natural fit to the Steiner Tree model (as described in
Table 3.6.)
In order to validate the efficacy of the dual pheromone TabuACO, the proposed
ACO will be compared to an attractive-only pheromone ACO using the same code on the
same machines.
3.4.3. Proposed Methodology. The TabuACO operates to solve the Steiner tree
in a manner similar to the generic algorithm. The following pseudocode describes the
algorithm.

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8

Initialize network and ants
While stopping criteria are not met
Set one or more ants to have an antMode of “foraging.” Each ant is given a
time limit to search for food.
While ants are on sorties
Case antMode of
Foraging:
Select an edge to traverse. As the ant moves, she must maintain a
path history that shows how to return to the nest.
Upon arrival at a node, the ant examines the node to see if it contains
a prize for an unsolved tree. If so, the ant claims the prize and sets
antMode to be “homeward bound.”
If the new node is a leaf node, and a prize was not found, the ant lays
down repulsive pheromone on all adjoining edges.
Figure 3.11. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Steiner Forest Problem
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9

10
11

12

13
14
15
16
17

If the new node is not a leaf node, does not contain a prize, all
adjoining edges except the homeward edge are considered. If none of
the edges (save the homeward edge) contain attractive pheromone,
and all (save the homeward edge) contain some repulsive pheromone,
then all edges (including the homeward edge) are deprecated with
repulsive pheromone.
If an ant forages unsuccessfully for an extended period of time so that
its time limit expires, then antMode will be set to “homeward bound.”
Homeward Bound:
As an ant returns home, and an unsolved foodsource was found, ants
lay down attractive pheromone along each edge in the path between
the foodsource and the nest according to the quality of the find. The
antMode is set to “home.” If the ant encounters a solved foodsource,
it ignores the find and continues foraging.
Home:
Ant reports find to nest, all contracts formed and amount spent. The
ant sortie is over.
EndCase
Endwhile
Evaporate pheromones
Endwhile
Report optimal paths to each prize

Figure 3.11. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Steiner Forest Problem (con’t)

In line 1 of Figure 3.11, the network is initialized. All pheromone traces are
eliminated (zeroed). All ants are placed at their home nest nodes and not authorized to
travel.
In line 2, a stopping criterion is set. A certain number of iterations may be
allowed for solutions to be found. In the case of a known solution, the stopping criterion
could be for the ants to find the known solution.
In line 3, if multiprocessing is supported, multiple ants may be sent out
concurrently.
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In line 4, a WHILE loop is set up that allows ants to run sorties in which they
forage for food.
In line 6, the ant originated at node nest, now sits at a node i (ni), and considers
selecting an edge eij which would allow her to move to node j (nj).
First a probabilistic function peij is computed for each edge connected to the node
the ant is at as described in (15).4

𝑘
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑗 𝜖𝑃𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡..𝑒𝑛𝑑−2

0

2+𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 ×(1−𝜌𝑎𝑑 )−𝜌𝑎𝑑 −𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗

𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑗 =

2

{

2+𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 −𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗
2

𝑘
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑗 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑−1

(15)

, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

If the proposed node j (nj) exists in ant k’s path history somewhere between the
nest and two hops before node i (inclusive), it is assigned a probability for selection of
zero. This prevents loops from forming.
If the proposed node j is the node previously visited before node i it represents
backtracking on the part of the ant. The likelihood of selection is discouraged but not
prohibited.
Otherwise, the probability of selection peij is computed based directly on the
positive and repulsive pheromone along the edge e between i and j.
A Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is then computed as described in (1617).

4

Of course when the environment is a tree, only one edge may exist between two nodes, but a

graph, by definition, allows multiple edges to exist between nodes ‘i’ and ‘j’.
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𝑐(𝑒) = ∑𝑛𝑒=1 𝑝𝑒

(16)

𝑐(𝑒)

𝑐𝑑𝑓(𝑒) = 𝑐(𝑛)

(17)

The ant will then select a number between 0 and 1, and perform the reverse cdf
function to identify which edge has been selected.
Table 3.7 describes an example where an ant sits at node i and has n=4 paths to
choose from. The ant has reached an unexplored portion of the graph, so 𝜏𝑒 =0 for every
edge. The ant travelled along edge e=1 to reach node i. The ant’s path history shows it
must visit node j=2 to return to its nest. Based upon the rules given above, the following
table would be built:

Table 3.7. Example CDF Data
e
p(e)
c(e)
cdf(e)

1
0.25
0.25
0.2

2
0
0.25
0.2

3
0.5
0.75
0.6

4
0.5
1.25
1

The reverse cdf function is simply a matter of testing the random value against
cdf(e) values until the correct value of e can be found. The “reverse CDF” process is one
of converting a pseudorandomly selected number to a path number. This process is
described in Figure 3.12.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

r = uniform randomly distributed value between (0,1)
e=1
eFound = FALSE.
While (not eFound)
If ( r ≤ cdf(e))
eFound=TRUE
break out of while loop
EndIf
e=e+1
EndWhile
%the value for ‘e’ is now known
Figure 3.12. Reverse CDF Pseudocode

The virtual ant (evaluated at line 6) travels to node j along edge eij. Edge and node
path histories are maintained on two stacks. If the value selected j is the same as the most
recent entry on the stack, the ant is backtracking. If the ant is backtracking, the most
recent entries are popped from the stacks. If the ant is venturing further from the nest, the
node and edge traversals are pushed onto the path-home stack Pk.
In Line 7 of Figure 3.11, it is the nature of the Steiner problem for the entire prize
to be claimed in order to maximize the profit. The cost along the edges are incurred for
their use and independent of the amount the edge carries.
In Line 8 of Figure 3.11, repulsive pheromone is laid along an edge by use of
(18). The EMA factor, 𝜌, must be a value between 0 and 1. A large value for 𝜌 will
introduce small changes in the environment. (𝜌𝑑 is the Exponential Moving Average
factor for deposition of pheromone). The algorithm uses a large value initially to
encourage exploration, and a smaller value as the iteration count grows to encourage
exploitation.
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𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 = {

𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 − (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒

(18)

The resultant 𝜏𝑟 is a value that becomes nonzero as the repulsive pheromone takes
on significance. It approaches ± 1 as the number of iterations approaches infinity5.
In Line 11 of Figure 3.11, when a find occurs for an unsolved tree, attractive
pheromone is laid along each edge homeward by use of (19).

𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {

𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 − (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑 ), 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒

(19)

The resultant τ𝑎𝑖𝑗 is a value that approaches ± 1 as the number of iterations
approaches infinity.
In Line 15 of Figure 3.11, global pheromone evaporation occurs by use of (3).
3.4.4. Expected Results. A PCST graph can have any topology. It will contain
nodes with one or more edges. A node with multiple parents and no children could serve
as a termination point in some problems. However, this is not the case with the Steiner
Tree Problem. Any node with multiple edges could serve as a waypoint to connect to
another point in the solution. For the PCST problem, it seems that only a node with a
degree of one (a leaf node) can serve as a starting point for deprecation. Repulsive
pheromone is first placed on the pendant edge and spreads from there to other parts of the
graph by the ant as she forages. The performance of the TabuACO depends entirely on

5

(If evaporation occurs the pheromone concentration will settle on a lesser value.)

57
the Steiner Tree topology. If no leaf nodes are found, we would expect the TabuACO to
behave no better than a conventional ACO. If a leaf node is found, and the rules of
geometry and the placement of prizes allow large areas of the search space to be
deprecated, we would expect the TabuACO to significantly outperform a conventional
ACO.
3.4.5. Experiments. A library of Steiner Tree problems was published by
Resende
[42]. Improvements were made to these problems by Ljubic [41]. Three of the K100
series from Ljubic were used for the testing. None of these puzzles contained leaf nodes,
so in order to create a greater variety of graphs for testing, the K1C100.3 and K14C100.3
puzzles were created.
The K1C100.3 was made by taking the K100.3 puzzle and attaching a child node
to every node in the original puzzle. Every prize in the parent node was copied to its
child. A cost of 1000 points was assigned to each pendant edge.
The K14C100.3 puzzle was made by taking each node of the K100.3 puzzle and
attaching two children to it, two children to those children, and two children to each of
those children.

Figure 3.13. K14c Construction.
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The construction process is depicted in Figure with the original parent node in
black and the children in blue. The result was that each original (parent) node was given
14 children. The children are comprised of 8 leaf nodes and 6 inner nodes
The K196c100.3 puzzle was made by taking each node of the K14c100.3 puzzle
and attaching two children to it, two children to those children, and two children to each
of those children. The result is that each original node of the K100.3 puzzle was given
196 children connected by a tree structure. Each structure has 64 leaf nodes and 132 inner
nodes.
The test problems are summarized in Table 3.8.
The ACO and TabuACO will have an objective function which takes node #1 in
the graph as the root and determines the optimal path (minimum spanning tree) to each of
the prizes in the forest. The score for each tree is computed as the value of the prize
minus the cost of traveling over the minimum spanning tree to obtain that prize. The
score for the forest is computed as the sum of the scores for each tree.

Table 3.8. Benchmark Steiner Forest Problems

Name

Nodes

K100.1
K100.2
K100.3
K1c100.1
K1c100.2
K1c100.3
K14c100.2
K196c100.2

42
24
26
84
42
52
360
5400

Leaf
Nodes
0
0
0
42
24
26
208
1664

Prizes

Edges

9
8
8
18
16
16
16
16

185
83
123
227
107
149
419
5459

Average
Degree
4.4
3.5
4.7
2.7
2.5
2.9
1.2
1.0

Tree
Content
0
0
0
50%
50%
50%
93%
99%
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The cost of each tree is evaluated as the value of the prize minus the cost of the
path from the root to the prize bearing node. The algorithm will run for 5,000 sorties or
until the forest is solved. Optimal solutions were not available at the libraries and had to
be determined through experimentation.
To perform the test, the performance of a standard ACO with positive (only)
pheromones will be compared to the performance of the TabuACO with positive and
repulsive pheromones.
3.4.6. Data. Each solver was allowed to run a fixed number of sorties, and the
solution compared to the best-known solution. The results are summarized in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9. Benchmark Steiner Forest Results for K100, K1c100, and K14c100 series
Puzzle Name

Best Score

Sorties

K100.1
K100.2
K100.3
K1c100.1
K1c100.2
K1c100.3
K1c100.3
K14c100.2
K14c100.2

-558838
-339296
-763735
-1137638
-687461
-1543180
-1543180
-729491
-729491

5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
1000
5000
1000
5000

Percentage above best-known score
ACO
TabuACO
3
3
1
1
0.6
0.7
46
45
2.5
2.1
3
4
1.4
1.4
14
13
10
11

Results were averaged over 10 trials. It was observed that no repulsive pheromone
was deposited during the K100 trials. Noticeable amounts of repulsive pheromone were
deposited on leaf pendant edges during the K14c100 trials. Analysis of the underlying
data finds no statistically significant difference between the performance of the
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TabuACO compared to the ACO for the K100, K1c100, and K14c series. Analysis of the
K196c100.2 puzzle found that the 1000 sortie test was insufficient time to allow either
solver to complete, but the TabuACO did outperform the reference ACO. Rather than
total the scores and somehow accommodate a penalty for missing trees, it seemed best to
change the metric and simply count the number of trees solved in the allotted time. Using
this metric, all of the previous tests performed equally well for both solvers.

Table 3.10. Steiner Forest Comparison for K196c100.2
Puzzle Name

Prizes in Forest

K196c100.2
K196c100.2

15
15

Sorties
Permitted
1000
5000

Average Number of Prizes Located
ACO
TabuACO
10
14
13
15

Results in Table 3.10 were averaged over 10 trials. Analysis of the data 6 finds a
statistically significant difference. The TabuACO outperformed the reference ACO for
the K196c100.2 puzzle.
3.4.7. Discussion of Results. A graph of a Steiner Forest can take on any shape.
In the experiment above, a series of graphs resembling a meshed network were tested (the
K100 series). The topology of these graphs prevented repulsive pheromone from being
deposited, and thus no difference was observed between the performance of the two
solvers.

6

Using the Student’s T-test, values greater than 4 were found for t, while a value of 1.8 or greater

was needed to conclude the result is significant with 95% certainty.
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With the belief that leaf edges were necessary to jump start repulsion, the K1c100
series was created, and prizes copied to the children nodes. This puzzle however was
trivial for either solver to complete and no difference in performance was measurable.
Continuing with the belief that a Steiner Graph containing a significant amount of
tree topology would perform differently than graphs with mesh topology, the K14c100.2
puzzle was created. The data showed that significant amounts of repulsive pheromone
could be observed in the environment. However, no significant difference in performance
was measured. The puzzle, with prizes placed downstream of existing prizes, was
apparently fairly trivial for the ACOs to solve.
In the final series of tests, each original node of the K100.2 was given 196
children in a tree structure, and 7 prizes were randomly placed throughout the tree portion
of the graph. The original 8 prizes in the mesh portion of the graph were retained. Ants
had to navigate through the mesh to reach prizes in the trees. This puzzle proved to be
challenging enough, and of a suitable topology, for a difference in performance to be
noticed. It is believed that ants could easily get lost foraging in the graph. Without
repulsive pheromone, they could waste a lot of time researching areas that have already
been searched. In comparing puzzles, Table 3.8 reveals that when the average degree in
the graph is approximately 1.0, or when the percentage of tree content relative to total
graph content is approximately 99%, we see a significant difference in performance of
the TabuACO over the reference ACO.
3.4.7.1. Conditions within the model. There are a number of conditions which
can affect the performance of the solvers. Once a problem has been rendered as a model,
the TabuACO attempts to take advantage of the model topology to reduce the search
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space the solver must examine. A number of topological conditions can influence the
performance of the TabuACO. These are summarized in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11. Summary of Topological Analysis
Topological Condition

TabuACO
offers
advantage
over ACO

Discussion

Puzzle lacks any leaf nodes

No

The lack of leaf nodes
deprecation from occurring

Puzzle contains a small
number of leaf nodes

No
discernable
advantage

The amount of search space that can be
trimmed is small in proportion to the
total search space.

The puzzle is NP hard and
could take years of
computing time to solve.

No
discernable
advantage

The hardness of the puzzle prevents
significant penetration into the search
space and prevents any significant
buildup of pheromone from occurring.

Puzzle contains a mixture
of tree and mesh topologies

Possible

The presence of leaf nodes will allow
repulsive pheromone to be deposited.
The amount of territory which can be
trimmed is generally a function of the
number of nodes with degree = 1. If
these are strategically located, or a large
portion of the node population, a
performance difference can be expected.

Puzzle is modeled as a tree
structure

Very
Likely

Leaf nodes allow deprecation to occur
and allow the ant to note that she has
travelled a given dead-end path before.

prevents

3.4.7.2. Conditions within the solver. When the graph appears to contain the
conditions necessary for success, improper tuning of the solver can still prevent proper
results. Usually, best performance is obtained when repulsive pheromone deposition rates
are high, and repulsive evaporation rates are low. In fact, if the “food” isn’t allowed to
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move around, and if a pathway identified as an empty leaf node will continue to remain
empty until the puzzle is solved, then there is no need to evaporate repulsive pheromone
at all.
Repulsive pheromone can accumulate to a high level and remain high until the
solver converges on a solution.
3.5. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Results from the Steiner Tree Problem and the Quadratic Assignment Problem
show that the TabuACO (having both attractive and repulsive pheromones) can
outperform the reference ACO (having only attractive pheromones). The challenge is
finding a problem of the right size with the right topology. A performance advantage is
found on problems which are modeled as graphs with a tree topology. Likewise graphs
which are 99% tree shaped demonstrate a clear advantage. As the number of tree
pathways diminish, and the number of leaf nodes decline, the advantage to the TabuACO
declines as well. The TabuACO offers no discernable advantage for graphs which have
very little tree topology. A graph which contains 100% mesh topology and 0% tree
topology offers no advantage. Furthermore, no advantage is found for problems (such as
the TSP) in which every node in the model must also appear in the solution. An
advantage is only found in graphs where nodes in the model can be temporarily removed
from the search space because they do not contribute to the solution.
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4. THE APPLICATION OF THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER TO
TRANSACTIVE ENERGY MARKETS
4.1. THE “SMART GRID”
Many systems are driven to become “ultra quality” systems. They are challenged
to improve the quality of what they provide while managing cost. Furthermore, many
successful systems, after they are well established, find that they must add new
functionality, or in some cases, be repurposed to perform tasks that they were not
originally designed for. We find all of these paradigms to be true of the Smart Grid effort.
In it, the power grid is tasked to work in ways in which it was not originally designed, to
improve the quality of the service provided, to provide new features not currently
available, and at the same time to manage costs.
The incorporation of new sources of power, and the increased flow of information
are an important part of this transformation. There are many aspects of the grid that
warrant improving. In the US, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007
characterized the “Smart Grid” in part as:
1.)

Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve
reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid.

2.)

Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security.

3.)

Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including
renewable resources.

4.)

Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and
energy-efficiency resources.

5.)

Deployment of ‘‘smart’’ technologies (real-time, automated, interactive
technologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer
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devices) for metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and
distribution automation.
6.)

Integration of ‘‘smart’’ appliances and consumer devices.

7.)

Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving
technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermalstorage air conditioning.

8.)

Provision to consumers of timely information and control options.

9.)

Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances
and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving
the grid.

10.)

Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption
of smart grid technologies, practices, and services [43].
Item #3 on the list underscores the importance of renewable energy. Indeed, since

this act of Congress, many states and regions around the world have decided to
vigorously pursue the adoption of renewable energy. This new direction in the industry is
causing a paradigm shift which cannot be supported very well by the current system, and
is the subject of the application section of this dissertation.
4.2. SMART GRID DOMAINS
The classic teaching by Adam Smith [44] is that when a free market is allowed to
operate, an “invisible hand” can effectively guide a very large system (the economy) to
an equitable outcome. This is an interesting choice of words today because it says that the
economy operates as a self organizing system.
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Electricity, when viewed as a commodity, can be scarce or abundant. It can be
easy or difficult to deliver. Local prices can change customer behavior to affect the local
demand for electricity. The energy market is used every day to solve problems and match
generation to forecasted load. But many markets also employ a flat rate. This can have
the effect of hiding problems with energy availability. This lack of market functionality
has the effect of preventing economics from having its desired effect.
Analysis by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, a division of
the US Dept. of Commerce) defines seven domains in the Smart Grid Conceptual Model
[45]. These are depicted in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1. The Seven NIST Smart Grid Domains.
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•

Energy Markets

•

Network Operations

•

Service Provider

•

Bulk Generation

•

Transmission

•

Distribution

•

Customer
4.2.1. The Market Control Loop. Energy is bought and sold through contracts

within regional organizations for the energy to be transmitted throughout the United
States. This centralized control mechanism has worked well with a base load electrical
power paradigm, but as more distributed forms of electric power generation are
introduced, the power supplied to the grid becomes more variable.
The current wholesale electrical energy market for the electrical power grid is
operated much like a control system. The energy market allows, enables, or contractually
requires generators to contribute power at specific times and locations on the grid. This is
done through the formation of contracts between energy buyers (who purchase large
blocks of power on behalf of consumers), energy producers (who operate utility-scale
generation plants), and owners of transmission systems (who are hired to move the power
from one location to another over long distances). This market process makes it possible
for network operators to control the grid in near real-time.
Network operations can be viewed as a fast acting “inner control loop” which
manages the grid in near real-time, while the energy market is a slow acting “outer
control loop” that establishes the flow of power (Figure 4.2). Network operators manage
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the flow of power by continually monitoring the draw of loads, the output of generators,
and by making adjustments to match the level of generation to meet the load.
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Figure 4.2. The Energy Market and Energy Management as Outer and Inner Control
Loops

The wholesale energy market is focused on the generation and transmission of
electrical power and does not account for distribution and consumer load. While
accounted for in the transmission circuit model, consumer loads and distribution circuits
are commonly aggregated and represented as a single load. This has served well in the
traditional grid comprised of centralized generation and single owner transmission and
distribution assets [46] [47] [48] [49] [50], but new technologies are moving the electric
grid away from single party ownership of all generation, transmission, and distribution
assets.
Many regions have goals of transitioning significant amounts of power from
fossil-fuel powered sources to distributed energy resources (DERs) [51] [52] [53]. The
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introduction of these new power sources challenges both the operation of the grid as well
as the traditional energy marketplace [54] [55]. The shift is most often being done by
adding significant amounts of wind and photovoltaic (PV) power into the distribution
grid at both utility and consumer levels [56]. As the use of these DERs expands, it
becomes increasingly difficult to regulate the voltage and frequency of power placed on
the grid [57]. In addition to causing an overall voltage rise [58], increased use of PV
sources increase the possibility of rapid voltages changes on the grid due to changes in
weather than cannot be compensated for [59]. The market itself complicates the ability of
network operators to manage the grid because some tariffs in some regions require that
operators “must take” renewable power when it is available [60] and many DER
providers are too small to participate in the existing bulk power markets but have an
impact on the grid [61] [62] [63] [64]. There are a number of proposals for modernizing
the grid as well as the energy market [64] [65] [66] [67] [68]. While these are fine ideas,
[64] [65] [66] [67] at the present we have not demonstrated an ability to have grid assets
that self-organize in such a way that consumers of all sizes participate in determining the
market price for every interval of time. The proposal found in [68] is interesting in that it
is one of the few to mention self-organization. The proposal [68] could apply to large or
small net zero market participants, but its focus is the optimization of Combined Heat and
Power (CHP). A building outfitted with optimized CHP would accept prices from the
market and decide when to draw or contribute power to the grid. Unfortunately, this
proposal doesn’t explain how this process might scale to involve all market participants.
The introduction of a transactive energy market provides a means of decentralizing
control and allowing for self-organization of the grid assets.
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Figure 4.3. A Transactive Energy Market Added to Perform Distribution Aggregation

Transactive energy markets can be described as “an internet-enabled free market,
where customer devices and grid systems can barter over the proper way to solve their
mutual problems, and settle on the proper price for their services, in close to real time”
[69]. In this paper we propose a method of implementing a self-organizing transactive
energy market which will operate at the distribution circuit level. Each distribution circuit
is represented as a single component in a system which models a distribution network,
but each distribution circuit typically serves thousands of service locations. Scaling the
current wholesale market to include every conceivable participant has been deemed by
many to be impractical. Instead, some have called for a transactive energy paradigm to
either supplement or potentially replace the legacy system [70] [71] [63]. Self-organizing
systems have been shown to alleviate communication problems through methods such as
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limited stigmergy [72]. An ant colony optimization method is implemented to create a
decentralized control scheme.
4.2.1.1. Timescales. Figure 4.3 describes various “control loops” which operate
at different timescales. There is of course the fast-acting control loop that everyone thinks
of – the real time SCADA loop used by network operators to monitors loads and adjust
generation. There are however many additional “control loops” outside this loop. Before
electricity is generated, it must be planned (via the energy market function). Before a
generator can sell electricity on the market, it must come online.

Table 4.1. Electric Utility Function Times Relative to the Flow of Power
Time relative to actual Function
flow of power
Years in advance
Planning and construction
- Transmission adequacy
- Generation adequacy
Months in advance
Maintenance
Hours in advance
Energy Market
- Load forecast
- Unit commitment
- Congestion
- T&D efficiency
Real time

Operations
- Energy Management
-- SCADA
-- Load following
-- Demand Response
- Voltage regulation
- System stability
- Outage detection, crew dispatch, and FLISR

Moments afterward

Billing and account management
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Before a generator can come online, it must be built. Before it can be built it has
to be permitted. These functions operate at different timescales as shown in Table 4.1.
4.2.1.2. Control challenges imposed by the market-selected fuel mix. The
Energy Market will almost always optimize for “economical dispatch.” In this process,
the least expensive fuel (e.g. nuclear) is selected first, and more expensive forms of
generation last. A typical, centrally dispatched fuel mix can be found in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4. Fuel Mix in Study Area With No Wind Conditions (Showing Low Cost
Power on Bottom (Nuclear in Black) and Higher Priced Energy Above It. Legend
Located in Gray Band.) [73]

In this analysis by the National Renewable Energy Lab [73], we see in Figure 4.4
a system that draws approximately 38,000 MW at night and approximately 46,000 MW
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during the peak of the day. An entire week is shown starting on a Monday at Midnight.
The load is met rather nicely by dispatching sufficient amounts of power from various
nuclear, coal, combined cycle, and hydro sources.
In Figure 4.5, a small amount of windpower is introduced. The smooth peaks and
valleys that we saw in Figure 4.4 are gone. They are replaced by more jagged edges
which only approximate the load on the system. In order to accommodate the variable
contribution from the wind, the network operator must make adjustments to the other
forms of generation which he can control.

Figure 4.5. Fuel Mix in Study Area with 10% Wind and 1% Solar Contribution [73]
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The network operator would endeavor to shed the most expensive forms of power
first, and the least expensive forms of power last – all while balancing the amount of
generation against the amount of load. In Figure 4.6 we see even more wind power added
to the mix at the expense of combined cycle and coal. In Figure 4.7 it reaches the level of
a 30% contribution by wind. The smooth, periodic valleys and troughs across the top of
Figure 4.4 are all but gone by Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.6. Fuel Mix with 20% Wind Penetration and 3% Solar [73]

Additional contribution by wind and solar displaces dispatchable generation (such
as coal), and ultimately causes the network operator to lose control of the grid. There are
points on the graph in Figure 4.7 (such as Monday at Midnight) where the remaining
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dispatchable generation (gray and black) is much smaller than the wind contribution (in
green).

Figure 4.7. Fuel Mix with 30% Wind Penetration and 5% Solar [73]

Given these conditions, and the loss of control margins within the system, a
complete and sudden drop in windspeed could make it very challenging to maintain
voltage on the grid.
4.2.2. Operations Control Loop. The discussion above described that there are
multiple loops which are necessary to bring power online. Different loops control the
construction and destruction of power plants; the financial agreements to fuel and spinup
the generation, and finally the real-time operation of the power plants and transmission
network.
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Network operators continually monitor the health of the electrical network. A
number of network conditions can occur which could serve as a sign of poor system
health:
•

Overvoltage

•

Undervoltage

•

Phase imbalance

•

Insufficient real power

•

Insufficient reactive power

•

Under frequency

•

Over frequency
Network operators ordinarily adjust generation levels in an effort to balance the

generation against the load. However, some network operators have the option of
adjusting the load. Adjustment to the load – usually through some market-based reward
for the consumer – is called “demand response.”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) identifies 15 or more different
activities7 which fall under the umbrella term “Demand Response.” These include:
1.)

Direct Load Control

2.)

Interruptible Load

3.)

Critical Peak Pricing with Control

7 It should be noted that the list of what constitutes “demand response” varies somewhat by
organization. The FERC definition includes Ancillary Services under the umbrella term. It should also be
noted that the FERC definition of DR, and FERC Order 745 which allows utilities to cut back generation in
favor of DR was challenged in court and went all of the way to the US Supreme Court [74].
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4.)

Load as Capacity Resource

5.)

Spinning Reserves (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification)

6.)

Non‐Spinning Reserves (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification)

7.)

Emergency Demand Response

8.)

Regulation Service (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification)

9.)

Demand Bidding and Buyback

10.)

Time‐of‐Use Pricing

11.)

Critical Peak Pricing

12.)

Real‐Time Pricing

13.)

Peak Time Rebate

14.)

System Peak Response Transmission Tariff

15.)

Other [75]
There are over a dozen different techniques used for DR, but DR calls are

generally provided a day in advance – when the energy market determines that there will
be a generation shortfall. Sometimes the spot market can identify an hour in advance that
there will be a price spike and/or a generation shortfall. Customers who subscribe to a
Real Time Price (RTP) program might be informed in “real time” of the price change
(though in some experimental programs customers are informed the day after the event
[76]).
DR is not a widespread capability at the time of this writing. One form of DR is
“Direct Load Control.” The largest Direct Load Control program in the world is at FPL
(formerly “Florida Power and Light”). With 800,000 devices deployed on customer’s
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water heaters, air conditioners, etc. FPL is able to control over 1,000 MW of power [77].
No other utility has a direct load control program of this magnitude.
This level of control is operated at the wholesale market level. It addresses
generation shortfalls, or transmission line issues. The utility does not have real-time
visibility to distribution assets, and cannot alleviate the strain on assets even if it knew an
issue has developed. For example, if a service transformer were overloaded, contractual
limitations, AMI network limitations, customer participation levels, and other constraints
would make it so that a solution could not be guaranteed in every case.
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Figure 4.8. Demand Response as an Extension of Operations
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Demand Response is called upon by network operators. Although the Energy
Market prepares the contracts with the consumer to enable this activity, it should be
considered an extension of network operations as described in Figure 4.8.
4.2.3. Power Markets. This section endeavors to explain the various markets at
work today, and ultimately show the need for an additional market to cover an uncovered
area.
The history of the regulated utility can be traced back to the origins of
electrification. When Edison, Westinghouse, and others developed the many technical
innovations necessary to operate the electrical grid, Samuel Insull developed rate
innovations and promoted monopolies under government regulation. Today we find the
grid undergoing considerable change as new pressures push it to be reinvented. The
original design assumed that electricity would always flow unidirectionally from a small
number of large generators to numerous small consumers. This design is challenged
today to deliver power in the face of numerous distributed energy resources, investment
in alternative power sources and underinvestment in aging generation and infrastructure.
The electric utility industry is very capital intensive. Investments in recent years are 58%
in generation, 31% distribution, and 11% into transmission [78].
It is well established in the literature that a properly functioning free market
works to the mutual benefit of both buyers and sellers of a product, and that this is a very
desirable trait in the energy market [79]. Customers find the best products to meet their
objectives, while sellers find the broadest possible market for their goods.
In order to promote competition and free enterprise in the industry, many regions
have moved toward deregulated markets. The wholesale power markets in all of these
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regions allow producers to compete for the available business. Wholesale power markets
are a fairly recent innovation. Deregulation actually started in other countries and gained
wide appeal in the US around the ‘90s and 2000s. Congress formally created the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1978 and gave the FERC the authority over
electricity transmission. Over the years, FERC issued a series of rules which provided for
gradual deregulation of the power industry.
In 1992, FERC order 636 allowed for “customer choice.” In many regions, the
program allows retail consumers to choose their provider [80]. The provider serves as a
retail aggregator, and may offer multiple plans to their subscribers. The retail aggregators
then in turn participate in the wholesale market on behalf of consumers. The plans
offered by the retail aggregators may offer a variety of banking services to the consumer.
They may be able to offer a guaranteed rate, and a fixed amount on the bill for a period of
one year. While we don’t see it in practice, the technology exists to expose retail
customers to real-time prices driven by wholesale market prices. When done properly,
and with sufficient granularity, the market can be effective at attracting generation to
relieve network congestion [81] [82] [83].
Industry experts observe that the grid is moving from a “fly by wire” type of
control for dispatchable generation to a stochastic form of generation. They note that new
methods are needed to control such a grid [84]. The rise of “prosumers” (those who
sometimes produce and sometimes consume energy) is changing the nature of the grid.
4.2.3.1. The free market. The idea of commerce dates back prior to recorded
history. Many countries endeavor to facilitate free market economies. It is well known
that a healthy marketplace competition promotes the ability of consumers to find the
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attributes they desire in a product, and conversely, the ability of producers to find
additional markets for their products. Two hundred years ago, Adam Smith in his book
The Wealth of Nations described the naturally occurring self-regulation which occurs in a
free market economy. Smith described it as if an “invisible hand” guides participants to
“promote an end which was no part of (their) intention.” [44] The economy itself is
commonly viewed as a self-organizing system [85]. Naturally occurring commerce in a
free market allows prices to rise and fall in response to supply and demand. Surplus leads
to low prices, which in turn spurs consumption, which in turn eliminates the surplus and
brings prices higher. Conversely, shortage leads to high prices, which spurs conservation,
which in turn eases the shortage and allows prices to fall.8
Despite the effectiveness of a free market economy, the power industry has found
that some degree of monopolization is practical. In 1892 Samuel Insull became president
of the Chicago Edison Company. He argued quite successfully that given the high cost of
generating equipment, and that these power plants were centrally located, utilities should
be allowed to operate as a monopoly, free of competition, and be regulated by the state
[46]. He reasoned that because the high capital investments required by the utility,
competition would not result in lower costs or better service, but in duplication of service

8

It is interesting to note that many insects, including ants, work individually toward their own

ends, but collectively find the behavior of the colony to appear to have directed organization (guided by an
“invisible hand”). Ants individually forage for food, just as humans may individually hunt or gather. Ants
and humans perform many other supporting roles to sustain their lives. Humans have worked together to
form organized societies which obtain or produce the required goods. Smith argues that humans may do so
with their own individual ambitions in mind, but collectively, through the marketplace may appear to have
an invisible hand which guides the outcome. Ultimately, goods are produced and delivered for a price
which is mutually agreed upon as fair.
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and higher costs. He warned that there could be too much service in areas of greatest
competition, and little or no service in areas where infrastructure has not been built [46].
This wisdom has prevailed since the inception of the grid but is being questioned as
generators become more numerous and diverse. The original underlying belief was that
large, centralized generation is always more cost effective than smaller distributed
generation. This original assumption is no longer always true.
There are those today who promote the decentralization of the electric grid [54].
Some argue that there are numerous thermodynamic inefficiencies in large power
systems and argue that there are cost saving benefits of decentralized generation [86].
The electricity market is different from most markets because it is a commodity
that cannot be stored in bulk in its raw form. This prevents “market makers”9 from
participating in the market – buying and selling the commodity for a profit. Instead, a
number of other approaches have been developed. Utilities may deal directly with
consumers, or in some states (such as Texas) a retail layer is introduced between the
generation and transmission companies and the consumer. This layer provides customer
service to the consumers and aggregates retail purchases to buy power at the wholesale
level.

9

Despite the absence of “market makers” in the electricity marketplace, similar opportunities exist

if one has the right equipment. With energy storage equipment, it would be possible to buy energy when
the price is low, store it, and use it when the price is high. There are a number of technologies which could
someday be utilized in this role. Centralized storage can be found today in pumped hydro and compressed
air. Smaller scale storage might be found in a fleet of electric vehicles, banks of batteries, or small scale air
liquefaction.
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4.2.3.2. History. Economic theory starts with the basic premise from Adam Smith
that free market exchange is the best mechanism to balance supply and demand at a fair
price [44]. The rules which define a fair market mechanism are arrived at by consensus
between government and private entities. Every region is allowed to arrive at rules that
they feel are appropriate.
The original economies of vertical integration argued originally by Insull [46]
have been studied over the years. Economists Coase and Williamson find that vertically
integrated utilities are easier to operate, [47] [48] and others find that they cost less to
operate [49] [50].
The new challenge for utilities is for them to accept power from a diversity of
clean and renewable sources when and where such power is available. In many cases this
requires a vertically integrated utility to break up, and separate generation from
transmission and distribution. Such utilities must now rely heavily on energy markets to
orchestrate the energy needed to supply the projected demand.
As the Smart Grid is developed, the view in the US is that a wholesale market can
be operated effectively which represents the needs of the stakeholders, and that DER can
be viewed as a load reduction within the customer domain10. Small generators are not
allowed to participate in the energy market [87]. The view in Europe of the Smart Grid is
quite different. DER is considered a separate (eighth) domain. In Europe, owners of small
generation can participate in the Energy Market just as large generators [88]. DER is also
controllable by Operations just as large generation. These fundamentally different views

10

Referring now back to Figure 4.1. The Seven NIST Smart Grid Domains.
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are important in that significant levels of generation are largely ignored by the US energy
market and recognized by the European (as depicted in Figure 4.9).
The European view is to take the four NIST domains that have physical actuality
and make them columnar domains in the 3D SGAM view. A fifth domain, “DER” is
added to give place to the ability of non-utility owned generation to participate in the
market place. The NIST domains “Markets” and “Operations” finds their place as
“Zones” in the SGAM design. Europe (in particular Germany) calls for the creation of a
“Smart Grid,” but also of “Smart Markets” to allow for the interaction of DER with the
Energy Market [89].

Figure 4.9. (European) Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) [88]
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4.2.3.3. The argument for better markets. Different theories exist as to how a
market should be operated for the maximum benefit of society [90] [91]. Some believe in
shielding consumers from price spikes, while others believe in exposing consumers to
such spikes.
In most tariffs and most markets operating today the real cost of power is hidden
from consumers. The consumer is instead presented a uniform price regardless of their
location and regardless of the spot market shortage or surplus that may exist at the
moment. As a result, consumers lack any incentive to respond to market conditions when
there is a shortage of electricity or a constraint on the powerline. This lack of information
for consumers can create devastating financial strains on utilities as they attempt to mask
all of the challenges in creating and delivering power [92].
Some experts have concluded that the biggest problem with the current grid is not
technical but regulatory [93] [94]. When customers pay a flat rate regardless of their
location it causes those who live near a source of power to subsidize those who live far
away. When customers pay a flat rate regardless of their time of use, it causes those who
use power off-peak (when wholesale prices are low) to subsidize users who tend to use
more power on-peak (when wholesale prices are high). Furthermore, with the deployment
of supplemental power sources such as rooftop solar, we find that “the wealthy” are able
to reduce their utility bills. This ultimately leaves the less affluent to pay for the
infrastructure that serves everyone. While the matter of equity is one for state regulators
to debate, many believe that “as a matter of principle, ethical pricing should be cost-based
and not create subsidies between consumers” [67].
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The industry needs policies that incentivize investment in the appropriate areas
[93]. Some believe the way customers are insulated from the real cost of power is a core
part of the problem. “Price-responsive demand is essential to realize the benefit of the
Smart Grid” [95]. “The average cost-based pricing formula precludes economically
accurate price signals from guiding consumption decisions” [64]. When markets are
allowed to function, the market itself offers an emergent behavior which guides the
required behavior. High fuel prices are passed along to the customer and motivate
conservation. Low fuel prices can also be passed along in a deregulated market and allow
consumers to enjoy savings. When the real cost of power is scaled out from a zonal
market to a nodal market, it promotes market based congestion management [79].
“Market-based determinations of capacity needs (have been found to be) superior to even
the best guesses of regulators” [96].
4.2.3.4. US wholesale markets. North America is divided into separate regions
for reliability regions called “interconnects.” In the lower 48 states, the interconnects11
join and trade energy in three sections: The Western interconnect, the Texas interconnect,
and the Eastern interconnect [97].
These regions are overlaid with reliability councils, and also subdivided into
independent systems (Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission
Operators). The ISOs/RTOs are depicted in Figure 4.10. These organizations help move
power and call upon spinning reserve to balance load.

11

The term “interconnect” is used to say that all generators and loads within this area are

interconnected.
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Power producers and very large consumers of energy (such as entire utilities)
participate in market operations within power pools located in these operating regions. It
is possible for buyers and sellers to form contracts between each other within their power
pool. A power producer may participate in a distant market through the use of agreements
with owners of transmission lines.

Figure 4.10. US Independent System Operators (RTOs and ISOs) [98]

Transmission capacity is a very real constraint. Even though the “Eastern
Interconnect” stretches from Kansas to the East coast, it does not mean that unlimited
power may freely flow between all points as needed within the interconnect. Shortages
can occur within an interconnect and even within an ISO. Shortages result in higher
prices.
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Figure 4.11 shows that different parts of the country can pay more for energy than
other regions (even in a fluid spot market).
Figure 4.12 captures a moment of time within the Midwest ISO in which a price
fluctuation occurred within the ISO. There is a spot market for energy, and corresponding
prices. But there is also a day-ahead energy market. When proper planning can occur,
regions tend to settle on day-ahead prices which are less (per MW) than the spot market.
(Such regional pricing is depicted in Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.11. Example Spot Pricing Developed Among and Within Organizations in the
USA [99]
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All of the wholesale markets in the US have transitioned from a “zonal market” to
a “nodal market” [101] [102]. This creates much finer granularity in the analysis and
improvements in the ability to address localized shortages and surpluses of power. For
example, transitioning to a nodal system in Texas is estimated to cost between $530-660
million, yet will save customers an estimated $5.6 billion in the first 10 years of operation
[103].

Figure 4.12. Example Price Map at MISO Generated for Dec 20, 2017 at 23:40 Showing
Parts of Missouri, Iowa, and Illinois [100]

The wholesale market drives the movement of power from large (“centralized”)
generators to distribution networks (as shown in Figure 4.1). SCADA instruments in the
distribution substation allow network operators to see how much power flows through the
substation, but once it is in the distribution network visibility to real-time power flow is
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generally not available. Temporary shortages and surpluses within a given distribution
network are generally hard to find, and there is no “retail energy market” market
mechanism to correct these differences. All of the costs are “internal” and owned by a
single entity.
Distribution networks are designed to be worry free. Power engineers who design
the distribution network will size the substation transformers based on the power needed
downstream. They will ensure that the conductors that carry power from the substation to
the service transformer are adequately sized. (Customers select a service capacity and
thus directly influence the size of the service transformer.) Everything is carefully
engineered to deliver the power the customers say they need when they say they need it.
However, distribution networks are big and slow to change. A growth spurt of new
construction in one area can outstrip a substation transformer’s ability to deliver power to
that area. Infrastructure can suffer weathering or damage and lose capacity. New and
unexpected types of loads (such as electric vehicles) can catch a utility off guard and
unable to serve the accumulated demand within a service territory. Customer-sided
generation (such as wind and solar) is outside the utility’s control. Customers can
contribute power to the grid (or not contribute) in ways the utility energy purchaser
cannot rely on or control. All of these can create localized shortages of energy, yet these
shortages are not reflected in the cost of power. Residential consumers tend to pay a flat
rate, regardless of their time of use, and regardless of the distance energy must travel to
reach their load.
4.2.3.5. Day ahead and hour ahead markets. All dispatchable generation is
planned based on a load forecast, which in turn, is based on the weather forecast. In order
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to accurately gauge the need for power, these forecasts are refined over time. The “next
day” weather forecast tends to be far more accurate than the forecast for the next week.
The forecast for the “next hour” tends to be more accurate than the forecast for the next
day. These short-term markets tend to reflect the real cost of generating power.
For the most part, all residential consumers pay the same price per kWh at every
time of day regardless of the availability and price of power. By insulating the customer
from the “pain” that the utility feels, the customer is prevented from participating in the
solution.
4.2.3.6. Large generation. The markets operate by first determining the amount
of load that is expected to be required in each region. The load forecast is largely based
on the weather forecast. In the wholesale energy market, buyers meet sellers armed with
this information. The load requirements generally outstrip the ability of any single power
plant to provide. The market thus identifies the lowest cost provider and accepts that bid.
More power is usually needed, so the next lowest cost bid is accepted, and so on until
sufficient generation is contracted to meet the forecasted load and ancillary service
requirements. Large generation is usually able to offer power at a lower price than small
generation. In part, large generators can use less expensive fuels than small generators
(such as U235 or coal). But these plants usually also require that a significant portion of
the plant capacity be utilized, and that it is not operated in a dynamic fashion that requires
numerous ramp ups and ramp downs in reaction to a wildly varying load.
4.2.3.7. Retail markets. The cost of electricity consists of energy costs and
network costs [104]. Ordinarily a utility will offer a variety of tariffs to retail customers.
All of the tariffs are different yet all of them are considered fair. The most commonly
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used tariff employs a flat rate. The flat rate charges consumers the same price for energy
regardless of the time or amount used. Residential customers have very predictable usage
patterns. Flat rates are easily metered by a simple watthour meter.
4.2.3.8. Real time pricing. Opinions as to the ideal and most equitable pricing
mechanism continue to be a source of vigorous debate. Ahmad Faruqui writes:

Flat rate pricing, which has been in place for the past century creates an
enormous subsidy between customers with varying load shapes. It is
unethical and needs to be replaced by dynamic pricing. Not only will this
be more ethical, it will also improve the economics of the power system
and lower costs for all customers [67].

Efforts to develop time-based rates (in particular Time Of Use based rates) date
back to the original rollout of the grid. Improvements in technology have allowed the
consideration of other rates which are more reflective of wholesale market activity. A
landmark paper proposing “Dynamic Pricing” was written by Vickrey in 1971 [66].
Since then, there have been pilot programs to expose retail customers to real-time
prices [105]. These have been well received in concept, but slow to find implementation.
A rare example of a retail RTP program can be found at Elevate Energy, Chicago Illinois
USA [76]. Residential customers participate and use either the price from the wholesale
market from the G&T that supplies the electricity. One G&T posts the day-ahead price
from the wholesale market. Another G&T uses a dynamic spot market price which is
adjusted throughout the day. Customers can learn about the real time price by:
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•

Visiting a website

•

Text message alerts

•

Email alerts
They can call the utility on the phone and talk to a person and ask them about the

price forecast.
Customers settle up after the fact with the price they paid during the market
interval during which they consumed the power.
The barriers to implementation appear to be political rather than technical [67]
[106].
In terms of raw power, Georgia Power (Southern Company) operates the largest
RTP market in the US. It was felt that opening up the pool of all available power to all
market participants was the fairest mechanism [107]. However, to participate in this RTP
market, a customer has to be 1 MW or larger. This limits the number of participants to
80.
However, one could question the fairness of real time prices which were based on
a criterion the customer didn’t want. A better approach would be to develop a
“transactive energy market” which optimizes along the criterion (or criteria) specified by
the consumer.
4.2.3.9. Transactive energy. “Transactive energy” is the name given to the
notion that numerous small customers can effectively participate in the wholesale market
to buy and sell energy by contracting to activate customer owned DER. Efforts (such as
the OASIS Energy Market Information Exchange) have been made to develop protocols
for transactive energy [108]. In theory, this would allow a customer to buy DER power
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from a neighbor. Unfortunately, the OASIS eMIX standard doesn’t identify a means to
communicate these messages in real time to the participants [109].
The GridWise Architecture Council has developed ideas similar to those proposed
here [110]. The tenets proposed by the GWAC include:
•

“The information age will revolutionize the way in which energy systems work
today.

•

Intelligence (better information supports better decision making) will invade all
levels of the energy systems from generation, to bulk transmission, local
distribution, and residential, commercial, and industrial consumption.

•

Value is best judged in a fair market environment open to participation and
review by regulatory authority. This should be exposed at all levels of the system.

•

Transparency of value allows market participants to develop and deploy
economical solutions that cross traditional enterprise and regulatory boundaries.

•

The system will evolve from its present form of operation, through a series of
tractable changes over time. Changes include organizational boundaries
(ownership and operational responsibility), technology deployment, and forms of
collaboration between system components.

•

Collaboration based upon autonomous decision making enhances the resilience of
complex systems to system-wide failure and accommodates evolutionary
changes” [65].
Technology minded customers would know that each of the alternative energy

sources have environmental issues of their own.
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4.2.3.10. New challenges. It is not always possible to upgrade everything at any
time. Not all utilities have the funds to undertake significant construction projects. Yet, a
significant upgrade may be required if there is a rapid adoption of Electric Vehicles
(EVs). A study by Bloomberg forecasts that the cost of EVs will drop to match the cost of
comparable gasoline powered vehicles in the year 2020 [111]. When this happens, it
could prove to be a tipping point in the market and a rapid shift to the adoption of EVs. A
rapid charging EV can draw more power than the power drawn by the house it is parked
next to. However, if properly managed, EVs could increase electric sales overall by 25%
[112].

Figure 4.13. Results of Increased Penetration of PV at a Hawaii Electric Circuit. [113]
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This type of loading will complicate both the energy market and operations. Add
to this the adoption of DER. It is possible for energy to appear where and when it isn’t
needed. This too can cause difficulties in operating the grid. (Note the red curve in Figure
4.13 that dips below zero during the 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. window).
There is research that suggests that given a centralized knowledge of the electric
vehicles, their locations, and their charging requirements, it would be possible to
incentivize vehicle owners (as Demand Response participants) to stagger their vehicle
charging in a way that levels the load on the available generation [114]. This in turn
would allow lower cost generation to serve the load and minimize the need for expensive
peaking generation.
In a similar fashion, given a centralized knowledge of the real-time consumption
of electricity, and the strain on every distribution asset, it would be possible (in theory) to
issue some type of Demand Response program to alleviate the strained asset. But current
DR participation ranges from zero to 100% at different service transformers. DR
participation ranges from 0.1% of peak load to 10.2% at different ISOs/RTOs, and an
ability to shed as much as 6.2% of peak load for all ISOs/RTOs combined [115]. The
only mechanism that does reach every consumer is the marketplace.
The marketplace must continue to support large, centralized generation, but also
accommodate DER. If DR is built out in an area, a local marketplace needs to support all
sizes of DR entrants to the market. The energy market needs a mechanism to support an
“all of the above” energy policy. Large and small generators, large and small consumers,
large and small DR participants. Remote participants would require the support of
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transmission operators, while local participants require the support of distribution
operators.
There are two ways this can be approached:
1.)

Build out the centralized energy market to have improved granularity in the
markets and improved visibility to distribution issues, or

2.)

Develop a type of distributed energy market which offers improved granularity in
the markets and improved visibility to the distribution issues.
Either approach could be made to work. Building out a centralized system allows

for a simpler algorithm, but it creates new challenges. A centralized approach could
introduce a single point of failure in the architecture. It also requires enormous amounts
of data to traverse vast distances bidirectionally in real time. If the current data is not
available to the centralized system, it cannot compute an optimal result. On the other
hand, a distributed system is more difficult to destroy. A computing node is responsible
for fewer participants, so the loss of a computing node causes less damage to market
participation.
The transactive energy (TE) market endeavors to be this mechanism. TE allows
numerous, small, local markets to be created to form a local price, and through the free
market, solve local problems locally. With generation and ancillary services put in place
(as DR programs) the market can then hand off planned exchanges to network operators
to execute.
TE can create customized price for electricity which is as individualized as every
service location. This can serve as an alternative to the flat rate tariff, and an answer to
the problems the flat rate tends to perpetuate. As long as the majority of residential
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customers operate on a flat rate tariff, it will be difficult for the wholesale energy market
to scale out and engage small users in a way that will protect the interests of all of the
market participants. The flat rate tariff actually creates subsidies between tariff classes
[67]. It hides the true cost of delivering power to each service location. It perpetuates
many of the problems the market currently has in promoting competition and responding
to fluctuating fuel costs.
4.3. STATEMENT OF NEED
A market mechanism is needed that will accept participants of any size, apply a
consistent set of rules, and scale to include all participants.
4.3.1. Distributed Energy Resources. The introduction of significant amounts of
wind and photovoltaic (PV) power into the distribution grid as distributed energy
resources (DER) can create voltage and frequency regulation challenges [57]. Not only
can a significant penetration of PV power cause the overall voltage to rise [58], even
moderate amounts of PV penetration along with windblown clouds, can create a situation
in which rapid voltages changes are introduced onto the grid, and substation tap changers
are not able to keep up [59]. The introduction of these new power sources challenges both
the operation of the grid as well as the traditional energy marketplace [54]. “The present
electric power delivery infrastructure was not designed to meet the needs of a
restructured electricity marketplace, the increasing demands of a digital society, or the
increased use of renewable power production”[55]. New approaches are needed which
consider the needs of consumers, producers, and the grid itself.
The traditional grid has a long history of centralized generation accompanied by a
single owner of transmission and distribution assets [46] [47] [48] [49] [50]. However,
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the trend in deregulation is to split up the ownership of generation, transmission, and
distribution assets. This paves the way for small independent power producers to
participate in the grid, but small participants are generally excluded from the bulk power
market [61] [62]. With many areas now legislating renewable portfolio standards ranging
from 20 to 100% penetration in sourcing power to the grid, the opportunity for small
power producers to participate should not be ignored.
4.3.2. The US Wholesale Power Market. Transmission and distribution circuits
are very different from each other. The thinking supporting the design of these circuits is
very different. They are constructed using different rules and operate at different
voltages. In the wholesale energy market, an entire distribution circuit (consisting of a
substation transformer and everything electrically downstream) might be aggregated and
represented as a single node in a transmission model. Transmission level “nodes” or
“regions”[101] might participate in a wholesale energy market, but distribution-level
stakeholders typically do not. By aggregating all of the details of the distribution circuit
into a single node (and a single “load” in the model), the issues within the distribution
circuit become obscured. The wholesale market participants are not informed of activity
within the distribution circuit and, as a result, cannot do anything to address local issues
that may arise.
Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmissions Organizations
(RTOs) cover regions that serve approximately two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load
(depicted in Figure 4.10). The ISOs & RTOs foster competition for electricity generation
by, in some cases, forming or, in other cases, supporting a wholesale energy marketplace.
Bids are made in the marketplace to optimize for cost (called “economic dispatch”) [116].
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The energy buyers are often utilities who need to acquire power to serve to their
customers. The energy sellers are the owners of large generators. (The generator might be
owned by a utility or it might be independently owned.) The owners of transmission
participate in, and facilitate the sale. The contracts formed cover a variety of possibilities
including sometimes the option to buy between zero and all of the power available at a
power plant. Frequency and voltage regulation are often handled in a contract for
“ancillary services” in which one or more buyers hold the option to buy power as needed
in real time.
4.4. INTRODUCING TRANSACTIVE ENERGY
Distributed generation is the new reality. Nevertheless, to offer a fair price to
participants of all sizes, a way needs to be developed to engage the smallest of consumers
and producers in the energy market (including those connected to distribution voltages)
[44] [63] [64]. Such a change can engage large numbers of small producers and
consumers to alter their behavior in response to the corporate needs of the community.
Higher (or lower) energy prices can stimulate changes in consumer behavior in response
to prices, as well as smarten investment. Only when the granularity of the market is
extended to include all consumers and producers will we see the smallest assets (such as
individual service transformers) protected by market economies.
A decentralized energy market known as “transactive energy” (TE) has been
proposed to supplement and eventually replace [70] the legacy, centrally controlled
system. TE supports both market [71] and control functionality. In layman’s terms, one
might describe transactive energy as “an internet-enabled free market, where customer
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devices and grid systems can barter over the proper way to solve their mutual problems,
and settle on the proper price for their services, in close to real time” [69].
The marketplace needs to continue to support centralized generation but must also
make room for DER. DER might be able to relieve a strained asset, but so might Demand
Response where it has been sufficiently built out downstream of the asset, and the
network operator has visibility to the situation. The market needs a means to support an
“all of the above” approach to energy and consumption. TE aims to become that
mechanism through individualized markets with a large number of participants.
4.4.1. “Fairness” Under the Transactive Energy Paradigm. There are many
different tariffs in place at each electric utility. These tariffs also vary from utility to
utility. Each of these distribution tariffs are considered “fair” yet they are different. The
transactive energy market departs from these traditional practices and endeavors to apply
the rules considered “fair” at the wholesale level to the retail level. The notion of what is
“fair” in the energy marketplace has been argued for the past 100 years, and the debate
will not be settled here. Creating a retail energy market which is similar to the wholesale
market implies that consumers would have to pay individually for power from the
sources they select, and they would have to pay for the transportation of that power as
well. One consequence of a retail energy market is that producers must compete against
each other at a retail level; and conversely, consumers compete against each other as
well. When competition occurs in the marketplace usually it is considered beneficial. In
this competition we expect:
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•

Consumers willing to pay more should be able to extend their reach and obtain
power from distant locations (provided no network assets constrain their
purchase).

•

Consumers willing to pay more should be able to obtain expensive local power
when inexpensive distant power is unavailable due to network constraints.

•

Generators should end up with contracts from a mix of consumers – some local,
some distant.

•

Any given asset should end up with contracts from a mix of consumers which are
electrically downstream from the generators.

•

Consumers may end up with a of mix generation sources (of various costs) even
when they specifically asked the solver to provide the lowest cost solution.
The TabuACO achieved all of these outcomes in the contracts that were formed.

The process of incrementally obtaining power (using an ant authorized to purchase small
amounts of power at a time) allowed all of the consumers and producers to compete in
the marketplace simultaneously and arrive at an equitable sharing of the opportunities.
Another approach to achieving this particular outcome would be to formally control the
sale of power so that only small increments of power could be sold under any contract,
and thus the solver (whatever it is) must labor to form many thousands of contracts to
obtain the power any given consumer requires. This gradual release of energy to the
marketplace allows for some degree of competition between consumers and an
opportunity for some consumers to purchase low cost power some of the time.
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In the experiments, consumers seeking the lowest cost would sometimes get
contracts with generators that were low cost but not the lowest cost. There are several
things to be said about this outcome:
1.)

The stochastic search process which authorizes higher prices when low cost
solutions cannot be found will occasionally form a contract with a distant
generator that is low cost and bypass a local generator that was lower cost. The
Tabu ACO algorithm used in the TE application is a “greedy” algorithm in the
sense that it acquires any suitable power it can obtain. It takes the view that it is
better to acquire the power required in the marketplace at a reasonable price than
to run the risk of falling short before the market window closes.

2.)

Depending on a consumer’s strategy, this outcome is not necessarily suboptimal.
It is usually a good practice to diversify one’s supply portfolio in order to improve
product availability and maintain lines to multiple suppliers. Portfolio
diversification is practiced by many purchasing agents around the world. We can
say that the selection of multiple sources for generation is actually a desirable
outcome.

3.)

This “proof of concept” experiment did not employ the “evaporation” commonly
used by ACOs to converge to a solution. Instead it allowed the ant to form a
contract with any generator that met the purchase criteria. This is deferred to be a
future work in section 6.2.5. One approach to attaining the lowest cost would be
to implement a form of selective “evaporation” with the contracts. Once all of the
required generation has been found, an application-specific evaporation algorithm
can be used. The algorithm can identify cost paid for the least expensive contract,
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and the energy obtained by the most expensive contract. A new (cost saving)
sortie can be issued in which the ant seeks a replacement for the most expensive
contract. If a replacement is found during the bidding period, it can be approved,
and the expensive contract can be cancelled or possibly demoted to an agreement
to provide spinning reserve instead of power. This process can continue until the
lowest available outcome is acquired within the time allowed. Of course, nearly
everybody wants the lowest cost generation, but not everyone will be able to
acquire it. It can be said that it is “fairer” that people pay an average price. This is
part of the debate. The other side would argue that not all consumers are
“average” and that consumers should pay in proportion to the actual cost of goods
and services.
4.)

Alternatively, the existing algorithm can be used to seek the lowest cost
generation. A user who really values hitting a certain cost target, can name their
price, and if the ant doesn’t find generation available at that price, adjustment
their strategy before the market window closes. In this way, the existing algorithm
is perfectly satisfactory. Of course, this strategy risks experiencing an energy
shortfall at the close of the market window.
Furthermore, on the subject of marketplace competition, a real commercial

application would likely want tighter guarantees of fair play. In the proof-of-concept
experiment, equity was assured by running all nests for equal iterations on the same
computer. If processing is distributed so that every nest has its own processor, similar
controls are needed to ensure that some nests do not gain an unfair advantage due to
differences in processing power and network performance.
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4.4.1.1. Overages and shortfalls. There are several scenarios that may occur in
which a consumer uses more or less power than contracted, or a generator contributes
more or less power than agreed. Who pays for these differences? In the wholesale market
the participants pool their power. If a generator goes offline, it loses out on revenue, and
additional power is (often) purchased on the spot market to compensate for the shortfall.
Sometimes network operators can simply raise the contribution from the spinning reserve
and frequency reserve allocation to address the shortfall. A similar thing can occur here.
Consumers can use the transactive energy market to agree to purchase the minimum
amount of power they think they will require, agree to purchase spinning reserve to cover
any additional amount of power they think they may require, and allow network operators
to control the spinning reserve contribution in order to stabilize the grid. What if a
consumer draws more power than their energy and spinning reserve contracts allow? As
described in section 6.2.3, this is a subject for future work. However, we would expect
uncontracted power to be supplied by a power pool, and settled at a price higher than
average. The energy market provides a first pass approximation in matching the level of
generation to the load, but network operators have the means to tune the output of certain
generators until the level of generation matches the load.
A consumer with onsite generation may elect to operate their system off-grid, but
if they go on-grid they have access to additional generation beyond what they own. This
simple connection usually results in higher reliability and higher availability. But the
ability to purchase the power necessary to meet the local need is something that may
cause consumers to recalculate their investment in local generation. For those who are
off-grid, local power is “free,” but only after a substantial initial capital investment.
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The normal behavior for the stakeholders is described in Figure 4.14. Consumers
are expected to form a contract for low cost power which is the minimum they believe
they will need to use, and another contract with a generator for spinning reserve. The
spinning reserve costs something because the equipment is “rented” and standing by to
serve the consumer. If called upon to contribute, fuel will be spent, and the delivered
power which was held in reserve utilized. This source will likely be more expensive than
the other contracts the consumer holds. It should also be mentioned that the “network”
that transports the power is not expected to have zero resistance. There will be electrical
losses along this network. If a consumer elects to buy power from a generator that is quite
remote from their location, they do so with the understanding that some of the power will
be lost along the way.

uc [Package] Usecases [Happy Path]

Consumes some amount of pow er
greater than the amount of pow er
purchased but less than the
additional amount in spinning
reserv e.

Deliv ers agreed
upon pow er

Generates pow er
per contract

Maintains spinning
reserv e on behalf of
consumer per
contract

Consumer

Netw ork

Generator

Figure 4.14. Happy Path Usecase Showing Contractual Roles
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The corner case analysis is always more difficult than the happy path. What
should happen to our contractual agreements if a network outage occurs? It may be that
the loss of a transmission line allows distant generators to continue to operate but due to
the severed line, cause their power to be delivered to different consumers instead. What is
fair in this case? On one hand, it could be argued that electrons are fungible and that
electrons added at one point on the grid don’t necessarily make it to their contractual
destination anyway. Let consumers pay the rate they have used. On the other hand, it
could be said that high cost electricity can make or break certain industrial applications,
and cost matters a great deal to the economics of the business process. Should consumers
be informed of a transmission line outage and be asked to curtail? What if it is a local
outage and they become informed as their lights go out? This is described in Figure 4.15.
If the communications network were still operational, and the solver able to
perform a rapid analysis for the energy market, it may be possible for the consumer’s
equipment to immediately negotiate new contracts with local generation. Suddenly, the
power which would have left the area for sale elsewhere is no longer able to leave, just as
the power generated remotely is unable to enter the area. Can the old contracts be
temporarily set aside, and new contracts negotiated under the new (temporary) grid
topology? The distribution network (and/or network operator) could inform the
consumer’s equipment of the grid failure, and of power shortfall.
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If the communication network is a high-performance network, it may be possible
for the network to isolate the fault, come to understand its new topology, 12 and allow new
contracts to be renegotiated and operate until the old topology is restored.

uc [Package] Usecases [Netw ork Fault]
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Resells pow er instantaneously
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additional pow er ov er and
abov e pow er contracts
Suffers pow er outage
but attempts to
negotate immediately
for local pow er

Only pays
producers and
transporters that
actually deliv er
pow er

Contributes pow er
to grid

Pow er Pool

Consumer
Generator

Contributes agreed upon pow er
to grid and discov ers afterw ard
that pow er w as sold to pool
rather than consumer

Netw ork

Legend
Attempts to locate fault, isolate
fault from pow er feeds, and if
possible restore pow er to much
of the affected area

Issue
Money
Usecase

Suffers outage in
some area

Netw ork operator

Outages may be large or
small, easily repaired or
not.

Attempts to identify
affected consumers
and their
generators.

Figure 4.15. Power Outage Usecase

12

Products to monitor transmission asset health are common. Products to monitor distribution

asset health are available today, and costs are falling.
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The discussion of what is “possible,” “affordable,” and “fair” is left for
implementers to negotiate. Much of what is considered “fair” or “reasonable” is often
based upon the cost of the technology available at the time.

uc [Package] Usecases [Ov erconsumption]

Consumes more pow er than
contracts allow (scheduled
pow er purchase plus
spinning reserv e).

Supplies additional
pow er per default
contract

Deliv ers additional
pow er

Pow er Pool

Produces and
deliv ers pow er per
contract
Consumer

Netw ork

Generator

Legend
Issue
Usecase
May disconnect consumer
for non-payment or for
draw ing more pow er than
netw ork can support.

Netw ork operator

Produces pow er per
spinning reserv e
contract and deliv ers it
to grid.

Figure 4.16. Overconsumption Usecase

It should also be noted that this usecase introduces the “power pool” actor. This is
a bit of an artificial construct. The power pool is a collection of various participants who
have excess power for sale. The list includes:
•

Generators that contribute power to the grid as part of their startup or shutdown
process that is not specifically under contract.
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•

Generators that have unsold spinning reserve that could readily contribute power
at the request of the network operator.

•

Consumers that do not consume all of the power they have bought.
Another scenario is the case of the consumer using more power than they have

agreed to purchase. Figure 4.16 depicts the usecase scenario. What is reasonable in this
case? Should the consumer be disconnected the moment they exhaust the contract? Most
of today’s “smart meters” can easily support “prepay” metering and automatically
disconnect when the account balance reaches zero. They can also support a grace period.
Should the proposed system be invoked to acquire a purchase off of the spot market?
Should the consumer instead be assigned a purchase from the power pool at the current
market price? Some consideration has to be given to the ability of the communication
network. If it is highly capable, it may be possible to negotiate a new contract in less than
a second. If the network is instead optimized for cost, it may be that power is allowed to
flow to the extent the network can tolerate it, and payment is reconciled after the fact.
Integration with other systems is cited as a future work.
Consumers are expected to sign up for spinning reserve so that they may draw
power at their discretion. Spinning reserve is expected to be inexpensive to reserve, but
above average in cost to utilize. As a cost saving measure, consumers may designate a
fixed amount of power to be applied before any spinning reserve is utilized. Generators
under spinning reserve are controlled by the network operator. Generators assigned a
fixed contract may contribute their block of power at the appointed time without further
instructions from the network operator.
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uc [Package] Usecases [Underconsumption]
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Figure 4.17. Underconsumption Usecase

What happens if the consumer doesn’t use the amount of fixed power they
contracted for? (Such a situation is depicted in Figure 4.17). Case law would probably
find that since the contractor(s) delivered on their end of the agreement, the consumer is
obliged to pay them for their services. The excess power would flow to the “power pool”
entity for use at the discretion of the network operator.
Sometimes generators have problems and must go offline for unscheduled
maintenance or repair. (The usecase scenario is considered in Figure 4.18)
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uc [Package] Usecases [Undergeneration]
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Figure 4.18. Generation Shortfall

There are many options to be considered.
•

The generator might use the solver to resell its contracts to other generators

•

The network operator might inform the consumer of the generation shortfall and
inform the consumer that they will be purchasing power from the power pool at
the spot market price until the consumer finds a replacement generator.

•

The consumer, once informed of the failure, might elect to conserve power and
work within the constraints of the available power from other generators also
under contract.
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Large generators often must use or contribute a bit of power in order to get
synchronized to the grid. This is usually considered a negligible amount of power by the
generator, but what is to be done with it? What if an altruistic owner of solar generation
simply adds their excess power to the grid? What is to be done with excess “free” power?
(The usecase scenario is considered in Figure 4.19). The network operator will be
expected to monitor power production conditions, detect excess contributions, and
determine what to do about it.

uc [Package] Usecases [Ov ergeneration]

Sometimes it takes time
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Figure 4.19. Generation Excess
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4.4.1.2. Ancillary Services. The legacy energy market sells ancillary services as
well as energy. Ancillary services are used to handle the corner cases described above
which lead to generation/load mismatch. It is likely that anciallary services will still have
a place in the marketplace in addition to energy sales.
The conclusion of the analysis is that different regions will likely continue to have
different needs and subscribe to different notions of fairness. Any commercialized system
will need flexibility to support the range of options that real users would require. The
notion of fairness is best settled regionally. A real time spot market will likely be
required. A high-performance network would allow for immediate renegotiation of
contracts in the event of a network fault. If the network and solver perform sufficiently
well, it may be possible for the network operator to leverage “immediate renegotiation”
as a new tool to use in the event of an unplanned network event.
4.4.2. Disaster Recovery. There are many things that can damage the grid. A
massive solar flare could destroy much of the grid [117]. Large storms have been known
to destroy the grid [118]. Damage can occur to not only the transmission of power but
also to the monitoring and control of power. However, the introduction of significant
amounts of distributed generation along with distributed controls can change the
paradigm. Power will not necessarily be lost when a transmission line is lost. For
example, if a transmission line between a major generator and a substation is severed, any
distributed generators downstream of the substation will continue to serve the load. The
disconnected network may continue to operate in an islanded fashion.13 By the same
token, a neighborhood with significant amounts of distributed generation should be able
13

Usually with poor voltage and frequency regulation, but continuing to operate nevertheless.
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to operate independently from the grid (as a “microgrid”) if disconnected due to a
disaster.14
Distributed systems are well known in the literature for their advantages over
centralized systems when it comes to robustness. Distributed generation, distributed
control, along with a distributed energy market could allow an entire system to bootstrap
from an outage after a storm. Smart (communicating) distribution assets could determine
which lines and transformers were still in service. An automated fault location, isolation,
and service restoration (FLISR) capability could bring up portions of the grid that survive
the storm, and allow islanded systems to operate for months before being reconnected to
the regional interconnect. This type of capability is possible with the transactive energy
paradigm and not possible with today’s centralized control paradigm.

Table 4.2. GridWise Architecture Council Transactive Energy Framework Nodes [63]
Node Name

Scope

Regional
Control Area

Represents an entire region such as an ISO or RTO
Represents a legacy control area and its automatic
generation control
Represents one or more distribution networks
Represents a wholesale market participant. (A market
participant may be active in more than one region).

Distribution
Market
Participation
Supply
Building

14

Represents a market participant which is not part of the
legacy system, and any size.
Represents all of the load at a premises or otherwise
connected to the grid

A disaster in this case would include a hurricane, thunderstorm, earthquake, as well as a man

made disaster (e.g. terrorism).
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4.4.3. The GWAC Transactive Energy Framework. The GridWise
Architecture Council envisions a system architecture for transactive energy which
overlays the structure of the current power control and energy market [63]. The
architecture is summarized in Table 4.2. It is thought that participants can change roles at
any time. A supply node could become a building node (load) as conditions change.
4.5. STATEMENT OF SCOPE
This dissertation proposes a method of implementing transactive energy (TE)
using the TabuACO. It does not attempt to utilize TE as a control mechanism. This
instead is left to other researcher endeavors. A literature review finds that other research
is underway to leverage TE as part of a grid control system [119]. Linear programming,
artificial neural networks, and other approaches are being considered.
4.6. PROPOSED TRANSACTIVE ENERGY MODEL
Implementation of a transactive market with ant colony optimization requires a
new architecture to describe the control relationship (ref. Figure 4.20). The transmission
and distribution networks will still operate in a similar manner, with the main difference
being the creation of a new market. This new market is supportive of the design
constraints of the distribution circuit. Much like the process in the wholesale market, the
transactive retail market will form contracts between three parties:
1.)

The owner of the generation

2.)

The owner(s) of the grid assets

3.)

The consumer
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In this representation, the consumers are the nest for the ACO, and the energy at
the generation sites represent the food the ant agents are seeking. The grid itself is
modeled as a directed graph, with each grid asset represented as either a vertex or an edge
(Table 4.3).
bdd [Package] Framew ork [TACO_EM_Architecture]
«block»
Generator
High Speed
Communication

meter

Ow ner of Generation
Power
«itemFlow»

«block»
Grid
Ow ner of Transmission
and Distribution
Netw orks

references
: Grid Assets

«block»
Communications
Netw ork
Port

Ant Agent
«block»
Grid Assets

Power
«itemFlow»

meter

«block»
Load

High Speed
Communication

Consumer

Figure 4.20. Proposed Transactive Energy Framework (SysML Block Definition
Diagram)

When an ant finds a food source (generation), it forms a contract with that
generation asset and the grid assets along the path it traversed to deliver the energy to the
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consumer. This architecture operates as an object-oriented model (per Figure 4.20) with a
set of rules and assumptions:
•

A consumer may change roles and become a producer (and vice versa). Each
actor is represented as playing only one role during a market interval – the role
which represents their net requirements.

•

A market interval is typically a 15-minute period of time (but could be operated as
being more or less).

•

The grid consists of assets (wires, transformers, switches and other gear) used to
move electricity from one location to another. Each grid asset has capacity
constraints and can be contractually reserved for use by contract through
negotiation.

•

Each asset may be reserved for up to its rated capacity, but the owner of the asset
may have reasons of their own to limit the usage to a level below the maximum
rating of the asset.

•

Forward and reverse flows are accounted for separately – so an asset which is
completely reserved in the forward direction may still accept reservations in the
reverse direction until both directions reach capacity.

•

Consumers shop for both generation, and transportation via the power grid
through contractual reservations which are communicated via the communications
network.

•

Software agents (ants) act on behalf of the consumer to make the reservations.

•

The consumer is not required to reserve 100% of the capacity of a given generator
or grid asset.

119
•

Only real energy will be sought in the marketplace, although reactive energy and
other services exist.

•

Negotiation is dynamic and occurs anew every market interval.

•

Negotiation for a given market interval on the calendar may occur a day ahead, an
hour ahead, or minutes ahead of the actual need.
Negotiation for a given market interval must complete within the time of the

market interval, so that it can be closed out, and negotiation for the next interval begin.
4.7. APPLICATION OF THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER
A mapping from the market elements to ACO elements are described in Table 4.3
along with a few simplifications.

Table 4.3. ACO Correspondence
ACO element

Market element

Ant
Food (or prize)

Agent working on behalf of consumer to find energy sources
Energy or ancillary services. For sake of this exercise, the ant will
only forage for real energy. As a simplification, reactive energy
and ancillary services are considered acquired when real energy is
required. These other commodities can be purchased by
additional foraging in a future work.
A contract is formed to secure energy from the producer, and a
contract is formed with each asset along the route to deliver
power to the service location.
Consumer’s revenue meter (point of common coupling between
utility wiring and premises wiring).
Hints left by agents (in a public data store located in field assets)
as to what can be found further down the pathway. (Note: these
agents may be agents of any consumer.)
A grid asset which is not a conductor
A grid asset which is a conductor

Food retrieval

Nest
Pheromone

Node
Edge
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4.7.1. Application of a Reference Direction. A reference direction is overlaid on
the wires model to turn it into a directed graph. In the distribution network, wires which
run toward the substation are considered “upstream.” Wires which run away from the
substation are considered “downstream.” When a distribution network is fed by multiple
substations or a single substation with multiple busses, one source is arbitrarily modeled
as “upstream” and all of the others are labeled as “downstream.”
4.7.1.1. Leaf and root nodes. A leaf node is any node with a degree of one. A
tree network will ultimately have leaf nodes along its outmost edges. However, due to the
setup of the problem and the assignment of reference directions, certain information can
be derived from the reference directions to indicate a stopping criterion for the foraging
ant. A substation will likely have multiple feeders connecting to a bus which radiate
outward. This substation bus can be viewed as a significant source of power. Unless some
capacity constraint is reached, an ant will not visit a substation bus looking for power and
walk away. In the model, the root of the tree which models the distribution network will
be depicted as a node with a degree greater than or equal to one, and for these edges, the
reference direction for all edges face the same direction. Example topologies for the leaf
and root nodes are depicted in Figure 4.21.

Figure 4.21. Example Leaf and Root Nodes
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Leaf nodes are interesting to the ant because they may contain a food source, a
nest, or be empty.
4.7.1.2. Intermediate nodes serving as waypoints. Nodes which are not leaf
nodes are intermediate nodes. Example topologies are depicted in Figure 4.22. All such
nodes have a degree greater than one and reference directions into and out of the node.
Such nodes may be service transformers, tie points, protective devices, poles, or any
other distribution asset which is not a leaf node.

Figure 4.22. Example Intermediate Nodes

4.7.2. Pheromone Accounting. Two pheromones are used for each commodity
being sought: one pheromone is used to attract, and another pheromone is used to repel
the ant to or from traveling along a given direction on the edge.
4.7.2.1. Attractive pheromone. An attractive pheromone takes on a positive
value when it recommends to the ant that she be drawn in the direction the arrowhead is
pointing, and a negative value when she is to be attracted to the arrow tail (attracted to the
opposite direction the arrow is pointing).
4.7.2.2. Repulsive pheromone. The repulsive pheromone takes on a positive
value along an edge when it recommends to the ant that she be repelled away from the
arrow tail. A positive repulsive value will therefore cause the ant to follow the direction

122
the arrowhead is pointing. A negative repulsive value repels the ant away from the
arrowhead. A negative repulsive value therefore drives the ant towards the arrow tail.
4.7.3. Deposition. The TabuACO has the ant deposit pheromone under two
different sets of rules. One rule is applied when the ant encounters a find. Another rule is
applied when the ant doesn’t encounter a find.
4.7.3.1. Attractive pheromone. When an ant forages she maintains a path history
of the path she must take in order to return home. Since she is foraging in a graph, and
multiple paths may exist to get home even among a given set of nodes, the path history
accounts for both nodes and edges.

Nest
̶

+
Find

Figure 4.23. Attractive Pheromone Signs

Upon finding a food source and striking an agreement to purchase power, she
returns home along the path on record. As she travels, she deposits attractive pheromone
to lead ants back to the find, and she firms up agreements with each asset to rent a portion
of the asset’s capabilities for the interval period. The ant remembers the path home as she
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forages. Once a find is identified, and the ant travels homeward, edges pointing away
from the find are painted with negative attractive pheromone.
Edges pointing toward the find are painted with positive attractive pheromone.
The sign used depends on the reference direction as depicted in Figure 4.23. The formula
for deposition of attractive pheromone is described in (19).
Each find by the ant results in a new trail of attractive pheromone being laid (in
addition to any pheromone already present) between the food source and the ant’s nest.
4.7.3.2. Repulsive pheromone. Repulsive pheromone is laid while an ant
forages. If she finds a leaf node which does not have a food source, she deprecates the
node and all edges connected to it. Pheromone is a signed value. If the edge to the leaf
node is upstream (pointing away from the node), she applies positive repulsive
pheromone. If the edge to the leaf node is downstream (pointing into the node) she
applies negative repulsive pheromone. The sign used depends on the reference direction
as depicted in Figure 4.24.

+

̶

Figure 4.24. Repulsive Pheromone Signs

If the node has a food source, and the ant could not afford it, she does not
deprecate the node. She continues foraging.
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If the ant encounters an intermediate node that does not have a food source, she
examines all of the edges connected to it. If all of the edges except one have been
deprecated with repulsive pheromone, she decides to deprecate this node. This is done by
deprecating the remaining edge. If it is an upstream node positive repulsive pheromone is
laid. If it is a downstream node, negative repulsive pheromone is laid.
The formula for deposition of repulsive pheromone is described in (18).
4.7.4. Evaporation. The TabuACO contains two types of pheromone. These
pheromones evaporate at different rates.
4.7.4.1. Attractive pheromone. It is possible for a food source to become
exhausted. Pheromones which led ants to a particular node become obsolete when the
food source is no longer present. The attractive pheromones along every edge will be
partially evaporated with every iteration. This is done by multiplying the pheromone
values by a number between zero and one.
4.7.4.2. Repulsive pheromone. Repulsive pheromones are not evaporated.
Areas of the network which do not have food will not have food at some later point
during the market interval. They remain deprecated for the duration of the evaluation.
4.8. EXPERIMENT TO SHOW THAT THE TABU ACO CAN SERVE A RETAIL
MARKET AND ABIDE BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK DESIGN LIMITS
Section 4.2.3 described how the existing wholesale energy market performs a
function to arrange the scheduled movement of power through the transmission network
between generators and loads. The arrangement observes all of the design constraints of
the assets involved. It also arrives at a mutually agreed price for the power and use of the
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transmission assets to transport it. We would expect a retail energy market to do the same
at the distribution level.
4.8.1. Experiment. A test was performed on the “IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder”
[120] model. Its purpose was to confirm the ability of an ACO to recognize a new issue
in the network and endeavor to work around it as it sought to form contracts between
buyers, sellers, and transporters of power. It also served as a small-scale proof of concept
test for the algorithm.
It should be noted that despite the “O” in “ACO”, the TabuACO solver is used in
this experiment to analyze and manage the contribution of power to the grid – not
optimize the purchase of power to ensure a particular consumer received the lowest price.
IEEE offers Figure 4.25 when describing their 34 Node Distribution Feeder.

Figure 4.25. Original IEEE 34 Node Distribution Feeder (not to scale) [126]

The IEEE model contains information regarding a feeder circuit, complete with
node ratings, node locations, conductor ratings, and loads at various locations. There are
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six “spot loads” identified with nodes 830, 840, 844, 848, 860, and 890. There are
nineteen “distributed loads” identified in the IEEE model that occur along a conductor
between nodes.
The IEEE model represents aggregate loads and other pieces of equipment at
various “nodes” along the feeder. Additional detail is needed in order to conduct this
experiment. Small generation must be added at various points throughout the feeder, and
prices must be set as bids for power from these locations. Furthermore, additional detail
needs to be supplied regarding the various loads.
Figure 4.26 shows the additional detail drawn (not to scale) of the generators and
loads under the modeled nodes. The color indicates the price bid for the generation.
Substation power (at node 800) is bid at a very low price. The other blue ovals are
somewhat higher in price (but still low), yellows are higher, and reddish purple is the
highest price. Pricing for this particular experiment is arranged so that ants will prefer
substation power. Price data are found in Appendix C.
A study of the IEEE data finds that node 890 requires 503 kVA, but transformer
XFM-1 is rated for 500 kVA. This invariably creates a situation where an IEEE-defined
transformer will be overloaded with an IEEE-defined load. This will serve as the
condition for a test.
In this test, two groups will be compared. The control group will simulate power
delivery to a legacy wholesale energy nodal market, where the only node visible to the
market is node 800. A day-ahead load forecast will be available for the feeder as a whole
as presented to node 800. The test group will model a transitive energy market at Node
8900. The two market methods will be compared.
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Figure 4.26. Modified Distribution Feeder Model Depicting Source of Power and Prices
Bid (not to scale).

The successful method will be the one that alleviates the strain on transformer
XFM-1. The load at node 890 will participate in the transactive energy market, as well as
at least one other node upstream of XFM-1. Nests at these nodes will represent
consumers and seek to form contracts with generators and power network providers as
described in section 4.9.1.1. Furthermore, in this multinest environment, the objective of
the solver will be to secure the first available generation that meets the cost criterion. The
highest priority of the solver is to secure the power required by the nest. A second order
priority is to keep the costs low. The consumer defines a “buy immediately” action that is
to be taken if a certain cost target is met. The upper cost limit is the rate that the ant is
authorized to spend if the lower priced power cannot be easily found.
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4.8.1.1. Proposed methodology and detailed modifications to the IEEE-34
feeder model. To solve this problem models are created to represent the feeder
connectivity, the assets deployed along the feeder, the loads, the distributed generation,
and other grid assets. Each service requesting power is represented as a nest, and ants
leave the nest to forage for energy. The details of the model are posted in Appendix 2.
4.8.1.2. Theory of operation. A transactive energy market as described in Figure
4.3 will be operated as the experiment. The TabuACO solver will match individual
consumer loads with all available generators. The solver will allow multiple nests to
compete simultaneously for the available resources. The solver will allow each nest to
form contracts within the solver’s model for the resources and energy the nest needs. The
ant performs resource locking of the assets as she forages, then at the end of the sortie,
either releases or commits to the portion reserved. Ants incrementally reserve resources
as funds and network constraints allow, until all desired energy is acquired.
4.8.1.3. Class design. This experiment is a small-scale test to prove out the
concepts suggested. A node has properties which identify its type (pole, transformer,
etc.), its kVA rating, its coordinates, polyphase connection, as well as its contracted kVA
in each direction. An edge represents a conductor. Every conductor has exactly two ends,
and a node at each end. It too has a kVA rating (based on its ampacity and insulator
voltage rating). Edges in the model have a direction. All edges point upstream, and since
the IEEE model is a distribution network, all edges point to Node 800 (the substation
transformer). The Edge model records how much kVA has been contracted in each
direction. A contract for some amount of power through the conductor in the upstream
direction is treated independently from a contract for power flowing in the downstream
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direction. While Kirchoff’s current laws say that these flows would actually cancel each
other out, they cannot be relied upon to be present. So, a current flow up to the rated
amount is allowed to occur contractually in each direction.
4.8.1.4. Ant agency. An ant from each nest is given authorization by the nest to
spend money and form contracts on the nest’s behalf. As the ant travels, she has a certain
cost criterion in mind. Any generation that meets the cost criterion is immediately
purchased. However, if an ant cannot locate affordable generation very readily, she is
authorized to spend more at various hop count setpoints as determined by the nest. The
ant will not go above the maximum setting authorized by the nest.
The ant keeps records of the path home, but also of the contracts she has signed
along the way. The ant examines the constraints of every asset she travels. If the asset is
fully committed, she will not attempt to transit it. If some margin remains, but it is less
than the full amount she is looking for, she will reduce her contractual requirements to
the amount the asset can carry, then transit the asset. The ant will limit the contract with
the generator to be no greater than the constraints allowed. Should the ant doubleback in
her foraging, any constraints imposed by that asset will be lifted. In the path from the nest
to the generator, the ant has “locked” the portion of the asset necessary to deliver the
intended payload.
Once the ant forms a contract with a generator, the deliverable payload is finally
known. The generator may have less power available than the ant was authorized to
purchase. As the ant travels home, she finalizes the contracts with each asset. Contracts
with assets will be adjusted downward (as necessary) to become only the amount needed
for the generator. Unneeded portions will be freed for use by other ants.
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The ant also considers the losses of carrying energy across the asset. The series
resistive losses of the conductors are considered and used to derate the payload amount
delivered.
The cost per kVAh is modelled, and the ant computes the financial cost to move
the payload through the series of assets along the path. This travel cost will also serve to
limit the range of the ant to what is affordable and keep her near her nest.
4.8.2. Expected Results. The data contains numerous loads and sources of
generation under each node in the IEEE model. Many of these added sources of
generation are priced below the price of power from the main substation transformer.
This should cause the TabuACO to find and exhaust all of the low-cost sources of power.
This should result in different nests to arrive at different average costs. A “price map”
should be generated by the transactive energy market that resembles the price map
generated by the wholesale market.
Node 890 requires 503 kVA, yet transformer XFM-1 is rated for 500 kVA. Power
at node 8901 is priced higher than many sources upstream of XFM-1. It is expected that
the TabuACO will get 500 kVA from low cost sources upstream of XFM-1, then when
the limit is reached, obtain the balance of the required power from the higher priced
source downstream of XFM-1.
4.8.3. Results. In hundreds of trials of the TabuACO, the ant always found the
constraint at transformer XFM-1. Contracts totaling 500 kVA were formed with low cost
supplies upstream of XFM-1, while a contract for higher priced power at node 8900 was
formed for 3 kVA.
The costs incurred by the various individual loads are plotted in Figure 4.27.
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Y-coordinate

X-coordinate
Figure 4.27. Location Cost Map for Experiment After Run (Plotted to a Proportionate
Scale) for Modified IEEE 34 Node Feeder

Figure 4.27 looks different than Figure 4.25 because it is plotted to scale. The
feeders serve a mixture of sparse and crowded service locations. The size of the load is
depicted by the size of the circle. Larger circles represent larger loads. Filled circles
represent loads that participated in the market. The color of the fill represents the average
cost paid by the customer.
Figure 4.28 offers a closeup of the upper right area of Figure 4.27. This area
contains components that have constraints that are exercised during the run.
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Figure 4.28. Closeup View of Nest 890 (red) and Other Nests that Competed (blue) in the
Proof of Concept Test of the Modified IEEE 34 Node Feeder.

4.8.4. Discussion of Results. Ants were given a small portion of the load and
tasked to acquire a contract for generation. As ants incrementally built contracts between
node 890 and the substation at node 800, they eventually found that the node representing
transformer XFM-1 refused to grant passage of any more contracts for power. Ants were
forced to look elsewhere for power. Eventually, after walking far enough, they were
authorized to spend more. They could eventually afford the power available locally at
node 8900 and finally fulfilled the needs of the nest.
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At no time did the ants fail to see the constraint and attempt to work around it.
Occasionally they ignored the pheromone recommendations and wandered into
unproductive areas. A histogram of the ant hop count is pictured below in Figure 4.29.
We see it is a bell shape which is skewed to the left. This is typical of the TabuACO.
Often the ant is “lucky” and finds results quickly – thus the skew to the left; however
sometimes the ant is quite unlucky, and she is required to walk the entire graph.
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0

Figure 4.29. Hops Until Solution, Histogram Showing Distribution of 100 Trials

4.9. EXPERIMENT TO SHOW THAT THE TABU ACO CAN SERVE A RETAIL
MARKET AND ABIDE BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OPERATIONAL
LIMITS
Section 4.8 described how the TabuACO could implement a retail energy market
and abide by network design constraints. However, there are situations where the static
design limits are not sufficient to describe the dynamic capability of the grid design. The
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distribution network was originally designed for the unidirectional flow of energy, from
centralized generation to distributed loads. The addition of distributed generation
complicates matters. The original design assumptions are no longer valid, and the original
constraints no longer sufficient to regulate the operation of the substation. A dependency
exists on the load present. A test will be conducted to determine if the algorithm can
leverage an external engineering analysis tool to determine the limits of the distribution
network in order to accept as much PV power as possible. Again, by way of reminder,
there are multiple loops at work as described by Figure 4.3. The energy market serves as
an outer, planning control loop, while other systems operate inner loops to control
substation operation as it runs. Only the energy market planning loop will be tested here.
Implied in the discussion is that spinning reserve is still required for network operations,
and that acquiring a contract for spinning reserve can be formed using the same technique
as a contract for power. Customers will be expected to form contracts for spinning
reserve, as a percentage of the power they buy, to the level specified by the regional
RTO/ISO.
4.9.1. Experiment. A large-scale test on real utility data was conducted to test the
scalability of the concept15. The scalability test will use real substation data supplied by
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [59]. This data set (known as “Feeder J1”)
represents a distribution circuit located in the northeastern US with a 12-kV feeder circuit
that serves approximately 1300 residential, commercial, and light industrial customers via

15

The scalability test also tests the refinements in the code after numerous improvements were

made as a result of benchmark testing. The Proof Of Concept testing used simple code which was not
necessarily tuned. The POC code had a number of limitations including an inability to handle a graph
where loops may be present in the network topology.
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58 total miles of primary line. The peak load on the system is approximately 6 MW and
the circuit contains 1.7 MW of customer-owned PV systems (Figure 4.35). The J1 Feeder
data set includes a substation, several PV arrays (red circles), and a large number of
electrical loads (indicated with the blue circles). The Feeder J1 data set is of interest
because customers have complained of overvoltage conditions after several sets of PV
arrays were added to the feeder. This was noted even though the feeder J1 has four
voltage regulators throughout the circuit, and five capacitor banks (three of which are
voltage controlled) to help control voltage [59].
This experiment analyzes the contribution of power from multiple sources of
power, into the grid, drawn by multiple loads, with the contribution being limited to safe
levels. It does not optimize the cost paid by the participants. This effort is deferred as a
future work in section 6.2.5.1.
This data set was represented in the ACO architecture as a tree graph by
identifying the substation’s connection to the transmission network as the root of the
graph, and all other nodes and edges as being downstream in the distribution network,
resulting in 4840 nodes (1147 of which are nests), 4852 edges, and 1147 ants.16 The EPRI
Feeder J1 data set was analyzed with EPRI’s OpenDSS software [121], which allowed
for the visualization of the network (Figure 4.35) to be generated.
The scalability test consists of two experiments: a baseline experiment which does
not use the ACO for correction, and a test which uses the ACO to limit the operation of
the system to safe levels.

16

Not all loads became nests because some of the loads had an issue which prevented them from

being viably served (for example, some were present in the model, but not connected to the circuit).
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The baseline experiment was an evaluation of the current market (Figure 4.2).
This represents the use of the wholesale energy market to serve the needs of the Feeder J1
distribution circuit modeled as a single node. In this baseline experiment, all loads were
served by the substation. No visibility is provided to the wholesale market related to any
issues which arise on the distribution circuit. OpenDSS was also used to simulate the
engineering results of using this data set without any correction by the TabuACO
algorithm. This experiment provides the baseline information on the current methods
being employed and their ability to mitigate voltage variations.
The ACO experiment was an evaluation of the market with PV assets contributing
power to the grid which are interrupted and then restored. A comparison is made using
the current methods as described in section 3 to the transactive energy market module
added to operate a “retail level” market on the Feeder J1 circuit (Figure 4.3). In this
experiment, the TabuACO algorithm was used to match loads with any available source
of power. For the TabuACO experiment, ants were able to purchase from the substation
or the PV arrays. Different power sources were assigned different prices with substation
power being more expensive than PV power. Ants were given spending authority
sufficient to buy PV power first, and as foraging progressed ants would eventually gain
the authority to purchase substation power. In both experiments the OpenDSS software
was used to validate each proposed purchase scenario. The OpenDSS software was used
to validate each proposed resource reservation from the TabuACO algorithm and either
accept or reject each matchup based on a test for overvoltages. The proposed power
sources and loads are sent to OpenDSS which performs an engineering analysis and
produces a data file. The ACO reads the voltage file produced by OpenDSS, and
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compares every voltage to the allowed upper threshold. If all of the voltages are within
the acceptable voltage range, the proposed sale (represented by power and loads in the
OpenDSS model) is accepted. If any voltage exceeds the allowable range, the proposal is
rejected, and the ant is forced to forage further to find another source. To encourage the
use of PV power, PV power was priced at 1¢ while substation power was priced at 7¢.
The ant was initially authorized to purchase power at a cost below both. If she is
unsuccessful in purchasing PV power, she will eventually become authorized to buy the
higher priced power at the substation transformer. As the ACO operated, ants searched
for 1% of each nest’s energy requirements with each sortie. All of the ants competed
concurrently for the same resources.
The EPRI Feeder J circuit is different from the IEEE 34 Node circuit, and they
have different issues. A study of Feeder J doesn’t find any constrained assets in the
design. Instead, with the EPRI Feeder J circuit, voltage can be difficult to regulate.
The Engineering Analysis software used in this research is EPRI’s OpenDSS.
OpenDSS is able to simulate a variety of timescales. In the Feeder J data, a voltage
source is modeled at the substation bus. A voltage source is able to source tremendous
amounts of current, up to the MVA rating of the transformer, and holds a steady voltage
at that point in the circuit. The substation also models a tap changer which can
automatically regulate the voltage. Due to the timing of the operation of the tap changer,
a baseline analysis is conducted with the tap changer functioning. A voltage increase is
studied by temporarily disabling voltage regulation. Details on the setup of OpenDSS,
calls to OpenDSS, and other instructions on how to operate the system is described in the
OpenDSS material [121].
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The EPRI Feeder J data is defined in terms of OpenDSS defined elements. The
mapping alluded to in Table 4.3 is described in more detail in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Engineering model to TabuACO model mapping
EPRI OpenDSS Class
buscoords
generator
load
line
transformer
Vsource (voltage source at a substation)
PVsystem (photo-voltaic power source)

TabuACO Class
Node
Node
Node
Edge
Edge
Node
Node

When an ant finds a food source (a power source), the reservation must be
validated both financially and electrically. There are numerous concerns that must be
considered such as overloading of individual assets, as well as the operation of the system
outside the acceptable voltage range. The Engineering Analysis software used in this
research is EPRI’s OpenDSS [121], which can be used to simulate a variety of electrical
loads and sources at a variety of timescales. The EPRI Feeder J1 data is used by the ACO
architecture to create a model of the feeder and propose solutions. The solutions are
evaluated by the OpenDSS software to determine whether demand was met and the
voltage conditions on the feeder.
4.9.1.1. Proposed methodology. To solve this problem models are created to
represent the feeder connectivity, the assets deployed along the feeder, the loads, the and
the distributed generation. Each service requesting power is represented as a nest, and
ants leave the nest to forage for energy. Two types of files are exchanged between the
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TabuACO solver and OpenDSS. One file contains a model representing connectivity.
This file is expressed as OpenDSS commands, and is imported into both OpenDSS and
the solver. The solver edits this model to update the loads at each location and passes the
updated model to OpenDSS for evaluation. The solver asks OpenDSS to render voltages.
OpenDSS then publishes a file representing voltages. The voltages are examined by the
solver for compliance with the required bounds. If any voltage at any point exceeds the
bounds the proposal is rejected. If all voltages are within bounds the proposal is accepted.
4.9.1.2. Theory of operation. A transactive energy market as described in Figure
4.3 will be operated as the experiment. The TabuACO solver will match individual
consumer loads with all available generators. OpenDSS will be used to perform an
engineering analysis of the PV and substation contributions. Both the solver and
OpenDSS will use a model of the EPRI Feeder J1 circuit. The solver will use the model
to perform resource locking as multiple nests compete simultaneously for limited
resources. Also, since the solver is an ACO, it will accrue virtual pheromones as a
solution emerges.
4.9.1.3. Class design. An object-oriented design is used, and the objects are
described in the following Ant, Edge, and Node subsections.
•

Ant.
In the Ant class, attributes are used to record the ant’s current node, a history of

the nodes and edges which serve as the path home, and the nest node which the ant calls
home. An attribute describes the ant’s mode: if the ant is foraging, resting at home, or
travelling home. A series of attributes keep track of the power sought, and the power
acquired. An array which corresponds to the path home identifies the kVA constraints
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encountered along the path. In order to determine the ant’s level of effort, the ant
maintains a count of its movements (hops). An array of authorized price points defines
what the ant is authorized to pay. An attribute also maintains the cost of traveling home.
The authorized funds minus the cost home leaves the amount of funds available to
purchase power. Functionally, the ant is able to deprecate a path, forage for food, or
return to the nest. Functionally, the ant is able to deprecate a path, forage for food, or
return to the nest. A UML class diagram of the Ant class is presented in Figure 4.30.

Ant
authorizedPricePoints, an array that describes the prices the ant is allowed to pay
as a function of hopCount.
contractNode, the ID of the node with which the ant signed a contract.
costHome, the running total of costs incurred to lease assets along the path home.
kvarAcquired, the amount of reactive power acquired.
kvarSought, the amount of reactive energy sought.
kwAcquired, the amount of active acquired.
kwSought, the amount of real power sought during the current market interval.
locationID, the nodeID the ant is currently at.
mode, ant mode: foraging/home/homewardBound
nestID, the nodeID of the ant’s origin.
pathConstraintsHome, list of kVA constraints on the path home.
pathEdgesHome, the list of edges to the nets.
pathEfficienciesHome, a list of efficiencies on the path home.
pathNodesHome, the list of nodes to the nest.
pathReservationsHome, a list of power amounts reserved at each segment along
the path home.
previousLocation, the node the ant was previously at.
ttl, time to live.
deprecatePath(·), lay repulsive pheromone
forage(·), look for food
returnToNest(·), lay attractive pheromone if warranted
Figure 4.30. Class Design of Ant
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•

Edge.
An Edge class is used to model conductors and transformers. Edge properties are

typically imported from a wires model. Each edge has exactly two ends. Due to the
directionality of the graph, one end is identified as these are called the “up” node
(arrowhead) and the other the “down” node (arrow tail).

Edge
attPheromoneKvar, attractive pheromone for kVar
attPheromoneKw, attractive pheromone for kW
delivCommitKw, downstream commitments
dnNode, the downstream node (arrow tail connection)
ID, the edge ID within the network
kvaRating, the conductor’s rated capacity in kVA
length, conductor length in feet.
linecode, the class of conductor described by the dataset.
name, the name assigned by the dataset to this edge
recdCommitKw, commitment to allow current flow upstream
repPheromoneKvar, repulsive pheromone for kVar
repPheromoneKw, repulsive pheromone for kW
travelCostPerKva, cost in dollars for each kVA to travel through the edge.
travelEfficiency, the efficiency with which energy traverses the node.
type, conductor/transformer
upNode, the upstream node (having an arrowhead)
evaluateQuery(·)
Figure 4.31. Class Design of Edge (UML Class diagram)

Each edge has an ID, a name imported from the wires model, a kVA rating, a
length, and a travel cost which is expressed as a travel efficiency. Pheromones are
deposited on edges. One attribute is used to maintain the attractive pheromone level, and
another to record the repulsive pheromone level. Edges are grid assets and as with any
resource have to be reserved. An attribute is used to describe the commitment of power
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flowing upstream, and other for the commitment of power to flow downstream. A UML
class diagram of the Edge class is presented in Figure 4.31.
•

Node.
A Node class is used to represent service locations, generators, poles, and every

other asset that is not an Edge.
Node
ID, the node ID within the network
name, the name assigned by the dataset
type, asset type: transformer/pole/substation/PV
kvaRating, the node’s kVA rating
xloc, geographic x location
yloc, geographic y location
upstreamEdges, a list of edges which lead upstream to the substation
downstreamEdges, a list of edges which lead downstream
travelCostPerKva, cost in dollars for each kVA to travel through the node
travelEfficiency, the efficiency with which energy traverses the node
delivCommitKw, the kW commitment sold in the interval
delivCommitKvar, the kVAr commitment sold by node
recdCommitKw, the kW purchased by node
recdCommitKvar, the kVAR commitment purchased by node
desiredkW, amount of real power this node needs
desiredKvar, amound of reactive power this node needs
fundsAvail, the unspent funds currently available within the current market
interval.
antAgents, a list of ants which serve this nest pricePerKwh, price per kWh for
energy from this source
availKw, uncommitted real power available
availKvar, uncommitted reactive power available
delCntrctFromNode, an array of entries describing a contract for delivered power
delCntrctKw[·], a list of contractual kW
delCntrctFunds[·], funds owed to the node
delCntrctAnt[·], ants which have formed contracts
evaluateQuery(·)
Figure 4.32. Class Design of Node

The Node’s properties are typically imported from a wires model. Each node has
a geographic x-y location, an ID, a name, a rating, a cost for using the asset, an efficiency
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in using the asset. Since the network is a graph it can have “zero to many” upstream
edges, and “zero to many” downstream edges. Class attributes store reservations for
power to flow downstream and upstream through the node. If the node has load
characteristics, an attribute tracks the amount of power the node is seeking (as a Nest).
The funds available to spend are tracked, as are the ant IDs which belong to the nest. If
the node has generator characteristics, the selling price is kept as an attribute, as is the
available uncommitted power. Class attributes also track the funds owed to this node, or
owed by this node to other grid assets. A UML class diagram of the Node class is
presented in Figure 4.32.
4.9.1.4. Ant agency. The ACO foraging process imbeds an evaluation of the
conductor (edge) and transformer (node) constraints. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the
basic function of the TabuACO. Figure 4.33 now shows these concepts applied to the
energy market. The pathways originally described in Figure 1.1 now model conductors.
Nodes of Figure 1.1 model transformers, poles, and other transformational assets. The
consumer’s system represents the “nest,” and authorizes an ant to look for “food.” This
purchase involves traveling a viable path, and not only finding energy for sale, but
finding it at an affordable price. Every step that the ant takes causes a pedometer to
increment. As she forages a great distance, an authorization function allows her to spend
more. She may forage in a way that brings her back to a food source she passed by
previously because she could not (initially) afford the purchase.
Upon finding a source with an acceptable price, the ant forms a contract with the
producer and lays attractive pheromone back to the nest. She thus communicates with
other ants using clues left in the environment.
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sd [Package] Framew ork [Exchange]
Consumer's System

Communication
Network with grid
asset representation

Producer

Ant Agent
Authorize purchase

loop
[While sought item is not found, ant has not expired, and as funds and efficiencies allow.]
Forage to new
location
opt
[Move accepted]

Move accepted

Tentatively reserve (or cancel
reservation of) asset on behalf
of ant

opt
[Node is a producer]
Discover offerings available and prices
Tender bid

Consider bid

alt
[Price was acceptable]

Accept bid
Acknowledge

Lay pheromone to identify good find
Report find

[Sought item was never sold here or is sold out]
Deprecate edge leading to node

Figure 4.33. Messaging (SysML Sequence Diagram)
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4.9.1.5. The TabuACO applied to transactive energy. In the context of this
application, each service location will be represented as a “nest.” Each ant is tasked with
fulfilling a small percentage of the energy required for that service location using a given
amount of money (and pay a certain rate). As the ant forages, she makes tentative
contracts with the network elements along the path traversed to reserve the resources she
needs. If the edge or node will not permit the full amount required, the amount available
is reserved. If a network element that cannot be reserved is encountered, the ant turns
back and forages elsewhere.
In addition to the availability of energy resources, the ant also considers the cost
of travel through the network assets. If she has insufficient funds to travel further, she
turns back toward the nest. She may also turn back because a leaf node is encountered, or
simply because the random foraging process results in such a choice. When the ant
travels back along the same path toward the nest, she unlocks the resources she
previously reserved.
When the ant finds an acceptable and available source of power, she will form a
contract, accept the offer from the generator, and lock in a portion of that resource. On
the return to the nest, she will reserve every conductor, transformer, transmission and
distribution asset required to move the power from the generator to the nest. Certain
contracts may need to be adjusted downward if the original energy amount cannot be
reached due to asset or generator constraints. Pseudocode for this process is depicted in
Figure 4.34.
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1
2
3

4
5
6

7

8

9

10
11

Initialize network and ants
While one or more nests are unsatisfied
Set one or more ants to have an antMode of “foraging.” Each ant is given a time
limit to search for food, a specific quantity of a specific commodity to find, and a
formula which authorizes increasing price payments as a function of ant hop
count. The formula identifies an initial bid and a maximum cost the buyer is
willing to pay.
While ants are on sorties
Case antMode of
Foraging:
Select an edge to traverse. As the ant moves, she must maintain a path
history that shows how to return to the nest. If she moves further away from
the nest, she must form a tentative contract with the edge owner to carry the
item she is looking for homeward. The asset must consider the sum of all
contracts formed to see if capacity remains to accept another. If she moves
towards the nest (retracing her footsteps) she must cancel the contract
previously formed along that edge (and with the node she just left behind).
Upon arrival at a node, the ant attempts to form a contract with it. If it is a
grid asset (e.g. transformer), the contract is to carry the prize across it. If the
node is a generator, the ant examines the node to see if it contains the
sought prize for an acceptable price. If so, the ant claims the prize and sets
antMode to be “homeward bound.” Otherwise, she continues foraging.
If the new node is a leaf node, and the prize was not found, the ant lays
down a repulsive pheromone (particular to the prize type) on all adjoining
edges.
If the new node is not a leaf node, does not contain a prize, all adjoining
edges except the homeward edge are considered. If none of the edges (save
the homeward edge) contain attractive pheromone, and all (save the
homeward edge) contain some repulsive pheromone, then all edges
(including the homeward edge) are deprecated with repulsive pheromone.
If an ant forages unsuccessfully for an extended period of time so that its
time limit expires, then antMode will be set to “homeward bound.”
Homeward Bound:
As an ant returns home, and a prize was found, the ant lays down attractive
pheromone along each node and edge along the way. Upon reaching the
nest, the antMode is set to “home.”
Figure 4.34. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Transactive Energy Market
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12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Home:
Ant reports findings to nest, all contracts formed and the amount spent. The
ant sortie is over.
EndCase
Decrement the ant’s time-to-live
Increase the ant’s authorization to pay more for the prize.
Endwhile
Evaporate pheromones (positive only)
Endwhile
Report optimal paths to each food source.

Figure 4.34. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Transactive Energy Market (con’t)

4.9.1.6. Engineering validation of proposed contract. When the ant finds a food
source, the potential sale must be validated with engineering analysis even though the
sale is known to be valid financially. There are numerous concerns that could be
considered by the engineering analysis such as overloading of individual assets, as well
as operation of the system outside the acceptable voltage range. Feeder J, being a real
circuit, has many conditions which could affect its performance. However, EPRI
identifies one condition in the circuit which is particularly bothersome to customers [59].
This particular condition will be the focus of the simulation and the event the ants work
to guard against.
The “Feeder J” circuit is fed primarily from a substation in the SE portion. In
Figure 4.35, solar arrays are in red. Loads are small blue circles. Ordinarily voltages are
regulated fairly well. In a feeder with PV arrays installed, troubling overvoltages can
happen on a partly cloudy day. When the wind drives the clouds along, it can move a
shadow over the location of the PV array. This will cause the contribution from the array
to drop off precipitously. If the PV array was supplying a significant percentage of the
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load, this loss will cause the local voltage to drop as well. The voltage regulation
equipment in the substation will adjust one step upward (+2.5%) to correct the voltage
back up into the proper range. When the shadow moves off the array the PV will return to
contributing full power. If this occurs quickly, it can cause the voltage to rise before the
voltage regulators have time to react. A voltage swell will occur, and potentially damage
done to consumer’s devices before the substation tapchanger can move a step downward
(-2.5%.)

Figure 4.35. OpenDSS Rendering of Feeder J Loads
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During the night, and on overcast days, the Feeder J circuit relies entirely on
power from the substation. The substation is located at the lower-right end of the wide
blue trail depicted in Figure 4.35. The result is a well-behaved distribution voltage which
stays well away from the upper and lower limits. Figure 4.36 shows the allowable high
and low voltage tolerancces as horizontal red lines at 1.05 and 0.95 pu respectively.
Nominal voltage is of course provided with a voltage of 1.000.

Figure 4.36. OpenDSS Rendering of Feeder J Voltage as a Function of Distance from the
Substation
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When the power from the PV arrays joins with the contribution from the
substation, it causes voltages at some locations to jump above the tolerable limits. A
baseline evaluation of the feeder J1 was performed to find the voltage versus distance
from the substation bus. Different customers will have different experiences depending
on their distance from the substation, and their proximity to the PV arrays. The red, blue,
and black solid lines in the middle of the Figures 4.36 through 4.38 are the three phase
voltages. The solid lines for each phase are the medium voltage lines and the dashed lines
below are the low voltage lines. A nominal voltage would be at 1 pu right through the
middle of the graph. In Figure 4.36, the voltage at the substation starts at 1.02 pu (102%
of nominal). As power travels down the feeder, voltages drop due to resistive losses in
the conductors. One can see the medium voltages (represented as solid lines) steadily
decline out to a distance of 5 km from the substation. The low voltage lines (represented
as dashed lines) lose voltage even more quickly over short distances. These are seen
below the solid lines forming “the beard” in the diagram. In Figure 4.36, the voltages
jump at a distance of 5 km up to 1.04 pu due to the action of voltage regulators and
capacitor banks. This pattern can be seen to repeat as the distance from the substation
increases as a means of maintaining an acceptable line voltage. Voltages drop from 5 km
to 8 km and are boosted at 8 km due to voltage regulation, as can be seen in the voltage
drops from 8 km to 13 km which are boosted at 13 km. Voltages continue to drop from
13 km to the end of the feeder, where we see that medium voltages are at nominal (1.00
pu), and low voltages are lower but acceptable, running at 0.99 pu. When voltages are
properly regulated, they stay well within the red lines running horizontally along Figure
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4.36 at 1.05 and 0.95 pu. However, when distributed generation is present, the ability of
the voltage regulators to maintain the voltage within this range may be compromised.
The voltage increases we saw in Figure 4.36 occurring at 5, 8, and 13 km are due
to static volt/var corrections in the circuit. One can see that if these corrections were not
made in the circuit, voltages would become unacceptably low. However, these same
locations now become vulnerable to excessive voltages when the entire circuit runs high
The overvoltage scenario is depicted in Figure 4.37.

Figure 4.37. OpenDSS Analysis of Feeder J Voltage After a Cloud Moves off PV Array
Allowing Full PV Contribution
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4.9.2. Expected Results. As the ACO operates, ants will take a small (1%)
portion of each funded nest and search for energy sources. All of the ants will be
authorized to operate concurrently, but due to computational constraints will take turns.
Ants will trim leaf nodes and begin to follow useful trails to find power sources. As time
goes by, the ant agents authorization to spend more money will increase, and she will
eventually buy the higher priced local power (provided that the consumer has authorized
such a rate).
4.9.3. Results. In the baseline experiment substation power was supplied to the
loads, and no overvoltages were detected. The (simulated) voltage regulators were able to
compensate for any load changes and maintain nominal voltage (as described above and
in Figure 4.38.)
In the ACO experiment the addition of unreliable PV power was considered.
When PV power freely supplements substation power and there is an interruption it
results in overvoltages as depicted in Figure 4.37. This is the result when the proposed
algorithm is not applied. When the TabuACO was implemented, ants foraged for power
from a variety of sources. Ants (from nests representing loads) formed contracts with low
cost PV sources first until an overvoltage occurred. The overvoltage predicted was
attributable to the PV source. The ant then worked instead to obtain power from other
sources until arrangements were made that proved to be viable. The TabuACO algorithm
was able to limit voltages to safe levels in the ACO experiment (Figure 4.38.) High
voltages are found on the medium voltage (solid) lines at a distance of 5 to 11 km from
the substation. However, the algorithm tested the low voltage (dashed) lines to ensure
that no loads would suffer overvoltages.
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The TabuACO is a stochastic optimization process and so different runs
sometimes produce different outcomes. A typical outcome is found in Table 4.5. and in
Figure 4.38.
In this example, a total of 1526 kW was purchased from the PV sources before a
3% overvoltage would have been encountered. The balance of the projected load was
served by the substation. Repeating the experiment for 80 trials resulted in a mean of
1752 kW purchased from the PV sources with a standard deviation of 266 kW (with the
balance of the required load coming from the substation). Every run resulted in a
successful outcome. Other runs of the solver resulted in different PV allocations, but all
met with the same upper limit although the PV allocation differences caused differences
in the shape of the voltage curves within the voltage bounds.

Table 4.5. TabuACO Findings Regarding Limits to PV Contributions on Feeder J
Source Name
C_Existing13
B_Existing12
A_Existing9
C_Existing2
C_Existing11
B_Existing7
3P_ExistingSite3
3P_ExistingSite2
3P_ExistingSite4
B_Existing3
C_Existing5
C_Existing10
3P_ExistingSite1
Substation

Source Type
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
PV
Market mix

kVA rating
16
8
11
12
11
11
836
209
523
11
22
11
314
16,000

kW purchased
16
8
11
12
11
11
572
209
464
11
22
11
168
9969
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It may also be noted that as the TabuACO ran, ants would initially forage from
each nest everywhere, in all directions. However, as ants discovered leaf nodes, deposited
repulsive pheromone, and discovered unproductive trail nodes which led to leaf nodes,
soon entire trails were deprecated. This, along with any positive pheromones which may
have been deposited by other ants serving nearby nests, led the remaining ants to quickly
find viable power sources and converge to a solution. It was observed (but not quantified)
that as time passed, the algorithm appeared to run faster. Ants spent less time aimlessly
foraging, and travelled directly to nearby power sources.

Figure 4.38. OpenDSS Rendering of Voltages Along Feeder J with Limits Applied.
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4.9.4. Discussion of Results. An EPRI model of a real distribution circuit was
studied. Using an ant colony approach, a retail energy market with location marginal
pricing was simulated within a distribution circuit. Figure 4.37 shows the behavior of the
circuit when the algorithm limits are not applied. In this baseline experiment, it shows the
voltage escalating to 6% above nominal. Overvoltages can damage equipment. Compare
this to Figure 4.38 which shows the behavior of the circuit when the algorithm limits are
applied. The ACO experiment showed that the voltage could be successfully limited to a
target value (3%) above nominal.
The market endeavors to plan a suitable fuel mix prior to the real-time operation
of the grid. The transactive energy market modeled in this approach resolves market
contracts in a bottom-up fashion – whereas the conventional (wholesale) energy market
creates arrangements in top-down fashion. Furthermore, ACO’s are known for their
emergent properties. Solutions arise out of the data in a self-organizing fashion. The
ACO solver operated each nest independent of every other nest. Competing ants actually
collaborated to deposit pheromones along trails and share information (this is known as
“stigmergy”). The system self-organized without any centralized coordination. This is an
important point because a distributed energy market, accompanied by distributed control
of the grid could fit well with distributed generation.
It should be noted that there may be an increased cost to install and operate
communication equipment which can capture, communicate, and resolve the market and
operational issues. To some degree the cost is the cost of improving the granularity of the
analysis – regardless if the analysis is performed in a distributed fashion or a centralized
fashion. A distributed architecture also requires a different approach to implementing or
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enforcing global goals for the system. A systemwide maximum or minimum may be
difficult to achieve without a systemwide measurement. On the other hand, that doesn’t
prohibit such measurements from being made, disseminated and acted upon. Some
measurements (such as line frequency) are disseminated systemwide automatically. Other
measurements however shift the burden from moving data from the field to a central
location, to instead move measurements from a central location to the field. The scale of
the experiment is also notable. The results show that the solver operated an energy
market for an entire distribution circuit. The 14 sources identified in Table 4.5. are used
to feed 1147 loads. If an entire distribution circuit can operate as an energy market, then
it should be possible to integrate this market with a transmission level energy market. An
interface could be created at the substation to tie these markets together. (This research
shows the possibility of operating at least all of the medium voltage distribution circuits
as independent markets.) But this is not to say the entire system must convert to one
methodology or another. When tied together through a well-defined interface, it would be
possible for a mix of methodologies to be employed. All of the markets could be operated
bottom-up, some of the markets operated bottom-up and others top-down, or the entire
market in a top-down centralized fashion. This research added equipment to provide
granularity, to expose distribution circuit issues and, to allow small-stakeholder
participation. The TabuACO solver employed a methodology which lends itself to
deployment in a distributed manner, but in truth, it ran on a “centralized computer” which
merely modeled the possibility of distributed operation. By using a technique that
incrementally converges to a solution, and validating each step towards a solution with an
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engineering analysis package such as OpenDSS, it was possible to arrive at a solution
that was both financially and technically viable.
4.10. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE TABU ACO
TO THE ENERGY MARKET
The ACO implemented a transactive energy market for one market window for an
entire feeder. A “Proof Of Concept” test (section 4.8) and a “Test To Scale” (section 4.9)
both found that the transactive energy market was able to communicate the information
needed to limit contributions from certain sources and promote the contribution from
other sources in order to avoid electrical catastrophes on the grid.
The TabuACO was able to identify the appropriate fuel mix ratio which
maximized the PV contribution while avoiding the conditions that caused the PV
contribution to create voltage spikes that would overpower or outpace the substation
voltage regulation. This analysis mix kept service voltages within the allowable limits
which would be violated using the uncontrolled mix. The tabu property of the algorithm
was able to quickly eliminate unproductive leaf nodes and unproductive pathways. The
ACO property of the algorithm was able to guide the ant agents to low cost PV power
sources, verify the proposal, and resort to more expensive substation power when the PV
mix reached its viable limits.
The TabuACO performed well on this problem because it was able to trim away
ineffective paths. Ant agents were able to easily find power sources, and generally avoid
wasted effort. While an ant colony optimizer is not the only method that can arrive at a
solution, the difficulty in most other methods is that they require data to be collected in a
central location. This can work well for hundreds or possibly thousands of participants,
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but scaling to millions of participants can be difficult. In a real-world grid application,
each interconnect may contain hundreds of millions of meters. Large networks require
more computing time than small networks. Distributed methods offer advantages in
keeping the analysis smaller, moving less data, and eliminating single points of failure
from the architecture. If a distributed or federated architecture is used, the designer would
still need to determine how it would be sized and how the architecture itself would be
optimized. The TabuACO manages this by allowing the consumer to set the funds the ant
is authorized to spend, and the network identifies how much it costs to move power from
one location to another. This effectively puts the ants “on a leash” so that they cannot
wander very far from their nest. The size of the ants roaming territory is determined by
consumer preferences, not by architectural constraints.
The legacy wholesale market provides a top-down market solution and limits
itself to only consider transmission level loads. This research introduces a bottom-up
market solution that considers every load and every constraint – no matter how small. By
moving the energy market to a local level, local issues can be identified and addressed.
The fact that the solver operated an energy market in a distributed, bottom-up fashion is
significant. Distributed architectures are well known for their robustness. By enabling
local problems to be solved locally, it:
•

Eliminates the challenges in moving vast amounts of data long distances;

•

Eliminates the difficulties in keeping records in a central location current;

•

Eliminates the opportunity for catastrophic failure due to a weather disaster taking
out the centrally-located control center;
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•

Creates an opportunity for local markets to operate with the assets that remain
standing after a natural disaster destroys grid assets that ordinarily tie a locale to
the grid.
The goal of the paper was to show that calculations for decentralized market

operation are possible; and that swarm intelligence such as Ant Colony methods can offer
viable alternatives to traditional methods. This is accomplished through the selforganization of energy buyers and sellers within a model of a wires network.
While cloud cover is mentioned in the data set, this approach was not reliant on a
weather forecast. The speed of the regulator recovery and the tolerance of the grid to
accept both load and PV generation is used by the ACO to determine the limits. If instead
the weather is overcast it becomes a moot point – the PV will not contribute very much to
the grid regardless of what anyone does. If the weather is sunny with no clouds, the limit
serves as a safeguard if an unexpected cloud appears.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The TabuACO has been found to perform well, and even outperform conventional
ACOs in several benchmarking problems. The TabuACO performs better than a
conventional ACO because it preserves information unlike a conventional ACO. When
an unproductive path is found, it is not merely ignored, it is noted. This difference in the
algorithm is important. The repulsive information deposited in the environment was
found to be sufficient to solve network problems just as attractive information (in a
conventional ACO) can solve a network problem. The TabuACO was tried with repulsive
data only and it performed similarly to its performance with attractive data only. The
TabuACO with both repulsive and attractive data significantly outperformed either
pheromone by itself.
Testing of the TabuACO against a variety of benchmark problems led to the
discovery that the rules in use are very effective for trimming unproductive leaves from a
tree. The rules allow deprecation to spread so that entire branches may be deprecated
from a tree. However, it was discovered that as a graph becomes less tree-like and more
mesh-like,

the

effectiveness

of

the

TabuACO

is

reduced.

The

increased

interconnectedness of the graph prevents deprecation from spreading very far. A fully
interconnected graph may prevent deprecation from being applied altogether. The
development of computationally-safe rules which could be used to trim highlyinterconnected nodes is a topic for future research.
The testing also yielded other finds. Testing against the QAP problem
demonstrated that the algorithm could scale to tackle large problems. Furthermore, the
code did so without storing a model of the entire problem. The solver stored data for only
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the most promising paths. In the benchmark problems it retained a model of the 1000
most interesting nodes yet the model was able to effectively represent a puzzle containing
many hundreds of millions of nodes. Such storage efficiency could be useful for
computationally constrained applications. This characteristic can be particularly useful in
distributed applications which either cannot store, or do not need to store the entire
model.
The TabuACO was applied to the Smart Grid Energy Market. One important
remaining challenge in the Energy Market is to find a way to extend the existing market
mechanisms, refine their granularity, and reach all of the individual stakeholders. The
market hasn’t been operated to such a scale. This research modeled a distribution circuit
and matched individual loads to power sources while observing the constraints of the
circuitry. It found that it was able to operate each service location as a nest, and with
thousands of nests operating concurrently, the TabuACO generated contractual
agreements between power producers, network asset owners, and consumers. The
improved granularity allowed market mechanisms to protect distribution assets much like
the mechanism the wholesale market currently uses to protect transmission assets.
A test of the TabuACO using the IEEE 34 Node feeder model was able to identify
a constrained transformer and protect it with market mechanisms. (Higher priced local
generation was brought on line to supply power so the constrained asset did not have to
be overloaded.) In a similar fashion EPRI Feeder data along with OpenDSS were used to
discover the limits to which local PV arrays could safely contribute to the grid.
By operating a complete distribution network as a single power pool, it can
double as the node which currently represents the aggregate load at the same location in
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the existing wholesale market. This means that an entire distribution network can operate
as a microgrid, independent of other connections, yet buy and sell power through the
transmission grid to other participants. It means that the existing nodal wholesale markets
can operate much as they currently do, but the concept of locational margin pricing can
occur within the system which is represented as a single node at a higher level.
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6. FUTURE WORK
There are many exciting opportunities for additional research related to this
dissertation.
6.1. ACO RESEARCH
The fact that clear improvements in performance can be made in certain situations
with the simple rules provided in the TabuACO imply that more sophisticated rules can
yield additional improvements.
6.1.1. Advanced Subnet Deprecation Rules. The rules presented above are
merely a starting point for additional research. Additional rules could be developed in
which nodes with a degree greater than one could be deprecated.17 The ant maintains a
history of the path home. This history could be expanded, and the ant analysis improved
so that portions of a subnet which do not contribute to the solution could be identified and
deprecated.18
With the current deprecation process, foraging ants which happen across a useless
node will trim it. With more sophisticated deprecation rules, it may be that an ant must
transition to a special form of foraging so that she temporarily places a higher priority on
closing out the investigation of the subnet than on foraging for food. A third form of
pheromone may be beneficial in this case. When an investigation finds that a subnet has
been investigated, and found to potentially contribute to a solution, the environment

17

At one point a mistake in the Steiner tree research allowed multi-edged nodes at the bottom of a

subnet to be deprecated. This yielded faster convergence, however, the rules were not computationally safe.
18

It may be that the ant would have to be aware of the objective function (such as travel cost) in

identifying edges to deprecate.
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should be marked with a neutral pheromone to indicate this fact. This neutral pheromone
should prevent the ant from investigating the territory again.
The new rules may also introduce another dimension of tuning which is required
for this third type of pheromone. Tuning might control the point at which an ant places a
higher priority on subnet investigation than on foraging for food.
6.1.2. Refinement of the Path Selection Formula. The research above
experimented with several forms of computing the probability of path selection as a PDF
with a variety of formulae19. The literature review shows quite a bit of experimentation
has occurred into various approaches for depositing attractive pheromone and leveraging
the data found in the environment to select a path. Quite often the attractive pheromone
value is raised to an exponential power to amplify trace amounts of pheromone and allow
the pheromone to dominate the selection. Some experimentation with different
approaches to repulsive pheromone deposition and utilization can be expected to occur
with subsequent research.
6.1.3. Parallel Processing. The Energy Market Application was written in a way
that thousands of nests each sent out a single ant at a time on a sortie, but with multiple
processors, it would be possible to take advantage of the hardware resources to deploy
multiple ants simultaneously. Research could be conducted with multiprocessor platforms
to explore practical interfaces for model sharing among a multitude of processors.

19

Compare the simple formula used in section 3.2.3 and 3.4.3 to the more sophisticated approach

in section 3.3.1.3.
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6.2. ENERGY MARKETS
Transactive Energy, if implemented to scale, could fundamentally change the
operation of the grid. However, additional research is needed to drive it to
commercialization.
6.2.1. A Complete Transactive Energy Market. The exercise described in
section 4.7 was limited to one commodity. However, in a real system, multiple
commodities must be balanced. In a practical system, real and reactive energy must both
be balanced, and ancillary services must also be provided. In addition to frequency
regulation and spinning reserve, distributed generation (itself) brings about the need for
additional services. Distribution networks all have three phase power near the substation.
However, such networks tend to be radially fed with single phase circuits covering large
remote areas. Power contributed on one phase will not propagate to the other phases.
Furthermore, phases are separated in time. Energy markets need to address each phase. It
is entirely possible that a phase imbalance could develop. Abundant energy could appear
on one phase with a deficit on another. Contributions of power to one phase could also
result in congestion that does not appear on other phases. Contributions can cause a
voltage imbalance between phases, as well as movement of the phase angle. A threephase participant in the affected region would have the option of addressing a market
phase imbalance by buying energy inexpensively on one phase and reselling it on
another.
An ACO might allow multiple ants (from each nest) to forage for each
commodity concurrently.
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6.2.2. Secure Transactions. All contracts between machines should be protected
by authentication. Establishing security can be challenging. A “chain of trust” must be
established. New developments in blockchain technology offer an interesting research
opportunity in its application to transactive energy markets [122].
6.2.3. Expansion to Multiple Markets. This dissertation studied a circuit which
spans the distribution circuit. An interface can be formed at the substation transformer
(and substation meter) so that the entire downstream circuit is aggregated into one market
and represented by a node in the wholesale energy market. This is profound because it
would finally allow all markets to be joined. A hierarchy of suppliers and demands can be
built to join all related markets [123].
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The needs and/or capabilities of the aggregated distribution circuit can interact at
the wholesale level to complete the scaling of the market. The support described in
Figure 4.3 can be extended as described in Figure 6.1.
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An interface can be formed at the substation transformer so that all downstream
loads and generators are aggregated into one market and represented by a node in the
wholesale energy market. Bids and contracts could flow across this interface, while
power flows across the existing electrical interface. Today’s Wholesale Energy Market
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resolves bids every 15 minutes. The Transactive Energy Market would be expected to do
the same.
The needs of the consumer should also be identified in an automated fashion. This
aggregation technique can be extended downward so that a Home Area Network (HAN)
strives to identify consumer requirements and load sensitivity to price variation. Each
market resolution process correlates to a domain as depicted in Figure 6.2.
Thus, a “smart grid” could be formed which has the ability to provide location
marginal pricing with full granularity, and provide a market mechanism to respond to
issues large and small. Such an exchange would seemingly benefit all stakeholders. Large
generators benefit by moving away from flat tariffs toward a cost-based pricing system.
Small generators would benefit by participating in additional types of markets only
available today to large generators. Consumers would benefit by having a say in which
power is purchased on their behalf, by being able to potentially store and resell power,
and by having local (microgrid) market alternatives to centralized power. Transmission
network operators would benefit by having an additional (aggregate) entity which they
can call upon in time of need.
By having consumers purchase ancillary services as they buy energy, and by
joining federated markets, it could become possible to operate the grid entirely in a
bottom-up instead of a top-down fashion. This could be explored and tested for
scalability and robustness.
6.2.4. Expansion to a 24-Hour Market. The dissertation research took the view
that a single market interval (typically 15 minutes) would be evaluated before it was due.
The approach could be extended to cover a 24-hour planning period of 96 fifteen-minute
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intervals. A fairly simple modification to the code could occur to allow a vector array of
96 intervals to be carried and tracked by each object instead of a single value.
During this 24-hour period, a consumer may elect to defer certain loads to a less
expensive period of time. A “shiftable load” could be defined as “a load that the
consumer can move to occur earlier or later in time.” (Examples of shiftable load include
electric vehicle charging, clothes washing machines, dishwashing machines, and hot
water heating. An assumption can be made that these loads can be programmed to start
automatically under algorithm control.) A “non-shiftable load” could be defined as “a
load that the consumer wants to draw at a time of day that is, from their perspective, nonnegotiable.” In wholesale markets prices rise and fall throughout the day in relation to the
load (and the cost of fuel). The research can be changed to have ant agents shop for
power for consumers over a 24-hour span. In each interval of time, the ant would shop for
the nonshiftable load required during that interval, and if the price is favorable, consider
also purchasing power for the shiftable portion of the load. (The shiftable load would be
defined by time boundaries and any other constraints that it may have.) Resource locking
could also occur among the grid assets using a 96-element vector. Ants would return
home with a 96-element vector representing contracts with generators and network
providers.
By having all of the nests compete concurrently in the free market, they obtain
power fairly, on a first come, first served basis.
The Energy Market is commonly operated to optimize for cost while maintaining
reliability. Other optimizations could be considered. In some parts of the USA “Customer
Choice” programs are in effect which allow consumers to choose retail suppliers. By
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enabling individual consumers to choose individual power providers, it would allow them
to choose preferred fuel types, or other optimizations the customer wishes to pursue. The
use of alternative energy has consequences [124] [125] [126] [127] [128]. Consumers
should be allowed to weigh these consequences as they choose their power sources.
6.2.5. Optimizations. The research presented here demonstrated the viability of
the Transactive Energy, but a number of optimizations should be considered on the path
to commercialization.
6.2.5.1. Performance. The code used to drive the Feeder J research could be
improved to run faster. The largest gains can be made by improving the Engineering
Analysis software runtime.
6.2.5.2. Consumer objectives. It would be possible to modify the algorithm used
in this research so that a consumer could drive their purchase in a given direction (such as
the lowest possible cost). This can be done by overbooking a given commodity and then
cancelling the contracts which are the least favorable (e.g. most expensive). This process
can continue until the market window closes or until it is found impractical.
6.2.5.3. Communication. It is common for communication protocols to be
optimized to operate more efficiently [129]. Quite often context is leveraged to gain
operational efficiencies. Ants communicate in a common environment by laying
pheromones. Ants leverage this context to efficiently arrive at a solution. It may be
possible to develop a new protocol which formally communicates pheromone
information between smart grid applications.
6.2.6. Integration to Real-time Control. The introduction of significant amounts
of distributed generation (DG) will no doubt affect many aspects of the grid. Figure 4.2
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shows an outer planning loop performed by the energy market, and an inner control loop
performed by network operations. The market domain (depicted in Figure 4.1) interacts
with generators and energy distributors differently when a transactive energy market is
utilized. Consumers also interact with wholesale providers of energy. Transactive energy
involves a new level of monitoring and control that needs to accompany the deployment
of a new market paradigm. Real-time monitoring of smart meters needs to occur at the
distribution level, much like the real-time SCADA monitoring that occurs presently at
the transmission level. Furthermore, for a transactive market to coexist with a wholesale
market (as depicted in Figure 6.1,) a transactive power pool entity would have to be
managed and funded much like a wholesale power pool entity. Such a system would
anticipate the ability to monitor and report net energy flow every few seconds, remotely
connect and disconnect customers, and issue commands to distributed generation. The
grid tied DG will need to accept up/down commands and power factor adjustments. A
new caliber of AMI network would need to be developed to support these new
requirements. The current wholesale energy market updates every 15 minutes. A
transactive energy market would need update at a similar rate so that network operations
could act to control the circuit in a similar way.

APPENDIX A
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Ancillary Services: wholesale market services (other than the sale of bulk power) which
are necessary to sustain the grid. These services include spinning reserve (which can be
called upon to supplement the power already being supplied to the grid), and frequency
regulation.

Ant: a software component which serves as an agent on behalf of its client.

Ant Colony Optimizer: a nature-inspired optimization technique that solves problems by
using (virtual) pheromone trails deposited in (a modeled) environment.

Customer Choice: the ability of a utility customer to freely choose the sources of power
and payment plan.

Demand Response (DR): A generic term used to describe an approach to incentivize
consumers to reduce consumption when energy is scarce. Some definitions of DR include
Ancillary Services.

Distributed Energy Resource (DER): small generation or energy storage which is not
located near large generators and often customer owned.

Graph: a mathematical structure which contains Nodes and Edges. A pair of Nodes
exists for each Edge. Graphs may have directional or unidirectional edges.
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Leaf: a node in a tree which has one or more upward edges but no downward edges.

Locational Marginal Pricing: the localized price of wholesale electric energy when
influenced by patterns of load, generation, and the physical limits of the transmission
system.

Microgrid: an electrical distribution system containing loads and distributed energy
resources (such as distributed generators, storage devices or controllable loads) that can
be operated in a controlled, coordinated way either while connected to the main power
network or while islanded. [130]

Near Real time: a term used in various contexts to mean the performance of a task
during a period of time just before the actual moment (that it is required for a planning
system) or just after the actual moment (that something has occurred for a reporting
system) without intentional delay.

Nest: a node which an ant identifies as its home.

Nodal Market: a market operated by an ISO in which energy is traded at a nodal level
(where a node represents a bus or aggregation point).

Path: a chain of nodes connected by edges.
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Pheromone: in the model, a signed value between -1 and +1 associated with graph edges,
which represents the colorless, odorless chemical placed in the environment by ants to
communicate the success of a find.

Proof Of Concept (POC): a small test performed to confirm the viability of an idea.

Real time: to perform a task “live” within a period of time with sufficient speed to serve
as a control

Root: a node in a tree (or directed graph) which has downward running edges and no
upward edges.

Spanning Tree: a subtree which does not include all of the nodes in the original tree.

Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM): a European effort to define the Smart Grid.

Subgraph: a portion of a graph which does not include all of the nodes in the original
graph.

TabuACO: an ACO (described herein) that uses both attractive and repulsive
pheromones to converge on a solution. The attractive pheromone is applied to draw the
ant into productive areas of the model. The repulsive pheromones are applied to
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discourage travel to areas that have been previously explored and found to be
unproductive.

Transactive energy: a system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the
dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using
value as a key operational parameter. [63]

Traversal: the problem of finding a path from one node to another node in a graph.

Tree: a specialized form of a graph that contains only a single edge to link two nodes.

Utility Death Spiral: a theoretical process in which the adoption of DER could allow
consumers to go “off grid” and raise the cost of energy for those who remain on the grid.
This in turn would further incentivize the remaining customers to invest in DER and
leave the grid.

Zonal Market: a market operated by an ISO in which energy is traded at a zonal level
(where zones may span an entire state).
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A copy of the code used to implement the research as well as the data can be
found in the accompanying CD.
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The IEEE 34-Node model needed additional detail so that generators could be
present as well as loads. A drawing of the detailed model is available in Figure 4.26.
Table C.1 below provides additional underlying detail regarding the model used by the
research. The detail added to the model adds poles, service transformers, service
locations, and a few small sources of generation to the model.

Table C.1. Modifications to IEEE 34 Node Types, Locations, and Loads
Derived
ID

X Loc

800
802
8040
8041
8042
806
808
8090
8091
810
812
814
850
816
818
8190
8191
820
8210
8211
822
8230
8231
824
8250
8251
826
8270
8271
828
8290
8291
830
8300
8301
854
8550
8551
856

0
2580
2585
2685
2785
4310
36540
36545
36645
36540
74040
103770
103780
104090
104090
104090
104190
104090
104095
104195
104090
104095
104195
114300
114305
114405
117330
114295
114290
114300
114305
114405
134740
134745
134845
135260
135265
135365
158590

Y Loc
0
0
-5
-15
-15
0
0
-5
-15
-5804
0
0
0
0
1710
1705
1690
49860
49855
49840
63600
63595
63580
0
-5
-20
0
-425
-420
-840
-845
-860
-840
-845
-860
-840
-845
-860
-840

Extended node type
Substation
Pole
transformer
Service
Service
Pole
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
Pole
VoltageRegulator
Pole
Pole
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole

IEEE Defined Load
Ph 1
Ph 2
kW
kVAr kW

30

34

17

135

70

7

3

10

5

kVAr

Ph 3
kW

kVAr

25

14

4

2

25

10

15

16

8

5

2

40

20

10

5

4

2
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Table C.1. Modifications to IEEE 34 Node Types, Locations, and Loads (con’t)
852
832
888
890
8900
8901
8570
8571
858
8630
8631
864
8330
8331
834
842
8430
8431
844
8440
8441
8442
8450
8451
846
8470
8471
848
8480
8481
8482
8590
8591
860
8600
8601
8350
8351
836
8390
8391
8392
840
8400
8401
862
8370
8371
838

135260
135260
135260
145820
145825
145925
135255
135250
135260
135265
135365
135260
135265
135365
141090
141090
141095
141195
141090
141090
141095
141195
141095
141195
141090
141095
141195
141090
141090
141095
141195
143105
143107
143110
143115
143215
145780
145785
145790
145795
145895
145995
146650
146655
146755
145790
145795
145895
145790

35990
36000
36000
36000
35995
35980
41825
41820
41830
41825
41810
43450
43445
43430
41830
42110
42105
42090
43460
43460
43455
43440
43455
43440
47100
47095
47080
47630
47630
47625
47610
41825
41820
41830
41825
41810
41825
41820
41830
41825
41810
41810
41830
41825
41810
41550
41545
41530
36690

VoltageRegulator
Pole
transformer
Pole
transformer
Service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
Cap Bank
transformer
Service
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
Cap Bank
transformer
Service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
Service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
Service
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole
transformer
Service
Pole

150

75

150

75

150

75

4

2

15

8

13

7

2

1

4

2

15

8

13

7

9

5

135

105

135

105

135

105

0

0

25

12

20

11

23

11

20

16

20

16

20

16

16

8

20

10

110

55

20

16

20

16

20

16

30

15

10

6

42

22

18

9
22

11

9

7

9

7

28

14

9

7

Table C.2 below describes the ratings of each node, a randomly assigned
generation capability, along with a randomly assigned asking price for the power.

182
Table C.2. Modified IEEE 34 Node Ratings and DER Offer Prices
DER Generation
Derived
ID

Type

800
802
8040
8041
8042
806
808
8090
8091
810
812
814
850
816
818
8190
8191
820
8210
8211
822
8230
8231
824
8250
8251
826
8270
8271
828
8290
8291
830
8300
8301
854
8550
8551
856
852
832
888
890
8900
8901
8570
8571
858
8630
8631
864
8330
8331
834
842

Substation
Pole
transformer
service
service
Pole
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
Pole
Voltage Regulator
Pole
Pole
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
Voltage Regulator
Pole
transformer
Pole
transformer
service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
Pole

IEEE
Load

33.5
28.7

17.9

38.0
152.1
5.4
44.7
4.5
7.6
49.3
4.5

503.1
36.2
2.2
36.2

KVA
Rating

Ph
A
(kVA)

Ph B
(kVA)

Ph C
(kVA)

Gen Subtotal
price
by
in
service
cents /
(kVA)
kWh

2500.0
2500.0
112.5
48.0
48.0
2500.0
2500.0
25.0
24.0
2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
50.0
48.0
2500.0
225.0
192.0
2500.0
10.0
9.0
2500.0
50.0
48.0
2500.0
10.0
9.0
2500.0
10.0
9.0
2500.0
112.5
96.0
2500.0
10.0
9.0
2500.0
2500.0
2500.0
500.0
2500.0
750.0
720.0
45.0
45.0
2500.0
10.0
9.0
2500.0
45.0
43.0
2500.0
2500.0

833.3

833.3

833.3

2500.0

0.0
0.0

3.8
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
3.8
0.0

0.0

1.9

0.0

0.0
1.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

38.4

0.0

0.0

0.0
38.4

0.0

0.4

0.0

0.0
0.4

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.0
1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0

0.5

0.0

0.0
0.5

0.0
24.0

24.0

24.0

1.8

1.8

1.8

0.0
72.0
0.0
5.4

1.1

0.0

0.0

0.0
1.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

12.4
0.0
0.0
86.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
74.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
111.6
0.0
0.0
111.6
0.0
0.0
111.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
74.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
24.8
0.0
62.0
0.0
0.0
74.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
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Table C.2. Modified IEEE 34 Node Ratings and DER Offer Prices (con’t)
8430
8431
844
8440
8441
8442
8450
8451
846
8470
8471
848
8480
8481
8482
8590
8591
860
8600
8601
8350
8351
836
8390
8391
8392
840
8400
8401
862
8370
8371
838

transformer
service
Pole
Cap Bank
transformer
service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
Cap Bank
transformer
service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole
transformer
service
Pole

25.0
24.0
2500.0
100.0
750.0
720.0
112.5
96.0
2500.0
37.5
36.0
2500.0
150.0
112.5
96.0
225.0
216.0
2500.0
112.5
96.0
112.5
96.0
2500.0
112.5
48.0
48.0
2500.0
45.0
43.0
2500.0
50.0
48.0
2500.0

10.3

513.1
50.6
25.5

76.8
163.2
76.8
92.6
20.1
24.6
34.2
31.3

0.0
3.4

0.0
74.4
0.0

0.0

0.0
129.6
0.0
0.0

5.8

0.0

0.0
5.8

0.0
111.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
74.4
0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

14.4

14.4

14.4

0.6

0.6

0.6

4.5

4.5

4.5

0.0
1.9
0.0
13.4

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.5

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.5

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.0
0.9

0.0

2.9

0.0

0.0
2.9

3.4

0.0

0.0

43.2

43.2

43.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
43.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
37.2
0.0
0.0
99.2
0.0
37.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
24.8
0.0
0.0
24.8
0.0
0.0
24.8
0.0

There are two transformers identified in the IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model. The
ratings for these transformers are described in Table C.3 below.

Table C.3. IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model Transformer Ratings
Transformer

Rating
(kVA)

High Side
kV
Configuration

Low Side
kV
Configuration

Substation
XFM-1

2500
500

69
24.9

24.9
4.16

Delta
Wye

Wye
Wye

184
Each node is connected by a conductor. Conductors (network edges) are defined
in Table C.4. Each line has two endpoints. The network has an upstream/downstream
sense to it. The upstream direction is always towards the primary source of power (in this
case the substation bus.)
Table C.4. Modified IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model Line Sections

ID

Upstream
Node

Downstream
Node

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

800
802
802
806
808
808
808
812
814
816
816
816
818
818
820
820
824
824
824
824
828
828
830
830
832
832
832
834
834
834
836
836
836
840
842
844
844
844
844
844
846
846
848
848
850
852

802
806
8040
808
810
812
8090
814
850
818
824
8230
820
8190
822
8210
826
828
8250
8270
830
8290
854
8300
858
888
8570
842
860
8590
840
862
8390
8400
844
846
8430
8440
8441
8450
848
8470
8480
8481
816
832

Distance

IEEE
Conductor
Type

kVA Rating

2580.0
1730.0
7.1
32230.0
5804.0
37500.0
7.1
29730.0
10.0
1710.0
10210.0
63595.0
48150.0
5.0
13740.0
7.1
3030.0
840.0
7.1
425.0
20440.0
7.1
520.0
7.1
5830.0
0.0
5825.0
280.0
2020.0
5840.0
860.0
280.0
7.1
7.1
1350.0
3640.0
1355.0
0.0
7.1
7.1
530.0
7.1
0.0
7.1
310.0
10.0

300
300
301
300
303
300
303
300
301
302
301
302
302
302
302
302
303
301
303
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301

7470
7470
5602.5
7470
1369.5
7470
1369.5
7470
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
1369.5
1369.5
1369.5
1369.5
1369.5
1369.5
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
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Table C.4. Modified IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model Line Sections (con’t)
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

854
854
854
858
858
858
860
860
860
862
862
864
888
890
8040
8040
8090
8190
8210
8230
8250
8270
8290
8300
8330
8350
8370
8390
8390
8400
8430
8441
8450
8470
8481
8550
8570
8590
8600
8630
8900

852
856
8550
834
864
8330
836
8350
8600
838
8370
8630
890
8900
8041
8042
8091
8191
8211
8231
8251
8271
8291
8301
8331
8351
8371
8391
8392
8401
8431
8442
8451
8471
8482
8551
8571
8591
8601
8631
8901

36830.0
23330.0
7.1
5830.0
1620.0
1615.0
2680.0
2670.0
7860.0
4860.0
7.1
1630.0
10560.0
12066.4
100.5
200.2
100.5
101.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
7.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
7.1
101.1
101.1
200.6
101.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
101.1
7.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

301
303
301
301
302
301
301
301
301
304
301
302
300
301
301
301
303
302
302
301
303
301
302
301
301
303
303
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
303
301
301
301
302
301

5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
1867.5
5602.5
1369.5
1248
936
5602.5
5602.5
1369.5
1369.5
1369.5
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
1369.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
1369.5
5602.5
5602.5
5602.5
1369.5
936

The kVA rating of a given line segment is determined by multiplying the
distribution voltage of the given line segment (24.9 kV or 4.16 kV) times the ampacity of
an aluminum conductor of the size specified in the IEEE configuration table. Each
conductor has a “type” defined by Table C.5.
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Table C.5. IEEE 34 Node Model Conductor Types and Gauges
Type

Conductor
Gauge

Ampacity

300
301
302
303
304

0/1
#2
#4
#4
#2

100
75
55
55
75
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